EDIT: disregard this comment, I mistook general semantics for, well, semantics. I'm no expert on semantics but I did take a couple of undergrad courses on philosophy of language and so forth. My impression was that EY has already taken all the good bits, unless you particularly feel like reading arguments about whether a proposition involving "the current king of France" can have a truth value or not. (actually, EY already covered that one when he did rubes and bleggs). In a nutshell, the early philosophers of language were extremely concerned about where language gets its meaning from. So they spent a lot of time talking about what we're doing when we refer to people or things, eg. "the current king of France" and "Sherlock Holmes" both lack real-world referents. And then there's the case where I think your name is John and refer to you as such, but your name is really Peter, so have I really succeeded in referring to you? And at some point Tarski came up with "snow is white" is a true proposition if and only if snow is white. And that led into the beginning of modern day formal/compositional semantics, where you have a set of things that are snow, and a set of things that are white, and snow is white if and only if the set of things that are snow overlaps completely with the set of things that are white.