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David_Solomon comments on Timeless Identity - Less Wrong

23 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 03 June 2008 08:16AM

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Comment author: David_Solomon 03 June 2008 10:41:21PM 0 points [-]

Sebastian:

Take this as a further question. One of the key distinctions between the 'you you' and the 'identical twin you' is the types of sacrifice I'll make for each one. Notwithstanding that I can't tell you why I'm still the same person when I wake up tomorrow, I'll sacrifice for my future self in ways that I won't for an atom-exact identical twin.

If you truly believe that 'the same atoms means its 'you' in every sense', suppose I'm going to scan you and create an identical copy of you on mars. Would you immediately transfer half your life savings to a bank account only accessible from mars? What if I did this a hundred times? If the same atoms make it the same person, why wouldn't you?

And if you don't really have the same regard for a 'copy' of yourself while you're still alive, why should this change when the original brain stays cryogenically frozen and a copy is created?