Paul_Gowder comments on Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality - Less Wrong

64 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 31 January 2008 07:36PM

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Comment author: Paul_Gowder 01 February 2008 03:52:44AM 7 points [-]

I don't know the literature around Newcomb's problem very well, so excuse me if this is stupid. BUT: why not just reason as follows:

1. If the superintelligence can predict your action, one of the following two things must be the case:

a) the state of affairs whether you pick the box or not is already absolutely determined (i.e. we live in a fatalistic universe, at least with respect to your box-picking)

b) your box picking is not determined, but it has backwards causal force, i.e. something is moving backwards through time.

If a), then practical reason is meaningless anyway: you'll do what you'll do, so stop stressing about it.

If b), then you should be a one-boxer for perfectly ordinary rational reasons, namely that it brings it about that you get a million bucks with probability 1.

So there's no problem!