RichardKennaway comments on Open thread, Aug. 10 - Aug. 16, 2015 - Less Wrong Discussion
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Because that way leads to
wireheading
indifference to dying (which wipes out your preferences)
indifference to killing (because the deceased no longer has preferences for you to care about)
readiness to take murder pills
and so on. Greg Egan has a story about that last one: "Axiomatic".
Whereupon I wield my Cudgel of Modus Tollens and conclude that one can and must have preferences about one's preferences.
So much for the destructive critique. What can be built in its place? What are the positive reasons to protect one's preferences? How do you deal with the fact that they are going to change anyway, that everything you do, even if it isn't wireheading, changes who you are? Think of yourself at half your present age — then think of yourself at twice your present age (and for those above the typical LessWrong age, imagined still hale and hearty).
Which changes should be shunned, and which embraced?
An answer is visible in both the accumulated wisdom of the ages[1] and in more recently bottled wine. The latter is concerned with creating FAI, but the ideas largely apply also to the creation of one's future selves. The primary task of your life is to create the person you want to become, while simultaneously developing your idea of what you want to become.
[1] Which is not to say I think that Lewis' treatment is definitive. For example, there is hardly a word there relating to intelligence, rationality, curiosity, "internal" honesty (rather than honesty in dealing with others), vigour, or indeed any of Eliezer's "12 virtues", and I think a substantial number of the ancient list of Roman virtues don't get much of a place either. Lewis has sought the Christian virtues, found them, and looked no further.
I already have preferences about my preferences, so I wouldn’t self-modify to kill puppies, given the choice. I don’t know about wireheading (which I don’t have a negative emotional reaction toward), but I would resist changes for the others, unless I was modified to no longer care about happiness, which is the meta-preference that causes me to resist. The issue is that I don’t have an “ultimate” preference that any specific preference remain unchanged. I don’t think I should, since that would suggest the preference wasn’t open to reflection, but it means that the only way I can justify resisting a change to my preferences is by appealing to another preference.
I know about CEV, but I don’t understand how it answers the question. How could I convince my future self that my preferences are better than theirs? I think that’s what I’m doing if I try to prevent my preferences from changing. I only resist because of meta-preferences about what type of preferences I should have, but the problem recurses onto the meta-preferences.
Do you need one?
If you keep asking "why" or "what if?" or "but suppose!", then eventually you will run out of answers, and it doesn't take very many steps. Inductive nihilism — thinking that if you have no answer at the end of the chain then you have no answer to the previous step, and so on back to the start — is a common response, but to me it's just another mole to whack with Modus Tollens, a clear sign that one's thinking has gone wrong somewhere. I don't have to be able to spot the flaw to be sure there is one.
Your future self is not a person as disconnected from yourself as the people you pass in the street. You are creating all your future yous minute by minute. Your whole life is a single, physically continuous object:
Robert Heinlein, "Life-line"
Do you want your future self to be fit and healthy? Well then, take care of your body now. Do you wish his soul to be as healthy? Then have a care for that also.