This is a linkpost for https://casparoesterheld.com/2017/06/27/a-survey-of-polls-on-newcombs-problem/
My own response varies based on presentation of the problem, as does most people I've informally discussed it with. What conclusions would anyone be able to draw from a blend of such polls? The right answer is clearly "one-box unless you think you can fool Omega", and most formulations of the question can be taken as "do you think you can fool Omega?".
Now that I think about it, I've only seen it discussed here in the context of acausal decision theory, showing that in the perfect-information case, one-boxing is simply correct. What do we learn from any polls that don't specify the mechanism that closely?
What should I learn from polls showing that 40% of some demographic think they can fool omega, 60% of some other demographic think they can, and 4% of most polls vote for lizard man?
Yeah, I also think the "fooling Omega idea" is a common response. Note however that two-boxing is more common among academic decision theorists, all of which understand that Newcomb's problem is set up such that you can't fool Omega. I also doubt that the fooling Omega idea is the only (or even the main) cause of two-boxing among non-decision theorists.