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Clarity comments on Open Thread, January 4-10, 2016 - Less Wrong Discussion

5 Post author: polymathwannabe 04 January 2016 01:06PM

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Comment author: Clarity 07 January 2016 05:48:56AM *  0 points [-]

choosing an interpretation of QM on grounds of explanatory parsimony.

  • contested the strength of the MW claim. Explanatory parsimony doesn't differentiate a strong from a weak claim

OP's original claim:

Why does E. Yudkowsky voice such strong priors e.g. wrt. the laws of physics (many worlds interpretation), when much weaker priors seem sufficient for most of his beliefs (e.g. weak computationalism/computational monism) and wouldn't make him so vulnerable? (With vulnerable I mean that his work often gets ripped apart as cultish pseudoscience.)

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