Climate change is extremely convenient for the left to promote leftist policies
In so far as this is true, it is also true that climate change denial[1] is extremely convenient for the right. (And vice versa.)
[1] I intend this here to mean simply "denying" rather than "denying in the face of what ought to be overwhelming evidence"; there doesn't seem to be a neutral way of putting it.
This is a general phenomenon: if there are rival positions X and Y on a factual matter, which if true would support rival positions P and Q on a matter of policy, then you may suspect partisans of P of bias when they assert X, but you may equally suspect partisans of Q of bias when they assert Y. So if you are not yourself very partisan, what difference should this make to your opinions about X versus Y? It should make you treat someone's opinion about X/Y as less informative in so far as they have a partisan position on P/Q that would explain it. (But bear in mind that the causation may go X/Y -> P/Q rather than the other way around, so the appropriate discounting is less than you might naively think.)
So, in this case, you might reasonably be very suspicious about American politicians' statements about climate change, because in the US the issue is very politicized. So, where else should you look?
[2] E.g., a wealthy entity -- a government, an industry consortium, etc. -- might provide funding for climate research in ways that happen to favour employment of scientists whose views match the wealthy entity's. Those scientists may individually be perfectly unbiased, following the evidence wherever it leads, but the process that selects them may be biased.
Climate change is extremely convenient for the left to promote leftist policies
In so far as this is true, it is also true that climate change denial[1] is extremely convenient for the right. (And vice versa.)
According to this argument, you should never think that any position of someone who disagrees with you is based on motivated reasoning. Because if the reasoning is convenient for opinion X, the opposite is always convenient for ~X. For instance, "evolution is a conspiracy of scientists" is convenient for creationists, but "evolut...
Here is a new paper of mine (12 pages) on suspicious agreement between belief and values. The idea is that if your empirical beliefs systematically support your values, then that is evidence that you arrived at those beliefs through a biased belief-forming process. This is especially so if those beliefs concern propositions which aren’t probabilistically correlated with each other, I argue.
I have previously written several LW posts on these kinds of arguments (here and here; see also mine and ClearerThinking’s political bias test) but here the analysis is more thorough. See also Thrasymachus' recent post on the same theme.