1. The distinction doesn't make sense to me. But then neither does the statement "Consciousness is really just computation." The only charitable reading I can give that statement is "Consciousness is really just <insert moderately complicated system description here> and, as you will notice, the only really powerful or mysterious component of that system is computation". But even with that clarification, I really don't understand what you are getting at with the a vs b distinction. I get the impression that you attach a lot more importance to the (abstract vs concrete) distinction than I do.

2. It is probably responsive here to state that there is one aspect of consciousness that the Turing machine model of computation completely fails to capture. This is the fact that consciousness is inherently (essentially) embedded in time. One thinks conscious thoughts concurrently with ongoing processing of sense data. Google for the CompSci research papers of Peter Wegner and Dina Goldin to see how the Turing machine model of computation is inadequate for many purposes. Including, IMHO, a central role in the explanation of consciousness.

3. I'm not sure what you are getting at here, but yes, I do think that some of the more physical aspects of computation - such as that it takes time and produces entropy - may be relevant regarding its use in modeling consciousness.

4. I am unable to make sense of the concept of "experiencing red"! I am not just a 'qualia' agnostic. I favor the torture and burning of anyone who even mentions 'qualia'. Particularly color qualia.

5. Ah. Extensional functions vs intensional algorithms. You are flirting with the right ideas here, but not quite nailing the essential issues. As mentioned above in #2, the key question is how the computation is embedded in time rather than whether the individual steps of the computation are achieved intensionally or extensionally.

6. Interesting question. Just how fundamental is computation? I suppose you realize that a ToE might have a variety of axiomatizations, and that some of them might include AND gates as primitives, while others do not.

7. No. And take care lest ye be taken before the Inquisitor.

8. No computations are conscious. But all consciousnesses embed computations. And some computations (but no special kinds of computations) are embedded in consciousnesses, or, more generally, embedded in minds.

Now some questions for you. Somewhat rhetorical, so you only need respond to the overall implicit argument.

1. What is it like to be a bat?
2. What is it like to be a pocket calculator?
3. What would it be like to be an embedded controller for this thing? More like being a bat than being a pocket calculator?
4. Is your answer based more on extensional (how does it appear to behave?) or intensional (how is it implemented internally?) thinking?
5. Why is this appropriate?
6. Is your evidence regarding the nature of your own consciousness extensional or intensional?
7. Are you sure of that?