How would your approach handle techniques to obfuscate latents and thus frustrate SAEs e.g. https://arxiv.org/html/2412.09565v1 ?
Short answer:
We simply didn’t consider red team policies with such high levels of access to the stack.
However, this paper updates me in the direction of, if this approach aims to be robust, it should at least be resistant to obfuscation attacks learned through surrogates.
Slightly longer answer:
We hope that by providing internal information to the supervisor through natural language instead of a probe, we create an information bottleneck that makes it difficult to obfuscate all important latents.
(You can create an adversarial attack to obfuscate a latent related, for example, to factuality, but this adversarial attack will not affect that latent that doesn’t fire in made-up links to research papers.)
Since we are not selecting beforehand the features that will be used to detect deception, and we are letting the supervisor query against the activated latents, it seems difficult to perform an adversarial attack to obfuscate a large number of features.
Based on a 2-day hackathon brainstorm. Current status: 70% of the tooling is done, unsure of how to proceed. Not enough experience with multi-month sized projects to judge for feasibility.
I'm looking for some feedback. Specifically I want feedback regarding my current implementation. The statement "SAEs could be useful for AI Control" is obvious enough.
Working hypothesis
Setup:
Gemma 2b must check whether or not the reasoning is deceptive.
*I've already check and the 2 models are capable of doing this.*
GOAL: If we provide internal information to the supervisor (important SAE latents in the supervised model) does the deception detection rate increases?
Current status of the project:
TODO
[ ] Label a subset of the features
[ ] Measure baseline performance of the supervisor
[ ] Provide the supervisor with *mind reading information*
Roadblocks: