If you believe the DA, and you also believe you're being simulated (with some probability), then you should believe to be among the last N% humans in the simulation. So you don't escape the DA entirely.
However, it may be that if you believe yourself to be likely in a simulation, you shouldn't believe the DA at all. The DA assumes you know how many humans lived before you, and that you're not special among them. Both may be false in a simulation of human history: it may not have simulated all the humans and pre-humans who ever lived, and/or you may be in a ...
If I were doing it, I'd save computing power by only simulating the people who would program the AI. I don't think I'm going to do that, so it doesn't apply to me. Eliezer doesn't accept the Doomsday Argument, or at least uses a decision theory that makes it irrelevant, so it wouldn't apply to him.
So - I am still having issues parsing this, and I am persisting because I want to understand the argument, at least. I may or may not agree, but understanding it seems a reasonable goal.
The builders know, of course, that this is much riskier than it seems, because its success would render their own observations extremely rare.
The success of the self-modifying AI would make the builders of that AI's observations extremely rare... why? Because the AI's observations count, and it is presumably many orders of magnitude faster?
For a moment, I will assume I...
See LW wiki's Doomsday Argument for reference.
The problem I have with this kind of reasoning is that it causes early reasoners to come to wrong conclusions (though 'on average' the reasoning is most probably true).
Nope. I don't think ignoring causality to such extent makes sense. Simulating many instances of humanity won't make other risks magically go away, because it basically has no effect on them.
Yet another example of how one can misuse rationality and start to believe bogus statements.
Seems backwards. If you are a society that has actually designed and implemented an AI and infrastructure capable of "creating billions of simulated humanities" - it seems de-facto you are the "real" set, as you can see the simulated ones, and a recursive nesting of such things should, in theory have artifacts of some sort (ie. a "fork bomb" in the unix parlance).
I rather think that pragmatically, if a simulated society developed an AI capable of simulating society in sufficient fidelity, it would self-limit - either the simul...
So - I am still having issues parsing this, and I am persisting because I want to understand the argument, at least. I may or may not agree, but understanding it seems a reasonable goal.
The builders know, of course, that this is much riskier than it seems, because its success would render their own observations extremely rare.
The success of the self-modifying AI would make the builders of that AI's observations extremely rare... why? Because the AI's observations count, and it is presumably many orders of magnitude faster?
For a moment, I will assume I have interpreted that correctly. So? How is this risky, and how would creating billions of simulated humanities change that risk?
I think the argument is that - somehow - the overwhelming number of simulated humanities somehow makes it likely that the original builders are actually a simulation of the original builders running under an AI? How would this make any difference? How would this be expected to "percolate up" thru the stack? Presumably somewhere there is the "original" top level group of researchers still, no? How are they not at risk?
How is it that a builder's observations are ok, the AI's are bad, but the simulated humans running in the AI are suddenly good?
I think, after reading what I have, that this is the same fallacy I talked about in the other thread - the idea that if you find yourself in a rare spot, it must mean something special, and that you can work the probability of that rareness backwards to a conclusion. But I am by no means sure, or even mostly confident, that I am interpreting the proposal correctly.
Anyone want to take a crack at enlightening me?
A self-modifying AI is built to serve humanity. The builders know, of course, that this is much riskier than it seems, because its success would render their own observations extremely rare. To solve the problem, they direct the AI to create billions of simulated humanities in the hope that this will serve as a Schelling point to them, and make their own universe almost certainly simulated.
Plausible?