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Eitan_Zohar comments on A resolution to the Doomsday Argument. - Less Wrong Discussion

-2 Post author: Eitan_Zohar 24 May 2015 05:58PM

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Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 25 May 2015 10:47:52AM *  1 point [-]

"Species can't evolve, that violates thermodynamics! We have too much evidence for thermodynamics to just toss it out the window."

Just realized how closely your argument mirrors this.

Comment author: estimator 25 May 2015 11:00:20AM *  1 point [-]

Er.. what? Evolution doesn't violate thermodynamics.

Bad analogies don't count as solid arguments, either. The difference between evolution/thermodynamics example and your case is that the relation between thermodynamics and evolution is complicated, and in fact there is no contradiction. While it's evident that your idea works only if you can acausally influence something. That's much closer to perpetual motion engine (direct contradiction), than to evolution (non-direct, questionable contradiction which turns out to be false).

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 25 May 2015 11:23:53AM *  1 point [-]

Look, I explained the details in the OP. Create a lot of Earths and hope that yours turns out to be one of them. That already violates causality, according to your standards. I don't see much of a way to make it clearer.

Comment author: bortels 01 June 2015 09:34:53PM 0 points [-]

Ah - that's much clearer than your OP.

FWIW - I suspect it violates causality under nearly everyone's standards.

You asked if your proposal was plausible. Unless you can postulate some means to handle that causality issue, I would have to say the answer is "no".

So - you are suggesting that if the AI generates enough simulations of the "prime" reality with enough fidelity, then the chances that a given observer is in a sim approach 1, because of the sheer quantity of them. Correct?

If so - the flaw lies in orders of infinity. For every way you can simulate a world, you can incorrectly simulate it an infinite number of other ways. So - if you are in a sim, it is likely with a chance approaching unity that you are NOT in a simulation of the higher level reality simulating you. And if it's not the same, you have no causality violation, because the first sim is not actually the same as reality; it just seems to be from the POV an an inhabitant.

The whole thing seems a bit silly anyway - not your argument, but the sim argument - from a physics POV. Unless we are actually in a SIM right now, and our understanding of physics is fundamentally broken, doing the suggested would take more time and energy than has ever or will ever exist, and is still mathematically impossible (another orders of infinity thing).

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 02 June 2015 01:42:11AM *  0 points [-]

FWIW - I suspect it violates causality under nearly everyone's standards.

Oh god damn it, Lesswrong is responsible for every single premise of my argument. I'm just the first to make it!

As for the rest of your post: I have to admit I did not consider this, but I still don't see why they wouldn't just create a less complex physical universe for the simulation.

Or maybe I'm misunderstanding you. My brain is feeling more than usually fried at the moment.