If we assume some large probability that we end up deciding not to have an endgame at all (i.e., not to try to actually build FAI with unenhanced humans), then it's no longer clear "the time hasn't come yet".
This is something we'll know better further down the road, so as long as it's possible to defer this decision (i.e. while the downside is not too great, however that should be estimated), it's the right thing to do. I still can't rule out that there might be a preference definition procedure (that refers to humans) simple enough to be implemented pre-WBE, and decision theory seems to be an attack on this possibility (clarifying why this is naive, for example, in which case it'll also serve as an argument to the powerful in the WBE race).
The "current state of the theory" seems to have little to do with it. (Edit: No that's too strong. Let me amend it to "one consideration among many".)
Well, maybe not specifically current, but what can be expected eventually, for the closed project to benefit from, which does seem to me like a major consideration in the possibility of its success.
Suppose you buy the argument that humanity faces both the risk of AI-caused extinction and the opportunity to shape an AI-built utopia. What should we do about that? As Wei Dai asks, "In what direction should we nudge the future, to maximize the chances and impact of a positive intelligence explosion?"
This post serves as a table of contents and an introduction for an ongoing strategic analysis of AI risk and opportunity.
Contents:
Why discuss AI safety strategy?
The main reason to discuss AI safety strategy is, of course, to draw on a wide spectrum of human expertise and processing power to clarify our understanding of the factors at play and the expected value of particular interventions we could invest in: raising awareness of safety concerns, forming a Friendly AI team, differential technological development, investigating AGI confinement methods, and others.
Discussing AI safety strategy is also a challenging exercise in applied rationality. The relevant issues are complex and uncertain, but we need to take advantage of the fact that rationality is faster than science: we can't "try" a bunch of intelligence explosions and see which one works best. We'll have to predict in advance how the future will develop and what we can do about it.
Core readings
Before engaging with this series, I recommend you read at least the following articles:
Example questions
Which strategic questions would we like to answer? Muehlhauser (2011) elaborates on the following questions:
Salamon & Muehlhauser (2013) list several other questions gathered from the participants of a workshop following Singularity Summit 2011, including:
These are the kinds of questions we will be tackling in this series of posts for Less Wrong Discussion, in order to improve our predictions about which direction we can nudge the future to maximize the chances of a positive intelligence explosion.