The premises of Pascal's wager are normally presented as abstract facts about the universe - there happens to (maybe) be a god, who happens to have set up the afterlife for the suffering of unbelievers.
But, assuming we ever manage to distinguish trade from extortion, this seems a situation of classical extortion. So if god follows a timeless decision theory - and what other kind of decision theory would it follow? - the correct answer would seem to be to reject the whole deal out of hand, even if you assume god exists.
Or, in other words, respond to a god that offers you heaven, but ignore one that threatens you with hell.
How is that coming? The previous thread went nowhere. I am of the opinion (lightly and willing to change) that the distinction is in the intent of the causal agent and in our VERY sketchy understanding of moral actions with and without trade possibilities. If something is permitted but not required to do (or not to do), then being paid to do (or refrain) from it is also permitted.
Also, it's extremely unclear how you go from "this is acausal extortion" to "reject the deal". You wouldn't say "two-box if there are negative values involved, one-box if it's positive", would you? If the basilisk were real and you couldn't prevent it, I think sane behavior (under any decision theory that supports this style of question) would be to cooperate.
Still nowhere :-(