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Arielgenesis comments on Open thread, Jul. 25 - Jul. 31, 2016 - Less Wrong Discussion

3 Post author: MrMind 25 July 2016 07:07AM

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Comment author: stoat 28 July 2016 06:55:41PM 1 point [-]

Eliezer ruminates on foundations and wrestles with the difficulties quite a bit in the Metaethics sequence, for example:

Comment author: Arielgenesis 29 September 2016 04:19:51AM 0 points [-]

Thank you. This reply actually answer the first part of my question.

The 'working' presuppositions include: * Induction * Occam's razor

I will quote most important part from Fundamental Doubts

So, in the end, I think we must allow the use of brains to think about thinking; and the use of evolved brains to think about evolution; and the use of inductive brains to think about induction; and the use of brains with an Occam prior to think about whether the universe appears to be simple; for these things we really cannot unwind entirely, even when we have reason to distrust them. Strange loops through the meta level, I think, are not the same as circular logic.

And this have a lot of similarities with my previous conclusion (with significant differences about circular logic and meta loops)

a non-contradicting collection of self-referential statement that covers the epistemology and axiology