You're missing VincentYu's point, which is also a point I have made to you earlier: the utility function in the conclusion of the VNM theorem is not the same as a utility function that you came up with a completely different way, like by declaring linearity with respect to number of lives.

If you assign some subjective "value" to different outcomes, and to different things, then maximizing expected u̶t̶i̶l̶i̶t̶y̶ value, will maximize it, as the number of decisions approaches infinity. For every bet I lose at certain odds, I will gain more from others some predictable percent of the time. On average it cancels out.

This might not be the standard way of explaining expected utility, but it's very simple and intuitive, and shows exactly where the problem is. It's certainly sufficient for the explanation in my post.

This is an absurd strawman that has absolutely nothing to do with the motivation for EU maximization.