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Comment author: ike 08 April 2017 03:35:57PM 0 points [-]

An evolved system is complex and dynamic, and can lose its stability. A created system is presumed to be static and always stable, so Christians don't consider LUC to be an issue with respect to the environment.

The distinction here would be that a created system's complexity is designed to be stable even with changes, not that it isn't complex and dynamic.

Comment author: ike 16 March 2017 07:52:03PM 2 points [-]

If you don't know the current time, you obviously can't reason as if you did. If we were in a simulation, we wouldn't know the time in the outside world.

Reasoning of the sort "X people exist in state A at time t, and Y people exist in state B at time t, therefore I have a X:Y odds ratio of being in state A compared to state B" only work if you know you're in time t.

If you carefully explicate what information each person being asked to make a decision has, I'm pretty sure your argument would fall apart. You definitely aren't being explicit enough now about whether the people in your toy scenario know what timeslice they're in.

Comment author: ike 16 March 2017 07:53:11PM *  0 points [-]

The "directly relevant information" is the information you know, and not any information you don't know.

If you want to construct a bet, do it among all possibly existing people that, as far as they know, could be each other. So any information that one person knows at the time of the bet, everyone else also knows.

If you don't know the time, then the bet is among all similarly situated people who also don't know the time, which may be people in the future.

Comment author: ike 16 March 2017 07:52:03PM 2 points [-]

If you don't know the current time, you obviously can't reason as if you did. If we were in a simulation, we wouldn't know the time in the outside world.

Reasoning of the sort "X people exist in state A at time t, and Y people exist in state B at time t, therefore I have a X:Y odds ratio of being in state A compared to state B" only work if you know you're in time t.

If you carefully explicate what information each person being asked to make a decision has, I'm pretty sure your argument would fall apart. You definitely aren't being explicit enough now about whether the people in your toy scenario know what timeslice they're in.

Comment author: ike 20 February 2017 03:49:32AM *  0 points [-]

Has anyone rolled the die more than once? If not, it's hard to see how it could converge on that outcome unless everybody that's betting saw a 3 (even a single person seeing differently should drive the price downward). Therefore, it depends on how many people saw rolls, and you should update as if you've seen as many 3s as other people have bet.

You should bet on six if your probability is still higher than 10%.

If the prediction market caused others to update previously then it's more complicated. Probably you should assume it reflects all available information, and therefore exactly one 3 was seen. Ultimately there's no good answer because there's Knightian uncertainty in markets.

[Link] Attacking machine learning with adversarial examples

3 ike 17 February 2017 12:28AM

[Link] Gates 2017 Annual letter

4 ike 15 February 2017 02:39AM

[Link] Raymond Smullyan has died

3 ike 12 February 2017 02:20PM
Comment author: ike 05 February 2017 08:17:04PM 2 points [-]

But is this because of a fault of the Hollywood system, or is it because there are few significant movie story ideas left that have not been done?

Neither: revealed preferences of consumers are in favor of reboots so that's what gets made. That's only a "fault" if your preferences differ from that of most consumers.

(Although I've heard someone argue that piracy made independent films less viable: to the extent consumers would be willing to pay were no pirate option available, but lack of such payments causes fewer films to be made, that would be a market failure argument. I don't really have enough knowledge to judge that as an explanation.)

Comment author: ike 24 December 2016 11:35:44PM 1 point [-]

The other tells you that it will be between $50 and $70 million, with an average of $10 million.

Typo?

Comment author: Raemon 09 December 2016 07:20:35PM 3 points [-]

This has always been how I thought about it. (I consider myself approximately an Average Utilitarian, with some caveats that this is more descriptive than normative)

One person who disagreed with me said: "you are not randomly born into 'a person', you are randomly born into 'a collection of atoms.' A world with fewer atoms arranged into thinking beings increases the chance that you get zero utility, not whatever the average utility from among whichever patterns have developed consciousness"

I disagree with that person, but just wanted to float it as an alternate way of thinking.

Comment author: ike 09 December 2016 08:02:13PM 1 point [-]

It's the difference between SIA and SSA. If you work with SIA, then you're randomly chosen from all possible beings, and so in world B you're less likely to exist.

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