So this about my gender politics: Unlike the case with, say, race, I don't think that an optimal outcome consists of gender distinctions being obliterated.
This seems a bit silly to me.
What does it mean to say that "race distinctions are obliterated"?
Someone looks at my outward appearance and then makes some inferences about what sort of person I must be.
What does it mean to say that "gender distinctions are obliterated"?
Someone looks at my outward appearance and then makes some inferences about what sort of person I must be.
What's the difference between the two?
Most people believe gender differences in psychology are both genetic and non-genetic, whereas most people believe race differences in psychology are only non-genetic.
From a social standpoint, why does it matter if the distinctions are genetic or not? Self-awareness of myself with respect to gender is not conceptually different from self awareness of myself with respect to culture. Since they are isomorphic, they should both be "obliterated" or both be accepted...why the double standard? I'd argue that either you condone the use of both heuristics, or neither...
I think the problem stems from OP being a gender essentialist, but not a racial essentialist.
For my own part...I think it's possible to use gender and race as heuristics without implicitly retreating into essentialism.
I think that men should become more aware of themselves as men, so that being female isn't any more special or unusual or abnormal or worthy-of-remark than being male.
I like this on one level - it's good in that it encourages men not to view themselves as "default". I don't see why it's restricted to men though -I think it can be applied to any privileged group.
On another level, you don't really need to use heuristics to conceptualize yourself...you already know a lot about yourself, and comparing your own actions to gender/race heuristics won't really further that knowledge.
Today's post, My Way was originally published on 17 April 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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