Lukas_Gloor comments on Arguments Against Speciesism - LessWrong

28 Post author: Lukas_Gloor 28 July 2013 06:24PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (474)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 28 July 2013 08:46:13PM *  3 points [-]

I've read the first part of the post ("What is Speciesism?"), and have a question.

Does your argument have any answer to applying modus tollens to the argument from marginal cases?

In other words, if I say: "Actually, I think it's ok to kill/torture human newborns/infants; I don't consider them to be morally relevant[1]" (likewise severely mentally disabled adults, likewise (some? most?) other marginal cases) — do you still expect your argument to sway me in any way? Or no?

[1] Note that I can still be in favor of laws that prohibit infanticide, for game-theoretic reasons. (For instance, because birth makes a good bright line, as does the species divide. The details of effective policy and optimal criminal justice laws are an interesting conversation to have but not of any great relevance to the moral debate.)

Edit: Having now read the rest of your post, I see that you... sort-of address this point. But to be honest, I don't think you take the opposing position very seriously; I get the sense that you've constructed arguments that you think someone on the opposite side would make, if they held exactly your views in everything except, inexplicably, this one area, and these arguments you then knock down. In short, while I am very much in favor of having this discussion and think that this post is a good idea... I don't think your argument passes the ideological Turing test. I would have preferred for you to, at least, directly address the challenges in this post.

Comment author: Lukas_Gloor 28 July 2013 08:59:19PM *  4 points [-]

No, this is indeed a common feature of coherentist reasoning, you can make it go both ways. I cannot logically show that you are making a mistake here. I may however appeal to shared intuitions or bring further arguments that could encourage you to reflect on your views.

And note that I was silent on the topic of killing, the point I made later in the article was only focused on caring about suffering. And there I think I can make a strong case that suffering is bad independently of where it happens.

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 28 July 2013 09:00:41PM 0 points [-]

And here I think I can make a strong case that suffering is bad independently of where it happens.

I would very much like to see that case made!

Comment author: Lukas_Gloor 28 July 2013 09:17:12PM 3 points [-]

It's in the article. If you're not impressed by it then I'm indeed out of arguments.

Furthermore, while D and E seem plausible candidates for reasons against killing a being with these properties (E is in fact Peter Singer's view on the matter), none of the criteria from A to E seem relevant to suffering, to whether a being can be harmed or benefitted. The case for these being bottom-up morally relevant criteria for the relevance of suffering (or happiness) is very weak, to say the least.

Maybe that's the speciesist's central confusion, that the rationality/sapience of a being is somehow relevant for whether its suffering matters morally. Clearly, for us ourselves, this does not seem to be the case. If I was told that some evil scientist would first operate on my brain to (temporarily) lower my IQ and cognitive abilities, and then torture me afterwards, it is not like I will be less afraid of the torture or care less about averting it!

There's also a hyperlink in the first paragraph referring to section 6 of the linked paper.

Comment author: SaidAchmiz 28 July 2013 09:26:55PM 0 points [-]

Ok. Yeah, I don't find any of those to be strong arguments. Again, I would like to urge you to consider and address the points brought up in this post.