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Yosarian2 comments on Simulations Map: what is the most probable type of the simulation in which we live? - Less Wrong

5 Post author: turchin 11 October 2015 05:10AM

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Comment author: Yosarian2 13 October 2015 10:25:09PM 0 points [-]

But also finding holes in SA does not prove that we are not in the simulation. If we don't know how to calculate probabilities we have to use vague prior, in which simulation and reality is equally possible.

Oh, I don't think you can prove we're not in a simulation; almost by definition it can't really be disproven.

I'm not 100% convinced that it's actually possible in our universe to simulate an entire other universe just as complicated as ours (you start running into problem with the minimum energy and space requirements in order to hold that much information, for example), but even if not that isn't a proof that we're not in a simulation, since it's possible that beings in a more complicated universe then ours are simulating us.

Comment author: turchin 14 October 2015 04:42:23AM *  0 points [-]

I think that the most abundant class of simulations are ones that are much simpler than reality it tries to simulate. Such simulations simulate only surfaces of things, which I see but not all atoms in the the universe.

Also if we speak about ordinary space-time in visible universe, the measure problem is not strong. It only starts to weight in if we add uncountable amount of my copies in casually non-connected part of Multiverse.

But even the fact we account for reality of such copies, no matter in what proportion, result in big world immortality - the analog of quantum immortality in inflationary large universe. It happens because such accounting means that I sample my self from many my copies in different parts of inflationary universe, and no matter how I could die some of such copies should survive.

Basically it means that at least one of two conjectures are true: a) I am in simulation b) I am immortal because of big world immortality (and even argument about diminishing measure is not working as measure is growing exponentially in inflational multiverse). See also post of yvain about big world immortality: http://lesswrong.com/lw/bg0/cryonics_without_freezers_resurrection/

But measure problem may be applied to simulation problem in another way. That is me and my copy in a computer may have different measure of existence even if we exist simultaneously in one world.

Comment author: Yosarian2 18 October 2015 01:54:22AM 1 point [-]

If you're going by that logic, though, then even the odds that you are a simulation are utterly dwarfed by the odds that, say, you are just a random event in the quantum foam at the end of the universe that for a fraction of a second comes together with your exact brain and all your memories and experiences, and then is gone. Simulations in any given finite universe would still be finite, but end of the universe quantum fluctuation would happen an infinite number of times, no matter how low the odds are, given an infinite post-heat death time frame.

As I've been saying, following that same form of logic inevitably leads to a lot of bizarre conclusions, many much weirder then the simulation hypothesis.