Why is politics one dimensional? Many people say that this is the result of the two party system, forcing people into coalitions.
I believe it's the other way round. People were dividing others to "us" and "them" long before political parties were invented.
I'd say that "us" and "them" is hardcoded in people. We also have a bias to imagine that all our enemies are in some sense the same (so there is only one "them", instead of "them1", "them2", "them3"...) Most people are probably bad at imagining that more then two options are possible.
Also, there are often binary decisions to make: Someone proposes a new change of law in the parliament, do you vote "yes" or do you vote "no"?
If parties are coalitions, you might expect different coalitions in different countries. Correlations between factual beliefs might switch between countries. But I do not think this happens.
Sure it does. For example, in Slovakia, the only political party that supports legalization of marijuana and gay marriage is classified as right-wing (their political opponents love to say "extreme right-wing"), because they also happen to support free market. If I understand it correctly, in USA marijuana and gay marriage are generally considered left-wing issues.
We also have a bias to imagine that all our enemies are in some sense the same (so there is only one "them", instead of "them1", "them2", "them3"...) Most people are probably bad at imagining that more then two options are possible.
Is that a falsifiable statement and do you have support for it?
By introspection this is false for me, but then I'm not "most people". However by the same token I would be wary of sweeping generalisations about "most people".
If someone told me "all my (political) enemies are the same, no significant difference between them", I would probably consider that person pretty stupid.
Here is a new paper of mine (12 pages) on suspicious agreement between belief and values. The idea is that if your empirical beliefs systematically support your values, then that is evidence that you arrived at those beliefs through a biased belief-forming process. This is especially so if those beliefs concern propositions which aren’t probabilistically correlated with each other, I argue.
I have previously written several LW posts on these kinds of arguments (here and here; see also mine and ClearerThinking’s political bias test) but here the analysis is more thorough. See also Thrasymachus' recent post on the same theme.