All of A.H.'s Comments + Replies

A.H.120

HCH is not defined in this post, nor in the link, about it.

For those reading who do not know what HCH means (like me!), HCH is a recursive acronym which stands for 'Humans Consulting HCH', an idea I think originating with Paul Christiano related to iterated amplification. It involves humans being able to recursively consult copies/simulations of themselves to solve a problem. It is discussed and explained in more detail in these two posts:

Humans Consulting HCH

Strong HCH

A.H.20

I Googled things like 'Aubrey de Grey on Demis Hassabis' for 5 minutes and couldn't find anything matching this description. The closest I could find was this interview with de Grey where he says:

I actually know a lot of people who are at the cutting edge of AI research. I actually know Demis Hassabis, the guy who runs DeepMind, from when he was an undergraduate at Cambridge several years after me. We’ve kept in touch and try to connect every so often.

He says they know each other and keep in touch but its not really a character reference. 

(I'm not cla... (read more)

A.H.10

Well, you can't have some states as "avoid at all costs" and others as "achieve at all costs", because having them in the same lottery leads to nonsense, no matter what averaging you use. And allowing only one of the two seems arbitrary. So it seems cleanest to disallow both.

Fine. But the purpose of exploring different averaging methods is to see whether it expands the richness of the kind of behaviour we want to describe. The point is that using arithmetic averaging is a choice which limits the kind of behaviour we can get. Maybe we want to describe behav... (read more)

A.H.10

(apologies for taking a couple of days to respond, work has been busy)

I think your robot example nicely demonstrates the difference between our intuitions. As cubefox pointed out in another comment, what representation you want to use depends on what you take as basic.

There are certain types of preferences/behaviours which cannot be expressed using arithmetic averaging. These are the ones which violate VNM, and I think violating VNM axioms isn't totally crazy. I think its worth exploring these VNM-violating preferences and seeing what they look like when m... (read more)

2cousin_it
Well, you can't have some states as "avoid at all costs" and others as "achieve at all costs", because having them in the same lottery leads to nonsense, no matter what averaging you use. And allowing only one of the two seems arbitrary. So it seems cleanest to disallow both. But geometric averaging wouldn't let you do that either, or am I missing something?
A.H.10

Thanks for pointing this out, I missed a word. I have added it now.

A.H.40

Without wishing to be facetious: how much (if any) of the post did you read?  If you disagree with me, that's fine, but I feel like I'm answering questions which I already addressed in the post!

Are you arguing that we ought to (1) assign some "goodness" values to outcomes, and then (2) maximize the geometric expectation of "goodness" resulting from our actions?

I'm not arguing that we ought to maximize the geometric expectation of "goodness" resulting from our actions. I'm exploring what it might look like if we did. In the conclusion, (and indeed, man... (read more)

5cousin_it
Guilty as charged - I did read your post as arguing in favor of geometric averaging, when it really wasn't. Sorry. The main point still seems strange to me, though. Suppose you were programming a robot to act on my behalf, and you asked me to write out some goodness values for outcomes, to program them into the robot. Then before writing out the goodnesses I'd be sure to ask you: which method would the robot use for evaluating lotteries over outcomes? Depending on that, the goodness values I'd write for you (to achieve the desired behavior from the robot) would be very different. To me it suggests that the goodness values and the averaging method are not truly independent degrees of freedom. So it's simpler to nail down the averaging method, to use ordinary arithmetic averaging, and then assign the goodness values. We don't lose any ability to describe behavior (as long as it's consistent), and we remain with only the degree of freedom that actually matters.
A.H.80

The word 'utility' can be used in two different ways: normative and descriptive. 

You are describing 'utility' in the descriptive sense. I am using it in the normative sense. These are explained in the first paragraph of the Wikipedia page for 'utility'.

As I explained in the opening paragraph, I'm using the word 'utility' to mean the goodness/desirability/value of an outcome. This is normative: if an outcome is 'good' then there is the implication that you ought to pursue it.

5cousin_it
That makes me even more confused. Are you arguing that we ought to (1) assign some "goodness" values to outcomes, and then (2) maximize the geometric expectation of "goodness" resulting from our actions? But then wouldn't any argument for (2) depend on the details of how (1) is done? For example, if "goodnesses" were logarithmic in the first place, then wouldn't you want to use arithmetic averaging? Is there some description of how we should assign goodnesses in (1) without a kind of firm ground that VNM gives?
A.H.60

This looks like an exact duplicate of something you posted a month ago.

Is this intentional?

A.H.10

Thanks for the comment. Naively, I agree that this sounds like a good idea, but I need to know more about it.

Do you know if anyone has explicitly written down the value learning solution to the corrigibility problem and treated it a bit more rigorously ?

2RogerDearnaley
Sadly I haven't been able to locate a single, clear exposition. Here are a number of posts by a number of authors that touch on the ideas involved one way or another: Problem of fully updated deference, Corrigibility Via Thought-Process Deference, Requirements for a STEM-capable AGI Value Learner (my Case for Less Doom), Corrigibility, Reward uncertainty Basically the idea is: 1. The agent's primary goal is to optimize "human values", a (very complex) utility function that it doesn't know. This utility function is loosely defined as "something along the lines of what humans collectively want, Coherent Extrapolated Volition, or the sum over all humans of the utility function you would get if you attempted to that human's competent preferences (preferences that aren't mistakes or the result of ignorance, illness, etc) into a utility function (to the extent that they have a coherent set of preferences that can't be Dutch booked and can be represented by a utility function), or something like that, implemented in whatever way humans would in fact prefer, once they were familiar with the conseqences and after considering the matter more carefully than they are in fact capable of". 2. So as well as learning more about how the world works and responds to is actions, it also needs to learn more about what utility function it's trying to optimized. This could be formalized along the same sort lines as AIXI, but maintaining and doing approximately-Bayesian updates across a distribution of therories about the utility function as well as about the way the world works. Since optimizing against an uncertain utility function in regions of world states with uncertainty about the utility has a strong tendency to overestimate the utility via Goodharting, it is necessary to pessimize the utility over possible utility functions, leading to a tendency to stick to regions of the world state space where the uncertainty in the utility function is low. 3. Note that the sum total of cu
A.H.30

Thanks for this comment-it explains your view very clearly and I understand what you are getting at now.

I think its a fair criticism. I've added footnotes within the post, linking people to your comment.

A.H.20

I still think it's a problem that this argument rests on the idea that investors are irrationally not renting land they own, but you don't provide any evidence for that.

I disagree. Firstly, even if, they were renting out their land, this would still be bad, for reasons described in the article (landlords extract land rent without doing anything productive etc.)

The section of the post which argues about empty homes rests on the fact that there are empty homes and a land tax would reduce them. I then provide evidence that there are, indeed, a significant num... (read more)

8Brendan Long
For the record, I'm not arguing against a land value tax in general. I actually think an LVT is reasonable idea if you can actually figure out how to determine land value. I just think this particular argument for an LVT has in incorrect premise, and the links used to support it don't actually support it. I think the two cruxes of our disagreement are, first that I think you are saying that you know why homes are vacant. These two quotes claim that houses are being left vacant for speculation: And here: Second, I think the reason matters. If the houses are being held vacant for a reason other than speculation, in undermines the argument for why an LVT would change that. An LVT would affect the vacancy rate if (1) it incentivizes people to rent out more houses and (2) it's possible to rent out more houses. I think (1) is not a meaningful difference given that investors are already strongly incentivized to rent out properties they own (they get rent!), and I think (2) is mostly wrong and most of the empty houses are empty because remodeling, sales, and finding renters takes time (around 2/3rds of these houses are empty for less than 6 months) or because no one wants them (the houses are in the wrong place or not liveable). This article summarizes the important data points here. Among other things, note that long-term vacancy rate in London is 0.4%, compared to 2.7% for England as a whole, and that the number of vacant properties has been doing down over time. Regarding your comments, I don't think vacation property owners are relevant here since I'm disputing your claim around land held for speculation, and vacation properties are held for their owners' use. This effects the incentives since vacation property owners are already forgoing rent which is worth more than any plausible LVT (although an LVT might push some of them over the edge to rent/sell). In short, I don't dispute the existence of empty homes; I dispute that they're empty for the reasons you claim
A.H.60

The second link is to a Scottish political campaign that doesn't claim to know way the houses are empty (at least on this page) and doesn't contain the 700,000 number in the link text (the linked political campaign claims 46,000 in Scotland and doesn't seem to say anything about the UK).

The phrase '700,000 empty homes throughout' the UK has different links for each word: one for England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. If you follow the link on 700,000, you will be taken to this page which gives a figure of 676,304 empty homes in England. Add this t... (read more)

4Brendan Long
Ah I missed that. Thanks! I still think it's a problem that this argument rests on the idea that investors are irrationally not renting land they own, but you don't provide any evidence for that. As I try to look into this more, I'm also finding that the vacancy rate seems really low in England. 676,304 vacant homes / 24.9 million total homes gives a vacancy rate of 2.7%, which is lower than every city in the United States except for Gilbert, AZ according to this article, although it's possible vacancy is being defined differently?
A.H.10

Interesting, thanks for sharing! I hadn't heard of this.

From Wikipedia:

An El Nino during the winter of 1998 produced above-average rainfall, which enabled extensive growth of underbrush and vegetation in the state's forests. In early April, however, the rains came to an abrupt halt, and the ensuing drought lasted until July.[2] These months of continuing dry conditions saw the drought index rise to 700 (out of 800), indicating wildfire potential similar to that usually found in western states.

I would assume that the drought was also exacerbated by El Nino,... (read more)

2SarahNibs
Yeah climate change has two pretty consistent trends: average heat slowly rising, and variance of phenomena definitely higher. More extremes on a variety of axes.
A.H.30

Eyeballing it, doesn't it imply that while 2024 will be hotter than 2023, the difference between 2024 and 2023 will be smaller than the difference between 2023 and 2022? Because the slope of the various lines is decreasing and in no case increasing?

Yeah, that sounds right I think.

Or is the y-axis measuring YoY impact rather than impact-relative-to-some-fixed-beginning? If so then I'm confused why the global warming section looks the way it does.

I agree, I don't think that YoY interpretation makes sense. I realise now that it's not made completely clear but... (read more)

A.H.43

Yeah, thanks for highlighting this. I started writing about it but realised I was out of my depth (even further out of my depth than for the rest of the post!) so I scrapped it. 

Thanks for clarifying with Robert Rohde!

I reached roughly the conclusion you did. When water vapour is injected into the troposphere (the lowest level of the atmosphere) it is quickly rained out, as you point out. However, the power of the Hunga-Tonga explosion meant that the water vapour was injected much higher, into the stratosphere (what the diagram calls the 'upper atmosp... (read more)

A.H.20

plenty of people are very good at math but never produce any technical writing on scientific journals

Fair enough! Its just that, unless they produce technical results, or pass graduate exams or do something else tangible its quite hard to distinguish people who are very good at math from people who are not.

his story seems to strongly imply that his past self wouldn't have been able to pass those math classes

Obviously its hard to tell from that interview, but he seems to suggest that the reason he didn't pass his classes was because he spent time partying, ... (read more)

A.H.5523

Sorry to be a party pooper, but I find the story of Jason Padgett (the guy who 'banged his head and become a math genius') completely unconvincing. From the video that you cite, here is the 'evidence' that he is 'math genius':

  • He tells us, with no context, 'the inner boundary of pi is f(x)=x sin(pi/x)'. Ok!
  • He makes 'math inspired' drawings (some of which admittedly are pretty cool but they're not exactly original) and sells them on his website
  • He claims that a physicist (who is not named or interviewed) saw him drawing in the mall, and, on the basis of this,
... (read more)
2TAG
Amateur/crank physicists love diagrams. I notice that wikipedia summarises him as an artistic savant.,
2Bezzi
Ok, maybe I shouldn't have used the same words used by clickbait youtube videos. Anyway, he seems more interested in drawing triangles than studying math textbooks, so I don't expect him to produce novel insigths. On the other hand, plenty of people are very good at math but never produce any technical writing on scientific journals. If banging your head can bring you from 50° percentile to 90° percentile in math attitude, that's still pretty big news even if you don't literally become a math genius (his story seems to strongly imply that his past self wouldn't have been able to pass those math classes).
A.H.10

I don't find it convincing that what you experienced has any relation to sudden savant syndrome. It sounds like you had a waking dream where you believed you can play the piano.

You did not actually play the piano and produce music though, right?

I have had dreams where I have believed I could do all kinds of things (play the guitar, lift heavy weights, fly etc.), but they didn't overflow in any way to real life. (I've even had dreams where I've thought to myself 'I know that I am dreaming, but this is definitely going to work when I wake up')

If I ask you to... (read more)

A.H.10

Yes, I too am more concerned from a 'maybe this framing isn't super useful as it fails to capture important distinctions between corrigible and non-corrigible' point of view rather than a 'we might outlaw some good actions' point of view.

Thanks for the links, they look interesting!

A.H.10

For , this is the policy that is optimal when  which has . Then 

 

Please could you explain how you get  when ?

Possibly a dumb question but I don't have a good intuition for what it means to differentiate an expected value with respect to an expected value.

I can see that this is the case when  is positive (as expected for a utility function) and uncorrelated with , but is is true in general? Even when  is strongly correlated (o... (read more)

A.H.10

I find that the walkinlabs.com domain does not give any results. I think the correct url is www.walkinlab.com (no 's' in the url). Is this the one you used?

A.H.10

Good point! Noticeably, some of your examples are 'one-way': one party updated while the other did not. In the case of Google/Twitter and the museum, you updated but they didn't, so this sounds like standard Bayesian updating, not specifically Aumann-like (though maybe this distinction doesn't matter, as the latter is a special case of the former).  

When I wrote the answer, I guess I was thinking about Aumann updating where both parties end up changing their probabilities (ie. Alice starts with a high probability of some proposition P and Bob starts w... (read more)

2tailcalled
I think this is a wrong picture to have in mind for Aumannian updating. It's about pooling evidence, and sometimes you can end up with more extreme views than you started with. While the exact way you update can vary depending on the prior and the evidence, one simple example I like is this: You both start with having your log-odds being some vector x according to some shared prior. You then observe some evidence y, updating your log-odds to be x+y, while they observe some independent evidence z, updating their log-odds to be x+z. If you exchange all your information, then this updates your shared log-odds to be x+y+z, which is most likely going to be an even more radical departure from x than either x+y or x+z alone. While this general argument is overly idealistic because it assumes independent evidence, I think the point that Aumannian agreement doesn't mean moderation is important. That said, there is one place where Aumannian agreement locally leads to moderation: If during the conversation, you both learn that the sources you relied on were unreliable, then presumably you would mostly revert to the prior. However, in the context of politics (which is probably the main place where people want to think of this), the sources tend to be political coalitions, so updating that they were unreliable means updating that one cannot trust any political coalition, which in a sense is both common knowledge but also taken seriously is quite radical (because then you need to start doubting all the things you thought you knew). There were a couple of multi-way cases too. For instance, one time we told someone that we intended to take the Bergen train, expecting that this would resolve the disagreement of them not knowing we would take the Bergen train. But then they continued disagreeing, and told us that the Bergen train was cancelled, which instead updated us to think we wouldn't take the Bergen train. But I think generally disagreements would be exponentially short? B
Answer by A.H.96

even when all parties are acting in good faith, they know that they wont be able to reconcile about certain disagreements, and it may seem to make sense, from some perspectives, to try to just impose their own way, in those disputed regions.

Aumann's agreement theorem which is discussed in the paper 'Are Disagreements Honest?' by Hanson and Cowen suggests that perfectly rational agents (updating via Bayes theorem) should not disagree in this fashion, even if their life experiences were different, provided that their opinions on all topics are common knowled... (read more)

2dr_s
But whether I believe in the info you give depends on my belief in your credibility, and vice versa. So it's entirely possible to exchange information and still end up with different posteriors.
2mako yass
You seem to be looking away from the aspect of the question where any usefully specialized agencies cannot synchronize domain knowledge (which reasserts itself as a result of the value of specialization, an incentive to deepen knowledge differences over time, and to bring differently specialized agents closer together. Though of course, they need to be mutually legible in some ways to benefit from it.). This is the most interesting and challenging part of the question so that was kind of galling. But the Aaronson paper is interesting. It's possible it addresses it. Thanks for that.
5tailcalled
More detailed comment than mine, so strong upvote. However, there's one important error in the comment: Actually it constantly happens. For instance yesterday I had a call with my dad, where I told him about my vacation in Norway, where the Bergen train had been cancelled due to the floods. He believed me, which is an immediate example of Aumann's agreement theorem applying. Furthermore, there were a bunch of things that I had to do to handle the cancellations, which also relied on Aumannian agreement. For instance I didn't know where I could get news about the floods, which was in disagreement with Google and Twitter which had a bunch of concrete suggestions, so I adopted Google's/Twitter's view and then investigated further to update more. I also didn't know where I could get alternate transportation, but again Google had some flight suggestions that I Aumann-agreed to and then investigated further. As another example, in Norway I was at a museum about an explorer who sailed the atlantic on a bamboo raft. At first I had disagreements with the museum as e.g. I didn't know that e.g. one of the people on the raft fell in the water and had to be rescued, but the museum told me that he did and so I Aumann-agreed with that. I think Aumann-agreement is the default thing that happens when communicating, and it's just that usually it happens so quickly that we don't even register it as "disagreements". Persistent public disagreements require that the preconditions for Aumann's theorem fail, and so our idea of "disagreement" ends up connoting precisely the disagreements where Aumann's theorem fails.
A.H.40

Oh damn, you're right. That was a stupid mistake. 

Yes, so the 3-8 billion fish per day does overstate the number of farmed fish killed. The real number of farmed fish killed per day is somewhere between 0.1 billion and 0.5 billion, which is a lot less than the wild fish killed per day.

A.H.*60

EDIT: AS POINTED OUT BY LOCALDEITY THIS COMMENT IS WRONG - I CONFUSED ANNUAL AND DAILY FISH DEATHS. HOWEVER, IT IS THE CASE THAT THIS POST OVERSTATES THE NUMBER OF FISH KILLED FROM FISH FARMS. SEE COMMENTS BELOW FOR CLARIFICATION.

I was going to call you out for a bit of a bait-and-switch in the paragraph starting 'Lewis Bollard notes...'

Lewis Bollard notes “The fishing industry alone kills 3-8 billion animals every day, most by slow suffocation, crushing, or live disemboweling.” So roughly the same number of fish are killed in horrifying, inhumane ways eve

... (read more)

You quote 3-8 billion per day, then the other numbers you mention are annual numbers.  3-8 billion per day would be ~1-3 trillion per year.  Seems your first reaction may have been more accurate.

A.H.30

sometimes the batter near the bowler starts to run before the bowler has actually thrown.

Yes!

In the rules of cricket, that gives the bowler the chance to get them out instead of throwing the ball like they normally would.

There is a line drawn on the floor known as the 'crease', about a metre pasts the stumps. If the batter has run past this line while the bowler still has the ball, the bowler can tap the stumps with the ball and get the batter out.

It's in the spirit of cricket for the bowler to say "hey, if you do that I'm gonna try to get you out". It's n

... (read more)
A.H.10

Thanks, that makes sense! And to be clear, would an 'explanation' be a program which could generate the data 3,1,4,1,5,9? And a good explanation would be one which took up fewer bits of information than just the list 3,1,4,1,5,9? 

2Christopher King
Yes! In fact, ideally it would be computer programs; the game is based on Solomonoff induction, which is algorithms in a fixed programming language. In this post I'm exploring the idea of using informal human language instead of programming languages, but explanations should be thought of as informal programs.
A.H.10

This seems very interesting but I'm having trouble understanding something. Can you specify what is meant by:

An explanation is good if it is smaller than just hard-coding the answer.

What does 'just hard-coding the answer' mean and look like?

3Christopher King
Let's say that you are trying to model the data 3,1,4,1,5,9 The hypothesis "The data is 3,1,4,1,5,9" would be hard-coding the answer. It is better than the hypothesis "a witch wrote down the data, which was 3,1,4,1,5,9". (This example is just ruled out by Occam's razor, but more generally we want our explanations to be less data than the data itself, lest it just sneak in a clever encoding of the data.)
A.H.43

The purpose of participating in a game is to maximize performance, think laterally, exploit mistakes, and do everything you can, within the explicit rules, to win. Doing that is what makes games fun to play. Watching other people do that, at a level that you could never hope to reach is what makes spectator sports fun to watch.

I don't know if you read the rest of the piece, but the point I was trying to make is that sometimes this isn't true! Sometimes if each team does everything within the rules to win then the game becomes less fun to watch and play (yo... (read more)

2quanticle
Then the solution is to change the rules. Basketball did this. After an infamous game where a team took the lead and then just passed the ball around to deny it to their opponents, basketball added a shot clock, to force teams to try to score (or else give the ball to the other team). (American) Football has all sorts of rules and penalties ("illegal formation", "ineligible receiver downfield", "pass interference", etc) whose sole purpose is to ensure that games aren't dominated by tactics that aren't fun to watch. Soccer has the off-sides rule, which prevents teams from parking all their players right next to the other team's goal. Tennis forces crosscourt serves. And, as I alluded to above, motorsport regularly changes its rules, to try to ensure greater competitive balance and more entertaining races. With regards to chess, specifically, Magnus Carlsen agrees (archive) that classical chess is boring and too reliant on pre-memorized opening lines. He argues for shorter games with simpler time controls, which would lead to more entertaining games which would be easier to explain to new viewers. None of these other sports feel the need to appeal to a wooly-headed "spirit of the game" in order to achieve entertaining play. What makes cricket so special? EDIT: I would add that cricket is also undergoing an evolution of its own, with the rise of twenty-20 cricket and the Indian Premier League.
A.H.10

I think the two-player-game-but-player2-gets-to-modify-the-rules is not a fair analogy here. Like I said it's the cricket-loving public that decides, not player 2.

Broadly, I agree with Richard Ngo's characterisation. You are right that the 'cricket loving public' plays some part in determining what counts as 'within the spirit' but it is the decision of the players themselves that often is most important.

How is this different from games with a referee? A foul is what the referee says it is; the spirit of cricket is what the cricket-lovers say it is. In bot

... (read more)
1RamblinDash
It may be that there isn't big enough money in cricket for it to be attractive to hypercompetitive athletes and coaches who are most likely to apply that optimization pressure?
A.H.10

Interesting, thanks for sharing! Its cool to see how different games manage the conflict between coming up with innovative tactics (which for me is all part of the fun of sports) and exploiting the rules in a way that makes the game boring.

Also thanks for the link to David Sirlin. I haven't heard of him and the website looks interesting!

A.H.30

Not a money pump unless there's some path back to "trust me enough that I can extort you again", but that's unlikely related to ethical framework.

I don't understand this. Why would paying out to an extortionist once make you disbelieve them when they threatened you a second time?

2Dagon
You may still believe they will (try to) kill you if you don't pay.  The second time you stop believing that they will not kill you if you do pay.
A.H.10

The "give me money otherwise I'll kill you" money pump is arguably not a money pump

I'm not sure how you mean this. I think that it is a money pump when combined with the assumption that you want to stay alive. You pay money to end up in the same position you started in (presuming you want to stay alive). When back in the position you started, someone can then threaten you again in the same way and get more money from you. It just has fewer steps than the standard money pump. Sure, you could reject the 'I want to stay alive' assumption but then you end up d... (read more)

Answer by A.H.20

Aren't you susceptible to the "give me money otherwise I'll kill you" money pump in a way that you wouldn't be if the person threatening you knew that there was some chance you would retaliate and kill them?

If I was some kind of consequentialist, I might say that there is a point at which losing some amount of money is more valuable than the life of the person who is threatening me, so it would be consistent to kill them to prevent this happening.

This is only true if it is public knowledge that you will never kill anyone. It's a bit like a country having an army (or nuclear weapons) and publicly saying that you will never use them to fight.

2Daniel Kokotajlo
The "give me money otherwise I'll kill you" money pump is arguably not a money pump, but anyhow it's waaaaaay more of a problem for consequentialists than deontologists.
A.H.30

I am confused about something. You write that a preference ordering  is geometrically rational if.

This is compared to VNM rationality which favours  if and only if 

Why, in the the definition of geometric rationality, do we have both the geometric average and the arithmetic average? Why not just say "an ordering is geometrically rational if it favours  if and only if  " ?

As I understand it, this is what Kelly betting does. It doesn't favou... (read more)

A.H.14

I think this is a good idea, thanks for implementing!

Very minor but the link lesswrong.com/moderation#rejected-comments just goes to the same page as lesswrong.com/moderation#rejected-posts (the written address is correct but the hyperlink goes to the wrong page)

2Raemon
Thanks, fixed.
A.H.30

The link to Harsanyi's paper doesn't work for me. Here is a link that does, if anyone is looking for one: 

https://hceconomics.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/events/Harsanyi_1955_JPE_v63_n4.pdf 

1momom2
Thanks! I wish the math hadn't broken down, it makes the post harder to read...
A.H.10

The infinite non-uniform discrete case is not much more difficult. If  is a finite or countably infinite set,  assigns a nonnegative value to each , and  is a probability distribution on , then 

Very minor, but shouldn't this read " is a probability distribution on " not ?

A.H.10

Thanks for writing this. I think that the arguments in parts III and IV are particularly compelling and well-written.

2Joe Carlsmith
Glad to hear you liked it :)
A.H.32

Thanks for writing this. I wanted to write something about how Deutsch performs a bit a of motte-and-bailey argument (motte:'there are some problems in physics which are hard to solve using the dynamical laws approach'. bailey:'these problems can be solved using constructor theory specifically, rather than other approaches'). Your comment does a good job of making this case. In the end I didn't include it, as the piece was already too long. I just wrote the sentence 

Pointing out problems in the dynamical laws approach to physics and trying to find solutions is useful, even if constructor theory turns out not to be the best solution to them. 

and left it at that.

A.H.10

I didn’t use ‘modal’ because that is used to refer to logical possibility/impossibility, whereas I am interested in referring to physical possibility/impossibility. Depending on your philosophical views, those two things may or may not be the same.


 

A.H.10

The form of a counterfactual law ("your perpetual motion machine won't work even if you make that screw longer or do anything else different") seems to be "A, no matter which parameter you change".


I don’t think this is right. As I am using it, ‘counterfactual’ refers to a statement about whether something is possible or impossible. Statements of the form "A, no matter which parameter you change" are not always like this. For example if A=’this ball has a mass of 10kg’. This is not a statement about what is possible or impossible. You could frame it as ‘it ... (read more)

A.H.10

Glad that confusion is removed!

I think that it is the best word to use. When used as an adjective Collins defines 'counterfactual' as 'expressing what has not happened but could, would, or might under differing conditions '. I think that this fits the way I was talking about it (eg. when referring to 'counterfactual laws'). In the first post, I talk about whether the lamp 'could would, or might' have been in a different state. In this post, we talk about whether a perpetual motion machine  'could would, or might' work if it was made using a different ... (read more)

2supposedlyfun
I'm bothered by something else now: the great variety of things that would fit in your category of counterfactual laws (as I understand it). The form of a counterfactual law ("your perpetual motion machine won't work even if you make that screw longer or do anything else different") seems to be "A, no matter which parameter you change". But isn't that equivalent to "A", in which case what makes it a counterfactual law instead of just a law?  Don't all things we consider laws of physics fit that set? F=ma even if the frictionless sphere is blue? E=mc^2 even if it's near a black hole that used to be Gouda cheese?
A.H.10

Hi, thanks for the question. I am using the term 'counterfactual' (admittedly somewhat loosely) to describe facts that refer to whether things are possible or impossible, regardless of whether they actually happen. 

In the first post, I claimed that it is only meaningful to say that the lamp transmits information if it is possible for the lamp to be a in a different state. Conversely, if the lamp was broken, then it is impossible for the lamp to be in a different state, and information does not get transmitted. If you just describe the system in terms ... (read more)

1TAG
Standardly, a counterfactual didn't happen. The term that means "whether things are possible or impossible, regardless of whether they actually happen" is "modal". https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
2supposedlyfun
Confusion removed; you were using "counterfactual" in a way I had never seen here or anywhere else. (Is that the best word, though?)
A.H.10

I think this was well-written and clear, so good job there! I also happen to disagree with the contents.

Thanks for your comment!

First off, I'm highly suspicious of any definition of a "prevailing conception" of physics that excludes the second law of thermodynamics! It seems like in actual practice, sometimes people make predictions by simulation, (the "PC") sometimes they make predictions by generalizing about the character of physical law (the quantum gravity example), and sometimes they do something in between those things and make abstractions/generali

... (read more)
A.H.10

I think I disagree with your characterisation of the split between 'objective' Shannon information and information as meaning, which requires interpretation.

As you point at the end of your comment, Shannon information requires you to know the probability distribution from which your data is drawn. And probabilities are reflections of your own state of knowledge, which is subjective. (Or at least subjectively objective, if you are using 'objective' in that sense, then I guess I agree.) For example, if Alice sends Bob a string '11111', we might be tempted to... (read more)

1TAG
Not necessarily. Objective probabilities could exist. That just gives you two different measures, an objective one and a subjective one. If Bob doesnt know that Alice can only send one of two five bit strings, then she, objectively, had sent only one bit, and his subjective subjective estimate based on subjective probability is wrong. In short , the same relationship between probability and information content holds in both contexts. The Shannon information is maximal, so your second use of "information" has to refer to something other than Shannon information. Yes, you have to causally control a signal to send information-as-meaning, and that has something to do with counterfactuals, but it isn't just counterfactuals. An uncontrolled, random sequence could have been different, so it has counterfactual versions.
A.H.10

I agree with your example and think that it touches on something important. However, in this post, I did not claim that the counterfactual condition was the only condition required for information transfer. You are correct to say that the lamp signal would not constitute information to someone who was unaware of the plan. But this is because, in that situation, there are other conditions that have not been met. Since the other person seeing the lamp signal would not react differently to the different signals, there is no causal link between the signal and ... (read more)

A.H.10

Hi, thanks for your question. I have a big piece covering all of this in more detail which I plan to post in a couple of days once I've finished writing it. In the meantime, please accept this 'teaser' of a few problems in the prevailing conception (PC):

  1. Dealing with hybrid systems. If we are operating in a regime where there are two contradictory sets of dynamical laws, we do not know what kind of evolution the system will follow. An example of such a system is one where both gravity (as governed by general relativity) and quantum mechanics are relevant. I
... (read more)
1TAG
It's important to note that the reversability of microphysical laws, is 1. not apriori or necessary. It something that was discovered. 2. it only applies to microphysical laws. So 2LT, being macroscopic, is still physics, as everyone except Deutsch thinks. 3. the problem is not so much stating it as justifying it microphysically.
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