Certainly I do not "lack free will" if that means I am in jail, or never uncertain of my future decisions, or in a brain-state where my emotions and morals fail to determine my actions in the usual way.

which seems to me to contradict the one before, as it expands the definition to include every possible human mind-state.

I don't know what E's sentence is doing there, to the point that I suspect it's been garbled by an editing error. But I don't see why "having free will" should not include pretty much all mind states, short of being asleep or abnormalities such as drug addiction. The phenomenon he is pointing to, whatever its name, is something that human minds do.

I'm very unclear on your question, and where you think the contradiction lies. Being addicted to a drug that you will reliably seek despite considering it wrong would reduce your "free will," as it would take you closer to being "never uncertain of my future decisions, or in a brain-state where my emotions and morals fail to determine my actions in the usual way."

(I would personally not have included the "uncertain" part before encountering Eliezer's work, but of course other writers do treat it as important.)