This post is a followup to "We are not living in a simulation" and intended to help me (and you) better understand the claims of those who took a computationalist position in that thread. The questions below are aimed at you if you think the following statement both a) makes sense, and b) is true:
"Consciousness is really just computation"
I've made it no secret that I think this statement is hogwash, but I've done my best to make these questions as non-leading as possible: you should be able to answer them without having to dismantle them first. Of course, I could be wrong, and "the question is confused" is always a valid answer. So is "I don't know".
- As it is used in the sentence "consciousness is really just computation", is computation:
a) Something that an abstract machine does, as in "No oracle Turing machine can compute a decision to its own halting problem"?
b) Something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2"?
c) Or, is this distinction nonsensical or irrelevant? - If you answered "a" or "c" to question 1: is there any particular model, or particular class of models, of computation, such as Turing machines, register machines, lambda calculus, etc., that needs to be used in order to explain what makes us conscious? Or, is any Turing-equivalent model equally valid?
- If you answered "b" or "c" to question 1: unpack what "the machine computed 2+2" means. What is that saying about the physical state of the machine before, during, and after the computation?
- Are you able to make any sense of the concept of "computing red"? If so, what does this mean?
- As far as consciousness goes, what matters in a computation: functions, or algorithms? That is, does any computation that give the same outputs for the same inputs feel the same from the inside (this is the "functions" answer), or do the intermediate steps matter (this is the "algorithms" answer)?
- Would an axiomatization (as opposed to a complete exposition of the implications of these axioms) of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness include definitions of any computational devices, such as "and gate"?
- Would an axiomatization of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness mention qualia?
- Are all computations in some sense conscious, or only certain kinds?
ETA: By the way, I probably won't engage right away with individual commenters on this thread except to answer requests for clarification. In a few days I'll write another post analyzing the points that are brought up.
I feel that dfranke's questions make all kinds of implicit assumptions about the reader's worldview which makes them difficult for most computationalists to answer. I've prepared a different list - I'm not really interested in answers, just an opinion as to whether they're reasonable questions to ask people or whether they only make sense to me.
But you can answer them if you like.
For probability estimates, I'm talking about subjective probability. If you believe it doesn't make sense to give a probability, try answering as a yes/no question and then guess the probability that your reasoning is flawed.
1: Which of these concepts are at least somewhat meaningful?
a) consciousness
b) qualia
2: Do you believe that an agent is conscious if and only if it experiences qualia?
3: Are qualia epiphenomenal?
4: If yes:
a) Would you agree that there is no causal connection between the things we say about qualia and the actual qualia we experience?
b) Are there two kinds of qualia: the ones we talk about and the ones we actually experience?
5: Is it possible to build a computer simulation of a human to any required degree of accuracy?
a) If you did, what is the probability that simulation would be conscious/experience qualia?
b) Would this probability depend on how the simulation is constructed or implemented?
6: What is the probability that we are living in a simulation?
a) If you prefer to talk about how much "measure of our existence" comes from simulations, give that instead
7: What is the probability that a Theory of Everything would explain consciousness?
8: Would you agree that it makes sense to describe a universe as "real" if and only if it contains conscious observers?
9: Suppose the universe that we see can be described completely by a particular initial state and evolution rule. Suppose also for the sake of simplicity that we're not in a simulation.
a) What is the probability that our universe is the only "real" one?
b) What is the probability that all such describable universes are "real"?
c) If they are all "real", are they all equally real or does each get a different "measure"? How is that measure determined?
d) Are simulated universes "real"? How much measure do they inherit from their parent universe?
10: Are fictional universes "real"? Do they contain conscious observers? (Or give a probability)
a) If you answered "no" here but answered "yes" for simulated universes, explain what makes the simulation special and the fiction not.
11: Is this entire survey nonsense?
I'll try and clarify the questions which came out as nonsense merely due to being phrased badly (rather than philosophical disagreement).
5: I basically meant, "can you simulate a human brain on a computer?". The "any degree of accuracy" thing was just to try and prevent arguments of the kind "well you haven't modelled every single atom in every single neuron", while accepting that a crude chatbot isn't good enough.
7: By "Theory of everything" I mean a set of axioms that will in principle predict the result of any phy... (read more)