No. If you forecast that the price of gold will go up, and the price instead goes down, then being honest about your forecast loses you money. Prediction markets reward people for making accurate predictions. Whether those predictions were an accurate reflection of beliefs is irrelevant.
Pretty much everything in life "reward[s] people for making accurate predictions". That's not the issue.
The problem is that to "supply accurate information" you need to know what is "accurate" ex ante and you don't. At the time you submit your bet to a prediction market you're operating on the basis of expectations -- you have no access to the Truth about the outcome, you only have access to your own beliefs. Accordingly, you don't tell the prediction market what is the correct choice, you tell it what you believe is the correct choice. Prediction markets aggregate beliefs, not truth values.
Nick Szabo writes about the dangers of taking assumptions that are valid in small, self-contained games and applying them to larger, real-world "games," a practice he calls a small-game fallacy.
This last point, which he expands on later in the post, will be of particular interest to some readers of LW. The idea is that while a prediction market does incentivize feeding accurate information into the system, the existence of the market also gives rise to parallel external incentives. As Szabo glibly puts it,
Futarchy, it seems, will have some kinks to work out.