In a recent edition of The Diff ($), Byrne Hobart pointed out a talk given by Robin Hanson at Manifest. The talk is well worth listening to. For example, Robin says:
I've always thought [Prediction Markets] was the best idea I've had in my life [...] My biggest contribution
The general thrust of the talk is...
Our world is full of big organizations that just make a lot of bad decisions because they find it hard to aggregate information [...], so prediction markets are a proven method for doing exactly that
... but that it's work to apply prediction markets.
Paraphrasing an entire section: You need to prove a technology works to get it accepted. It's insufficient to supply the technology. Robin gives the analogy of the motor - a motor on its own has no value. A motor hooked up to a pump in a coal mine… that's another story. In his analogy, the prediction market is the motor, and someone needs to find the "pump in the coal mine" to hook it up to.
What are the [...] high initial value things? The thing that most often comes to my mind is new hires.
Here is where I start to disagree with Robin.
The first question is:
- Are decisions made during hiring poor?
My intuition here is "actually fairly good." Firms typically spend a decent amount on hiring processes - they run screening tests, conduct interviews, look at CVs, and ask for references. It's fair to say that companies have a reasonable amount of data collected when they make hiring decisions, and generally, the people involved are incentivized to hire well.
The second question is:
- Would a prediction market work well?
If I look at the tests I mentioned, this prediction market is unappealing. We'd expect no cross-subsidies, mis-weighted demand, and noise traders (other than most participants won't be very good). There's little reason for the information to be dispersed - the company currently asks and gets the data.
There are further issues - the individual traders are unlikely to make lots of trades, so the mechanism by which better traders have more capital and make the market more efficient is absent.
I'm a big fan of Robin, but I don't give much weight to his diagnosis of problematic group decision mechanisms. Prediction markets are truly an impressive idea, and there may be cases where it really does aggregate and weight opinions more accurately (in the cases where that is the primary goal) than existing mechanisms.
For employment decisions, it's not clear that there is usable (legally and socially tolerated) information which a market can provide. Even worse for employment-continuation decisions (a market of coworkers voting on who they compete/cooperate with next cycle) than for initial-employment decisions, but both are game-able in ways that aren't going to be very good PR for the company.
I don't disagree with the first part, but the "because" clause is somewhere between over-simple and just plain wrong. The dysfunction in large organizations (corporations and governments as primary examples) is analogous to dysfunction in individual humans, which is ALSO rampant, and seems to be more about misalignment of components than about single-powerful-executive information and decision-making.