Reading the comments, I'm not sure we're addressing the question you're asking.

Prediction market proponents have put a lot of thought into how to turn mind-killing open-ended questions (far-mode) into resolvable bets (near-mode), often by use of conditional wagers (chance of Y, wager valid only if X happens). This is a good mechanism for applying percentages to such questions.

However, it completely bypasses the point I think you're trying to make, which is that all useful beliefs are of this form. Basically, you want a simple-example summary of Making Beliefs Pay Rent.

I'm not sure there exists such a single example - humans are very good at separating the signaling and identity "beliefs" from testable, resolvable "predictions", and each of us has different topics with different ease of analysis. This means that it takes quite a bit of thought, study, and reflection to see how the word means different things, which shouldn't be mixed.

I think the direction to go in these discussions isn't so much to find a topc that's often expressed as an identity-signal "belief" and push someone toward a prediction-probability-"belief". Instead, you can ask "what choices are you making based on this belief, and what's the cost if you're wrong"? When you find topics on which the individual can admit that there is a concrete wager being made, then you can guide them to understanding how belief works.

And of course, if they can't tie their belief to any decisions, or understand that the decisions would be different if the belief were incorrect, then you can point out that this kind of belief doesn't help the holder of the belief.

My parsing of it is "Katy Dee", which seems much more likely to be a nickname for a female (short name + initial) than any other option (Man named "Katy", parsing as "K.T.D." or "K @ ydee", etc.). I find it hard to believe that the name wasn't chosen with the knowledge that many users would take it as a female presentation.

So, misleading to me, at least. Not necessarily deceptive (and even if you did choose it with the expectation of misleading, it's not harmfully deceptive). Your gender doesn't matter very much here, so this particular confusion is pretty harmless.

Should you change it? Only if it bothers you. It probably affects how some people react to your posts - you'll get a different reaction on some topics, and probably a slightly different karma profile as a man than as a woman. That has good and bad elements to it, and it's your choice whether good outweighs bad.

We should give (slightly) more credence to what people in their last 12 weeks of life say, as they have (somewhat) less reason to mislead their listeners - they have less to gain from listeners' reactions.

From Manfred's comments (with which I agree), it looks like yes, you lose utility by failing to buy a bet that has positive EV. You lose half as much if you flip a coin, because sometimes the coin is right...

Yes. I mean that, when your choice is different from what standard (or for some cases, timeless) decision theory calculates for the same prior beliefs and outcome->utility mapping, you're losing utility. I can't tell if you think that this theory does have different outcomes, or if you think that this is "just" a simplification that gives the same outcomes.

Showing that it can't be pumped just means that it's consistent. It doesn't mean it's correct. Consistently wrong choices cost utility, and are not rational.

I couldn't tell what position you're taking. Is ambiguity aversion something more than just a common bias? Personally, I understand the intuitive appeal, but on reflection I am indifferent to a bet on red-or-blue or on green-or-blue. If I have additional information about the distribution of green and blue (including knowing anything about who's offering the wagers, or in some cases, that the wager is offered at all), then I'll update my prior of equal probability of blue or green.

Am I doing it wrong? should I prefer one or the other? How much should I prefer it (how much, as a fraction of the bet, should I pay to be allowed to make the bet I prefer)?

For your other examples, boots' rule and yo mama, both are trivial cases of decomposing "value" too far. There's nothing inconsistent about a mother preferring to have a visible fairness mechanism, and to follow that mechanism when it is present. There's nothing wrong with valuing left and right boots differently based on your expected needs. Neither of these have ANYTHING to do with probability calculation, they're just a way to point out that value is not simple. Neither of these present any difficulty to standard decision theory.

I can't tell as of yet whether intervals are helpful in calculating something (and if so, what) that always gets the same answer as the simpler (to me) Bayesian calculation, or if they're able to make different (and better) beliefs in some case.

I would greatly love an example that compares a plain Bayesian analysis with an interval analysis. Start with a prior and a prior-interval, update both based on some discovery, and then propose a wager where the two methods give different beliefs.

Hmm. I think you're right: I've never connected the terms in that way, using "risk-neutral" in tems of utility rather than money. Looking at it more closely, it appears it's more commonly used for money, which would be risk-seeking in terms of utility, and probably non-optimal. (note: I also recognize that most people, including me, over-estimate the decline massively, and for small wagers it should be very close to linear).

Switching between utils and dollars is very confusing. You should be very clear when you do so, or you risk getting confused between cases of risk aversion with simple declining marginal utility.

If money has logarithmic value to you, then existing unresolved bets SHOULD have an effect on your preferences even if you're risk-neutral.

Downvoted for the tease aspect - don't do that. Instead, make a post describing the assumptions and premises in concrete terms that lays the foundation for your proposal. Or put the whole thing in an open thread and see what responses you get and what you'd need to expand on before making a top-level post.

not downvoted for the problems I suspect you'll hit. I very much hope you can address them, though:

You say: opinions, the judgment, of the group members, not their personal preferences, but there aren't many individuals who can clearly distinguish among these things. If your mechanism depends on rational participants, it won't work too well for humans.

More importantly, you say that a well-defined group charter is a given. But there is no group with such a thing. Groups tend to have natural-language charters, and members routinely ignore even those.

I suspect that many dimensions of bias are highly corollated, including the dimensions of history and politics. This would seriously weaken the premise.

More importantly, do you have a model that distinguishes believability from accuracy, and values them separately? What led you to analyze the former rather than the latter?