It seems like his best points are tangential to the supposed subject of argument.

He strangely seems to take embryonic personhood for granted while in the same paragraph noting that the relevant metric is consciousness. His assertion that general intelligence requires emotional instability or large amounts of sleep seems unsupported in principle. Also, his suggestion that all programs will become intelligent once any AI exists is absurd. The idea of reorienting an AI's sense of self is an interesting one, though.

He seems to have a very primitive concept of uploading - if we can upload a brain, we can simulate a body for it. If uploaded humans want to be able to compete with AI, they could participate in specialized training environments to rewire their senses toward the pure digital instead of analog-to-digital. Rewiring senses is something we already know how to do and in a digital upload, there are no biological limits on neuroplasticity. For those who would rather remain in a human-esque form, set up digital reservations, problem solved.