This seems perfectly appropriate for an open thread post, where a little discussion could be had, but not really the level of discussion ofa discussion-level post... Ah, I see the title can be misleading. None-the-less, that is where this belongs.
To me this is acceptable as a discussion level post, but it doesn't feel terribly important one way or another. However, many commenters such as yourself do seem to care about what goes where, and I'm curious why. Is it because you're using an rss reader and it's distracting to have non-substantive posts show up?
Okay. I.. think my preference is a cached preference from seeing other people do it. On the other hand, my brain offers a signal-to-noise ratio response, that most discussion level posts should meet a certain standard (I am not aware of what the standard is).
I imagine that top level posts are well-worked through, with new ideas most people are very interested in here and can have a large and fruitful discussions about. Then discussion posts are like the former except can be less worked out and/or more specialised, like all the formal logic ones we're getting. Then open threads have actual discussion topics. I like this idea.
This topic isn't new and there isn't much new offered in the post. On the other hand, I would advise the author to read Tegmark's 'Our Mathematical Universe' to find an excellent discussion of what the MWI implies for immortality and number of yous.
No RSS, just preferences about where non-substantive posts show up.
but not really the level of discussion ofa discussion-level post
I've already started thinking about what my life might be like if-and-when multiple copies of myself start running around, to the point of working out a preliminary system for names and property/debts division, at least in part thanks to ideas from the LW community. How much more important could it be to at least have an idea of how the even longer-term future might play out? :)
And, if life can continue within these thermodynamic miracle bubbles, how likely is it that we are already in one of them?
Depending on which version of the Anthropic Principle you subscribe to, the answer would seem to be either 'nearly certain' or 'nearly impossible', with little room in the middle.
In Everett's many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, you can't die. Kinda.
How to reconcile the many-worlds interpretation, which hinges on the linearity of the equations of quantum mechanics, with general relativity, is left as an exercise for the reader.
(Stylistic note: You used the MWI acronym without expanding it, and while you mention "Everett branches" in the post, there is little context for someone not familiar with the subject. You may want to consider providing some more context.)
I've been thinking about ideas along these lines a bit recently. I think, if this kind of thing is possible (i.e. branches of low probability never go to zero, and are always realizable), it would be important to make sure that all of your probability mass is crisply divided with some going to universes where all consciousness is quickly extinguished and some to universes that continue with whatever properties you want, with little to none leftover for other possibilities.
In other words, quantum suicide is a bad idea for the individual (you leave around mourning loved ones), but perfectly fine and acceptable to exploit on the civilization level.
In other words, quantum suicide is a bad idea for the individual (you leave around mourning loved ones), but perfectly fine and acceptable to exploit on the civilization level.
No, it is not. Quantum probabilities enter expected utility calculations. If civilization is destroyed with high quantum probability, expected utility plummets.
Quantum probabilities enter expected utility calculations
Well of course they do, but the question is whether it should be on a relative or absolute basis. That is, do you care about the probability along all futures, or just the relative probabilities among ones where there will be conscious observers? My suggestion above is from the relative position, while it sounds like your preference is to calculate utilities according to the absolute position.
I do not think it is a settled question which is the objectively right way to do it. I lean towards relative currently, but even stating that doesn't narrow down exactly how to calculate expected value (is there weighting by number of observers? kind of observers?). I think we are all still confused on all of this, as evidenced by all the discussion here on the topic of anthropic probabilities, magical reality fluid, L-zombies, etc.
I'm sure you've read it, but to give everyone else context, here's the paper on civilization-level quantum suicide.
Also very relevant to this discussion is the paper "Many-Worlds Interpretations Can Not Imply ‘Quantum Immortality’" [pdf]
Edit: Original link wasn't working, so I uploaded a copy.
I haven't read it, thanks! Unfortunately, that link doesn't seem to go to the intended destination.
I'm posting from a phone and already wrestling with the keyboard; I can spiff things up a bit when I get home.
The universe is running down - there are only so many sources of negentropy that can be used for the work of life and intelligence. But thermodynamics is a statistical process, an average of a great many small processes. The standard model of MWI makes a certain hash of statistics - in a vanishingly small number of Everett branches, those statistical averages go right out the window: all the air in a room flies to one side, or an egg unscrambles itself.
In those universes in which life continues to survive after all the stars burn out, and all other known sources of useful energy have been turned into waste heat... might it be possible for said life to continue to survive in at least some timelines, by feeding on thermodynamic miracles?
And, at least as important, which forms of thermodynamic miracles are the most common, and which are most potentially useful? (After all, in any given volume of space ,a few electrons appearing out of relative nothingness is much more likely than an entire Boltzmann Brain appearing, and depending on how stable the matter-energy substrate that life at the time is using to maintain itself between miracles, said substrate might decay before some kinds of miracles ever occur...)
Edit: Question posed in recent 'Open Thread' at http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/jww/open_thread_1824_march_2014/api5