This assumes what the entire thread is about- that probability is a legitimate means for discussing reality. This presumes a lot or axioms of probability, such as that if you see X it is more likely real than an illusion, and induction as valid.
The appeal to absence of many true beliefs is irrelevant, as you have no means to determine truth beyond skepticism.
I do not think anything I wrote above depends on using probability to discuss reality.
The appeal to absence of many true beliefs is irrelevant, as you have no means to determine truth beyond skepticism.
Please elaborate. I believe it is not only relevant, but decisive.
I've raised arguments for philosophical scepticism before, which have mostly been argued against in a Popper-esque manner of arguing that even if we don't know anything with certainty, we can have legitimate knowledge on probabilities.
The problem with this, however, is how you answer a sceptic about the notion of probability having a correlation with reality. Probability depends upon axioms of probability- how are said axioms to be justified? It can't be by definition, or it has no correlation to reality.