You said, "I vote on posts for presence of strengths more than for absence of weaknesses." I agree the post has strengths, but you agree that the problems are there as well; given the failings, I disagree with the claim that this contribution is net positive.

I like the policy of voting on presence of strengths rather than absence of weaknesses, but disagree here because, as I said in my review, it's valuable and in part pretty clearly correct, but even though " it's not overall completely off base... it does seem to go in the wrong direction, or at least fail to embody the virtues of rationality I think the best work on Lesswrong is suppose to uphold."

(That said, I think this question is a more general Duncan-Sabien vs. Current Lesswrong policy question, as your reply about why you disagree makes clear - and I'm mostly on Duncan's side about what standards we should have, or at least aspire to.)

I have very mixed views about this, as someone who is myself religious. First, I think it's obviously the case that in many instances religion is helpful for individuals, and even helps their rationality. The tools and approaches developed by religion are certainly valuable, and should be considered and judiciously adopted by anyone who is interested in rationality. This seems obvious once pointed out, and if that was all the post did, I would agree. (There's an atheist-purity mindset issue here where people don't want to admit "The Worst Person You Know Just Made a Great Point" and that's a related issue.)

But the argument here is far stronger - not that the tools work, or that some people benefit, but "that these traditions, whose areas of convergence could together be referred to as the perennial philosophy, are trustworthy." And that seems to be going too far, failing to have the critical crisis of faith. And the next post in the series shows why - it takes far too many claims at face value to reach a convenient conclusion. So it's not overall completely off base, but it does seem to go in the wrong direction, or at least fail to embody the virtues of rationality I think the best work on Lesswrong is suppose to uphold.

I think the distinction is between "smarter and more capable than any human" versus "smarter and more capable than humanity as a whole"

The former is what you refer to, which could still be "Careful Moderate Superintelligence" in the view of the post.

there’s an extremely strong selection effect at labs for an extreme degree of positivity and optimism regardless of whether it is warranted.

Absolutely agree with this - and that's a large part of why I think it's incredibly noteworthy that despite that bias, there are tons of very well informed people at the labs, including Boaz, who are deeply concerned that things could go poorly, and many don't think it's implausible that AI could destroy humanity.

Now that there are additional posts, I'd love to hear if you still have this objection.

"Actual LessWrong readers also sometimes ask me how I deal emotionally with the end of the world.

I suspect a more precise answer may not help.  But Raymond Arnold thinks I should say it, so I will say it.

I say again, I don't actually think my answer is going to help."

It's not a common trope, certainly, but if it is one, it's also one that Eliezer is happy to play out. (And there are lots of good tropes that people play out which they shouldn't avoid just because they are tropes - like falling in love, or being a good friend to others when they are sad, or being a conscientious ethical objector, or being someone who can let go of things while having fun, etc.)

Agree that it's not just about being dramatic / making the problem about you. But that was only one of the points Eliezer made about why people could fail at this in ways that are worth trying to fix. And in your case, yes, dealing with the excessive anxiety seems helpful.