I think I'm getting you now - you're a radical advocate of ask/tell culture, right? I'm not - in my world you don't tell other people to remove part of their posts. But anyway, let's leave this and go to the content of your post, which is interesting.
Yes, Kripkenstein is controversial, which I referred to when writing that it's not clear it's the right interpretation.
Yes, I do think there are strong relativist strands in Wittgenstein. Again, it is hard to know what Wittgenstein actually meant, since he's so unclear, but a famous Wittgensteinian such as Peter Winch certainly drew relativistic conclusions from Wittgenstein's writings, something I delve upon here.):
Winch argues that cultures cannot be judged from the outside, by independent standards. Thus, the Zande’s belief in witches, while unjustified in our culture, is justified in their culture, and since there is no culture-transcending standard, we have no right to tell them what to believe. Gellner takes this to be a reductio ad absurdum of Wittgenstein’s position: since the Zande are obviously mistaken, any philosophy that says they are not must be false. And, since Gellner thinks that Winch has interpreted Wittgenstein correctly, this makes not only Winch’s but also Wittgenstein’s philosophy false.
(Actually, it strikes me now that Gellner's strategies wrt the two Wittgenstein interpretations are quite similar. In both cases he congratulates Winch/Kripke for having elucidated Wittgenstein's muddled ideas, by and large accepts their interpretation, and then argues that given this interpretation, Wittgenstein is obviously wrong.)
Regarding Wittgenstein and "mainstream philosophy". While Wittgenstein still is a star in some circles, most analytic philosophers reject his views today, rightly or wrongly. The linguistic approach to philosophy due to Wittgenstein and the Oxfordian ordinary language school died out in the 60's, and was replaced by a different kind of philosophy, which didn't think that philosophical problems were pseudo-problems that arose because we failed to understand how our language works. Instead they went back to the pre-Wittgensteinian view that they were real problems that should be attacked head on, rather than getting dissolved by the analysis of language.
This points to something more general, namely that analytic philosophy is far from monolithic. It includes Wittgensteinians, Quinean naturalists and "neo-scholastics" (in James Ladyman and Don Ross's apt phrase) and no doubt a score of other branches (it depends on how you individuate branches, obviously). I take it that most of LW's criticism of analytic philosophy is actually direct against "neo-scholasticism", which is accused of not being adequately informed by the sciences, of working with outdated methods, of being generally concerned with ephemeral problems, etc. In my view there is much to this criticism, but similar criticisms have been launched by naturalistic or postivistic philosophers within the analytic camp.
The huge differences between the different branches of analytic philosophy makes the term "analytic philosophy" a bit misleading, in fact.
I should have explicated more clearly what I meant by "some sort of Wittgensteinian logic" in the OP, though - point taken.
Ever since Tversky and Kahneman started to gather evidence purporting to show that humans suffer from a large number of cognitive biases, other psychologists and philosophers have criticized these findings. For instance, philosopher L. J. Cohen argued in the 80's that there was something conceptually incoherent with the notion that most adults are irrational (with respect to a certain problem). By some sort of Wittgensteinian logic, he thought that the majority's way of reasoning is by definition right. (Not a high point in the history of analytic philosophy, in my view.) See chapter 8 of this book (where Gigerenzer, below, is also discussed).
Another attempt to resurrect human rationality is due to Gerd Gigerenzer and other psychologists. They have a) shown that if you tweak some of the heuristics and biases (i.e. the research program led by Tversky and Kahneman) experiments but a little - for instance by expressing probabilities in terms of frequencies - people make much fewer mistakes and b) argued, on the back of this, that the heuristics we use are in many situations good (and fast and frugal) rules of thumb (which explains why they are evolutionary adaptive). Regarding this, I don't think that Tversky and Kahneman ever doubted that the heuristics we use are quite useful in many situations. Their point was rather that there are lots of naturally occuring set-ups which fool our fast and frugal heuristics. Gigerenzer's findings are not completely uninteresting - it seems to me he does nuance the thesis of massive irrationality a bit - but his claims to the effect that these heuristics are rational in a strong sense are wildly overblown in my opnion. The Gigerenzer vs. Tversky/Kahneman debates are well discussed in this article (although I think they're too kind to Gigerenzer).
A strong argument against attempts to save human rationality is the argument from individual differences, championed by Keith Stanovich. He argues that the fact that some intelligent subjects consistently avoid to fall prey to the Wason Selection task, the conjunction fallacy, and other fallacies, indicates that there is something misguided with the notion that the answer that psychologists traditionally has seen as normatively correct is in fact misguided.
Hence I side with Tversky and Kahneman in this debate. Let me just mention one interesting and possible succesful method for disputing some supposed biases. This method is to argue that people have other kinds of evidence than the standard interpretation assumes, and that given this new interpretation of the evidence, the supposed bias in question is in fact not a bias. For instance, it has been suggested that the "false consensus effect" can be re-interpreted in this way:
(The quote is from an excellent Less Wrong article on this topic due to Kaj Sotala. See also this post by him, this by Andy McKenzie, this by Stuart Armstrong and this by lukeprog on this topic. I'm sure there are more that I've missed.)
It strikes me that the notion that people are "massively flawed" is something of an intellectual cornerstone of the Less Wrong community (e.g. note the names "Less Wrong" and "Overcoming Bias"). In the light of this it would be interesting to hear what people have to say about the rationality wars. Do you all agree that people are massively flawed?
Let me make two final notes to keep in mind when discussing these issues. Firstly, even though the heuristics and biases program is sometimes seen as pessimistic, one could turn the tables around: if they're right, we should be able to improve massively (even though Kahneman himself seems to think that that's hard to do in practice). I take it that CFAR and lots of LessWrongers who attempt to "refine their rationality" assume that this is the case. On the other hand, if Gigerenzer or Cohen are right, and we already are very rational, then it would seem that it is hard to do much better. So in a sense the latter are more pessimistic (and conservative) than the former.
Secondly, note that parts of the rationality wars seem to be merely verbal and revolve around how "rationality" is to be defined (tabooing this word is very often a good idea). The real question is not if the fast and frugal heuristics are in some sense rational, but whether there are other mental algorithms which are more reliable and effective, and whether it is plausible to assume that we could learn to use them on a large scale instead.