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faul_sname comments on Open Thread, January 15-31, 2012 - Less Wrong Discussion

9 Post author: OpenThreadGuy 16 January 2012 12:56AM

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Comment author: faul_sname 17 January 2012 02:06:06AM 1 point [-]

This is intuitive to me as well, but I suspect that it is also wrong. What is the difference between sending information from the future of a simulated universe to the present of this universe and sending information back in the 'same' universe if the simulation is identical to the 'real' universe?

Comment author: Alejandro1 18 January 2012 05:35:43AM 3 points [-]

Newcomb's problem doesn't lose much of its edge if you allow Omega not to be a perfect predictor (say, it is right 95% of the time). This is surely possible without a detailed simulation that might be confused with backwards causation.

Comment author: TimS 17 January 2012 02:56:15AM 2 points [-]

Aside from the fact that the state of the art in science suggests that one (prediction) is possible and the other (time travel) is impossible?

But I think the more important issue is that assigning time-travel powers to Omega makes the problem much less interesting. It is essentially fighting the hypothetical, because the thought experiment is intended to shed some light on the concept of "pre-commitment." Pre-commitment is not particularly interesting if Omega can time-travel. In short, changing the topic of conversation, but not admitting you are changing the topic, is perceived as rude.