I disbelieve the orthonality thesis, but I'm not sure that my poisition is covered by either of your two cases. My position is best described as a statement by Yudkowsky:
"for every X except x0, it is mysteriously impossible to build any computational system which generates a range of actions, predicts the consequences of those actions relative to some ontology and world-model, and then selects among probable consequences using criterion X"
I certainly don't think AIs become friendly automatically. I agree they have to have the correct goal system X (xo) built-in from the start. My guess is that the AIs without the correct X built-in are not true general intelligences. That is to say, I think they would simply stop functioning correctly (or equivalently, there is an intelligence ceiling past which they cannot go).
Why do you think this, and on a related note why do you think AI's without X will stop functioning/hit a ceiling (in the sense of what is the causal mechanism)?
Stuart has worked on further developing the orthogonality thesis, which gave rise to a paper, a non-final version of which you can see here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/cej/general_purpose_intelligence_arguing_the/
This post won't make sense if you haven't been through that.
Today we spent some time going over it and he accepted my suggestion of a minor amendment. Which best fits here.
Besides all the other awkward things that a moral convergentist would have to argue for, namely: