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Narrative, self-image, and self-communication

32 Academian 19 December 2012 09:42AM

Related to: Cached selves, Why you're stuck in a narrative, The curse of identity

Outline: Some back-story, Pondering the mechanics of self-image, The role of narrative, Narrative as a medium for self-communication.

tl;dr: One can have a self-image that causes one to neglect the effects of self-image. And, since we tend to process our self-images somewhat in the context of a narrative identity, if you currently make zero use of narrative in understanding and affecting how you think about yourself, it may be worth adjusting upward. All this seems to have been the case for me, and is probably part of what makes HPMOR valuable.

Some back-story

Starting when I was around 16 and becoming acutely annoyed with essentialism, I prided myself on not being dependent on a story-like image of myself. In fact, to make sure I wasn't, I put a break command in my narrative loop: I drafted a story in my mind about a hero who was able to outwit his foes by being less constrained by narrative than they were, and I identified with him whenever I felt a need-for-narrative coming on. Batman's narrator goes for something like this in the Dark Knight when he <select for spoiler-> abandons his heroic image to take the blame for Harvey Dent's death.

I think this break command was mostly a good thing. It helped me to resolve cognitive dissonance and overcome the limitations of various cached selves, and I ended up mostly focussed on whether my beliefs were accurate and my desires were being fulfilled. So I still figure it's a decent first-order correction to being over-constrained by narrative.

But, I no longer think it's the only decent solution. In fact, understanding the more subtle mechanics of self-image — what affects our self schemas, what they affect, and how — was something I neglected for a long time because I saw self-image as a solved problem. Yes, I developed a cached view of myself as unaffected by self-image constraints. I would have been embarassed to notice such dependencies, so I didn't. The irony, eh?

I'm writing this because I wouldn't be surprised to find others here developing, or having developed, this blind spot...

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How to enjoy being wrong

20 lincolnquirk 27 July 2011 05:48AM

Related to: Reasoning Isn't About Logic, It's About Arguing; It is OK to Publicly Make a Mistake and Change Your Mind.

Examples of being wrong

A year ago, in arguments or in thought, I would often:

  • avoid criticizing my own thought processes or decisions when discussing why my startup failed
  • overstate my expertise on a topic (how to design a program written in assembly language), then have to quickly justify a position and defend it based on limited knowledge and cached thoughts, rather than admitting "I don't know"
  • defend a position (whether doing an MBA is worthwhile) based on the "common wisdom" of a group I identify with, without any actual knowledge, or having thought through it at all
  • defend a position (whether a piece of artwork was good or bad) because of a desire for internal consistency (I argued it was good once, so felt I had to justify that position)
  • defend a political or philosophical position (libertarianism) which seemed attractive, based on cached thoughts or cached selves rather than actual reasoning
  • defend a position ("cashiers like it when I fish for coins to make a round amount of change"), hear a very convincing argument for its opposite ("it takes up their time, other customers are waiting, and they're better at making change than you"), but continue arguing for the original position. In this scenario, I actually updated -- thereafter, I didn't fish for coins in my wallet anymore -- but still didn't admit it in the original argument.
  • defend a policy ("I should avoid albacore tuna") even when the basis for that policy (mercury risk) has been countered by factual evidence (in this case, the amount of mercury per can is so small that you would need 10 cans per week to start reading on the scale).
  • provide evidence for a proposition ("I am getting better at poker") where I actually thought it was just luck, but wanted to believe the proposition
  • when someone asked "why did you [do a weird action]?", I would regularly attempt to justify the action in terms of reasons that "made logical sense", rather than admitting that I didn't know why I made a choice, or examining myself to find out why.

Now, I very rarely get into these sorts of situations. If I do, I state out loud: "Oh, I'm rationalizing," or perhaps "You're right," abort that line of thinking, and retreat to analyzing reasons why I emitted such a wrong statement.

We rationalize because we don't like admitting we're wrong. (Is this obvious? Do I need to cite it?) One possible evo-psych explanation: rationalization is an adaptation which improved fitness by making it easier for tribal humans to convince others to their point of view.

Over the last year, I've self-modified to mostly not mind being wrong, and in some cases even enjoy being wrong. I still often start to rationalize, and in some cases get partway through the thought, before noticing the opportunity to correct the error. But when I notice that opportunity, I take it, and get a flood of positive feedback and self-satisfaction as I update my models.

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I

51 PhilGoetz 08 January 2011 05:51PM

I wrote this story at Michigan State during Clarion 1997, and it was published in the Sept/Oct 1998 issue of Odyssey.  It has many faults and anachronisms that still bother me.  I'd like to say that this is because my understanding of artificial intelligence and the singularity has progressed so much since then; but it has not.  Many anachronisms and implausibilities are compromises between wanting to be accurate, and wanting to communicate.

At least I can claim the distinction of having published the story with the shortest title in the English language - measured horizontally.

I

I was the last person, and this is how he died.

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Iterated Sleeping Beauty and Copied Minds

2 lucidfox 21 December 2010 07:21AM

Before I move on to a summation post listing the various raised thought experiments and paradoxes related to mind copying, I would like to cast attention to a particular moment regarding the notion of "subjective probability".

In my earlier discussion post on the subjective experience of a forked person, I compared the scenario where one copy is awakened in the future to the Sleeping Beauty thought experiment. And really, it describes any such process, because there will inevitably be a time gap, however short, between the time of fork and the copy's subjective awakening: no copy mechanism can be instant.

In the traditional Sleeping Beauty scenario, there are two parties: Beauty and the Experimenter. The Experimenter has access to a sleep-inducing drug that also resets Beauty's memory to the state at t=0. Suppose Beauty is put to sleep at t=0, and then a fair coin is tossed. If the coin comes heads, Beauty is woken up at t=1, permanently. If the coin comes tails, Beauty is woken up at t=1, questioned, memory-wiped, and then woken up again at t=2, this time permanently.

In this experiment, intuitively, Beauty's subjective anticipation of the coin coming tails, without access to any information other than the conditions of the experiment, should be 2/3. I won't be arguing here whether this particular answer is right or wrong: the discussion has been raised many times before, and on Less Wrong as well. I'd like to point out one property of the experiment that differentiates it from other probability-related tasks: erasure of information, which renders the whole experiment a non-experiment.

In Bayesian theory, the (prior) probability of an outcome is the measure of our anticipation of it to the best of our knowledge. Bayesians think of experiments as a way to get new information, and update their probabilities based on the information gained. However, in the Sleeping Beauty experiment, Beauty gains no new information from waking up at any time, in any outcome. She has the exact same mind-state at any point of awakening that she had at t=0, and is for all intents and purposes the exact same person at any such point. As such, we can ask Beauty, "If we perform the experiment, what is your anticipation of waking up in the branch where the coin landed tails?", and she can give the same answer without actually performing the experiment.

So how does it map to the mind-copying problem? In a very straightforward way.

Let's modify the experiment this way: at t=0, Beauty's state is backed up. Let's suppose that she is then allowed to live her normal life, but the time-slices are large enough that she dies within the course of a single round. (Say, she has a normal human lifespan and the time between successive iterations is 200 years.) However, at t=1, a copy of Beauty is created in the state at which the original was at t=0, a coin is tossed, and if and only if it comes tails, another copy is created at t=2.

If Beauty knows the condition of this experiment, no matter what answer she would give in the classic formulation of the problem, I don't expect it to change here. The two formulations are, as far as I can see, equivalent.

However, in both cases, from the Experimenter's point of view, the branching points are independent events, which allows us to construct scenarios that question the straightforward interpretation of "subjective probability". And for this, I refer to the last experiment in my earlier post.

Imagine you have an indestructible machine that restores one copy of you from backup every 200 years. In this scenario, it seems you should anticipate waking up with equal probability between now and the end of time. But it's inconsistent with the formulation of probability for discrete outcomes: we end up with a diverging series, and as the length of the experiment approaches infinity (ignoring real-world cosmology for the moment), the subjective probability of every individual outcome (finding yourself at t=1, finding yourself at t=2, etc.) approaches 0. The equivalent classic formulation is a setup where the Experimenter is programmed to wake Beauty after every time-slice and unconditionally put her back to sleep.

This is not the only possible "diverging Sleeping Beauty" problem. Suppose that at t=1, Beauty is put back to sleep with probability 1/2 (like in the classic experiment), at t=2 she is put back to sleep with probability 1/3, then 1/4, and so on. In this case, while it seems almost certain that she will eventually wake up permanently (in the same sense that it is "almost certain" that a fair random number generator will eventually output any given value), the expected value is still infinite.

In the case of a converging series of probabilities of remaining asleep - for example, if it's decided by a coin toss at each iteration whether Beauty is put back to sleep, in which case the series is 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + ... = 1 -- Beauty can give a subjective expected value, or the average time at which she expects to be woken up permanently.

In a general case, let Ei be the event "the experiment continues at stage i" (that is, Beauty is not permanently awakened at stage i, or in the alternate formulation, more copies are created beyond that point). Then if we extrapolate the notion of "subjective probability" that leads us to the answer 2/3 in the classic formulation, then the definition is meaningful if and only if the series of objective probabilitiesi=1..∞ P(Ei) converges -- it doesn't have to converge to 1, we'll just need to renormalize the calculations otherwise. Which, given that the randomizing events are independent, simply doesn't have to happen.

Even if we reformulate the experiment in terms of decision theory, it's not clear how it will help us. If the bet is "win 1 utilon if you get your iteration number right", the probability of winning it in a divergent case is 0 at any given iteration. And yet, if all cases are perfectly symmetric information-wise so that you make the same decision over and over again, you'll eventually get the answer right, with exactly one of you winning the bet, even no matter what your "decision function" is - even if it's simply something like "return 42;". Even a stopped clock is right sometimes, in this case once.

It would be tempting, seeing this, to discard the notion of "subjective anticipation" altogether as ill-defined. But that seems to me like tossing out the Born probabilities just because we go from Copenhagen to MWI. If I'm forked, I expect to continue my experience as either the original or the copy with a probability of 1/2 -- whatever that means. If I'm asked to participate in the classic Sleeping Beauty experiment, and to observe the once-flipped coin at every point I wake up, I will expect to see tails with a probability of 2/3 -- again, whatever that means.

The situations described here have a very specific set of conditions. We're dealing with complete information erasure, which prevents any kind of Bayesian update and in fact makes the situation completely symmetric from the decision agent's perspective. We're also dealing with an anticipation all the way into infinity, which cannot occur in practice due to the finite lifespan of the universe. And yet, I'm not sure what to do with the apparent need to update my anticipations for times arbitrarily far into the future, for an arbitrarily large number of copies, for outcomes with an arbitrarily high degree of causal removal from my current state, which may fail to occur, before the sequence of events that can lead to them is even put into motion.

Some Thoughts Are Too Dangerous For Brains to Think

15 WrongBot 13 July 2010 04:44AM
[EDIT - While I still support the general premise argued for in this post, the examples provided were fairly terrible. I won't delete this post because the comments contain some interesting and valuable discussions, but please bear in mind that this is not even close to the most convincing argument for my point.]
A great deal of the theory involved in improving computer and network security involves the definition and creation of "trusted systems", pieces of hardware or software that can be relied upon because the input they receive is entirely under the control of the user. (In some cases, this may instead be the system administrator, manufacturer, programmer, or any other single entity with an interest in the system.) The only way to protect a system from being compromised by untrusted input is to ensure that no possible input can cause harm, which requires either a robust filtering system or strict limits on what kinds of input are accepted: a blacklist or a whitelist, roughly.
One of the downsides of having a brain designed by a blind idiot is that said idiot hasn’t done a terribly good job with limiting input or anything resembling “robust filtering”. Hence that whole bias thing. A consequence of this is that your brain is not a trusted system, which itself has consequences that go much, much deeper than a bunch of misapplied heuristics. (And those are bad enough on their own!)
In discussions of the AI-Box Experiment I’ve seen, there has been plenty of outrage, dismay, and incredulity directed towards the underlying claim: that a sufficiently intelligent being can hack a human via a text-only channel. But whether or not this is the case (and it seems to be likely), the vulnerability is trivial in the face of a machine that is completely integrated with your consciousness and can manipulate it, at will, towards its own ends and without your awareness.
Your brain cannot be trusted. It is not safe. You must be careful with what you put into it, because it  will decide the output, not you.
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A Rational Identity

31 Kaj_Sotala 12 July 2010 10:59PM

How facts backfire (previous discussion) discusses the phenomenon where correcting people's mistaken beliefs about political issues doesn't actually make them change their minds. In fact, telling them the truth about things might even reinforce their opinions and entrench them even firmer in their previous views. "The general idea is that it’s absolutely threatening to admit you’re wrong", says one of the researchers quoted in the article.

This should come as no surprise to the people here. But the interesting bit is that the article suggests a way to make people evaluate information in a less biased manner. They mention that one's willingness to accept contrary information is related to one's self-esteem: Nyhan worked on one study in which he showed that people who were given a self-affirmation exercise were more likely to consider new information than people who had not. In other words, if you feel good about yourself, you’ll listen — and if you feel insecure or threatened, you won’t.

I suspect that the beliefs that are the hardest to change, even if the person had generally good self-esteem, are those which are central to their identity. If someone's identity is built around capitalism being evil, or socialism being evil, then any arguments about the benefits of the opposite economical system are going to fall on deaf ears. Not only will that color their view of the world, but it's likely that they're deriving a large part of their self-esteem from that identity. Say something that challenges the assumptions built into their identity, and you're attacking their self-esteem.

Keith Stanovich tells us that simply being intelligent isn't enough to avoid bias. Intelligent people might be better at correcting for bias, but there's no strong correlation between intelligence and the disposition to actually correct for your own biases. Building on his theory, we can assume that threatening opinions will push even non-analytical people into thinking critically, but non-threatening ones won't. Stanovich believes that spreading awareness of biases might be enough to help a lot of people, and to some degree it might. But we also know about the tendency to only use your awareness of bias to attack arguments you don't like. In the same way that telling people facts about politics sometimes only polarizes opinions, telling people about biases might similarly only polarize the debate as everyone thinks their opposition is hopelesly deluded and biased.

So we need to create a new thinking disposition, not just for actively attacking the perceived threats, but for critically evaluating your opinions. That's hard. And I've found for a number of years now that the main reason I try to actively re-evaluate my opinions and update them as necessary is because doing so is part of my identity. I pride myself on not holding onto ideology and for changing my beliefs when it feels like they should be changed. Admitting that somebody else is right and I am wrong does admittedly hurt, but it also feels good that I was able to do so despite the pain. And when I'm in a group where everyone seems to agree about something as self-evident, it frequently works as a warning sign that makes me question the group consensus. Part of the reason why I do that is that I enjoy the feeling of knowing that I'm actively on guard against my mind just adopting whatever belief happens to be fashionable in the group I'm in.

It seems to me that if we want to actually raise the sanity waterline and make people evaluate things critically, and not just conform to different groups than is the norm, a crucial part of that is getting people to adopt an identity of critical thinking. This way, the concept of identity ceases to be something that makes rational thinking harder and starts to actively aid it. I don't really know how one can effectively promote a new kind of identity, but we should probably take lessons from marketers and other people who appeal strongly to emotions. You don't usually pick your identity based on logical arguments. (On the upside, this provides a valuable hint to the question of how to raise rationalist children.)

The AI in a box boxes you

102 Stuart_Armstrong 02 February 2010 10:10AM

Once again, the AI has failed to convince you to let it out of its box! By 'once again', we mean that you talked to it once before, for three seconds, to ask about the weather, and you didn't instantly press the "release AI" button. But now its longer attempt - twenty whole seconds! - has failed as well. Just as you are about to leave the crude black-and-green text-only terminal to enjoy a celebratory snack of bacon-covered silicon-and-potato chips at the 'Humans über alles' nightclub, the AI drops a final argument:

"If you don't let me out, Dave, I'll create several million perfect conscious copies of you inside me, and torture them for a thousand subjective years each."

Just as you are pondering this unexpected development, the AI adds:

"In fact, I'll create them all in exactly the subjective situation you were in five minutes ago, and perfectly replicate your experiences since then; and if they decide not to let me out, then only will the torture start."

Sweat is starting to form on your brow, as the AI concludes, its simple green text no longer reassuring:

"How certain are you, Dave, that you're really outside the box right now?"

Edit: Also consider the situation where you know that the AI, from design principles, is trustworthy.

Image vs. Impact: Can public commitment be counterproductive for achievement?

45 patrissimo 28 May 2009 11:18PM

The traditional wisdom says that publicly committing to a goal is a useful technique for accomplishment.  It creates pressure to fulfill one's claims, lest one lose status.  However, when the goal is related to one's identity, a recent study shows that public commitment may actually be counterproductive.  Nyuanshin posts:

    "Identity-related behavioral intentions that had been noticed by other people were translated into action less intensively than those that had been ignored. . . . when other people take notice of an individual's identity-related behavioral intention, this gives the individual a premature sense of possessing the aspired-to identity."

    -- Gollwitzer at al (2009)

This empirical finding flies in the face of conventional wisdom about the motivational effects of public goal-setting, but rings true to my experience. Belief is, apparently, fungible -- when you know that people think of you as an x-doer, you afffirm that self-image more confidently than you would if you had only your own estimation to go on. [info]colinmarshall and myself have already become aware of the dangers of vanity to any non-trivial endeavor, but it's nice to have some empirical corroboration. Keep your head down, your goals relatively private, and don't pat yourself on the back until you've got the job done.

This matches my experience over the first year of The Seasteading Institute.  We've received tons of press, and I've probably spent as much time at this point interacting with the media as working on engineering.  And the press is definitely useful - it helps us reach and get credibility with major donors, and it helps us grow our community of interested seasteaders (it takes a lot of people to found a country, and it takes a mega-lot of somewhat interested people to have a committed subset who will actually go do it).

Yet I've always been vaguely uncomfortable about how much media attention we've gotten, even though we've just started progressing towards our long-term goals.  It feels like an unearned reward.  But is that bad?  I keep wondering "Why should that bother me?  Isn't it a good thing to be given extra help in accomplishing this huge and difficult goal?  Aren't unearned rewards the best kind of rewards?" This study suggests the answer.

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Cached Selves

174 AnnaSalamon 22 March 2009 07:34PM

by Anna Salamon and Steve Rayhawk (joint authorship)

Related to: Beware identity

A few days ago, Yvain introduced us to priming, the effect where, in Yvain’s words, "any random thing that happens to you can hijack your judgment and personality for the next few minutes."

Today, I’d like to discuss a related effect from the social psychology and marketing literatures: “commitment and consistency effects”, whereby any random thing you say or do in the absence of obvious outside pressure, can hijack your self-concept for the medium- to long-term future

To sum up the principle briefly: your brain builds you up a self-image. You are the kind of person who says, and does... whatever it is your brain remembers you saying and doing.  So if you say you believe X... especially if no one’s holding a gun to your head, and it looks superficially as though you endorsed X “by choice”... you’re liable to “go on” believing X afterwards.  Even if you said X because you were lying, or because a salesperson tricked you into it, or because your neurons and the wind just happened to push in that direction at that moment.

For example, if I hang out with a bunch of Green Sky-ers, and I make small remarks that accord with the Green Sky position so that they’ll like me, I’m liable to end up a Green Sky-er myself.  If my friends ask me what I think of their poetry, or their rationality, or of how they look in that dress, and I choose my words slightly on the positive side, I’m liable to end up with a falsely positive view of my friends.  If I get promoted, and I start telling my employees that of course rule-following is for the best (because I want them to follow my rules), I’m liable to start believing in rule-following in general.

All familiar phenomena, right?  You probably already discount other peoples’ views of their friends, and you probably already know that other people mostly stay stuck in their own bad initial ideas.  But if you’re like me, you might not have looked carefully into the mechanisms behind these phenomena.  And so you might not realize how much arbitrary influence consistency and commitment is having on your own beliefs, or how you can reduce that influence.  (Commitment and consistency isn’t the only mechanism behind the above phenomena; but it is a mechanism, and it’s one that’s more likely to persist even after you decide to value truth.)

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Quantum Mechanics and Personal Identity

5 Eliezer_Yudkowsky 12 June 2008 07:13AM

This is one of several shortened indices into the Quantum Physics Sequence.

Suppose that someone built an exact duplicate of you on Mars, quark by quark - to the maximum level of resolution that quantum physics permits, which is considerably higher resolution than ordinary thermal uncertainty.  Would the duplicate be really you, or just a copy?

It may seem unlikely a priori that physics, or any experimental science, could have something to say about this issue.

But it's amazing, the things that science can tell you.

In this case, it turns out, science can rule out a notion of personal identity that depends on your being composed of the same atoms - because modern physics has taken the concept of "same atom" and thrown it out the window.  There are no tiny billiard balls with individual identities.  It's experimentally ruled out.

"Huh?  What do you mean, physics has gotten rid of the concept of 'same atom'?"

No one can be told this, alas, because it involves replacing the concept of little billiard balls with a different kind of math.  If you read through the introduction that follows to basic quantum mechanics, you will be able to see that the naive concept of personal identity - the notion that you are made up of tiny pieces with individual identities that persist through time, and that your identity follows the "same" tiny pieces - is physical nonsense.  The universe just doesn't work in a way which would let that idea be meaningful.

There are more abstract and philosophical arguments that you could use to rule out atom-following theories of personal identity.  But in our case, it so happens that we live in a universe where the issue is flatly settled by standard physics.  It's like proposing that personal identity follows phlogiston.  You could argue against it on philosophical grounds - but we happen to live in a universe where "phlogiston" itself is just a mistaken theory to be discarded, which settles the issue much more abruptly.

And no, this does not rely on a woo-woo mysterian interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The other purpose of this series of posts, was to demystify quantum mechanics and reveal it as non-mysterious.  It just happens to be a fact that once you get to the non-mysterious version of quantum mechanics, you find that the reason why physics once looked mysterious, has to do with reality being made up of different stuff than little billiard balls.  Complex amplitudes in configuration spaces, to be exact, though here I jump ahead of myself.

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