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Dagon comments on [Error]: Statistical Death in Damascus - Less Wrong Discussion

3 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 20 March 2017 07:17PM

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Comment author: Dagon 20 March 2017 09:15:49PM *  0 points [-]

Had to search to find the rest of the problem (like what happens if he predicted you to be in Aleppo and you're there - you die). This was helpful, and I came across a 2008 paper which argues that CDT works here.

I'm still not sure how this is any different from Newcomb's problem: if Death predicts you perfectly, your best plan is to just accept it and leave your heirs the maximum amount (one-box). And CDT works just fine if you phrase it as "what is the probability that Death/Omega has correctly predicted your action" (but it does somewhat bend the "causal" part. I prefer the C stand for Classical, though).

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 21 March 2017 02:48:27PM 0 points [-]

I think they use Death in Damascus rather than Newcomb because decision theorists agree more on what the correct behaviour is on the first problem.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 21 March 2017 02:47:44PM 0 points [-]

My original post here is in error; see http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/orn/making_equilibrium_cdt_into_fdt_in_one_easy_step/ for a more correct version.