Some related scenarios are discussed in my post here, e.g. when popularity ≈ beauty + substance, and if popularity and beauty are readily apparent then you can estimate substance.
There had been a study comparing the effects of moderate protests vs extreme protests, in hypothetical situations (the study participants would e.g. read a fictional article describing the activities of a protest group), and concluded that "Extreme Protest Actions Reduce Popular Support for Social Movements":
How do protest actions impact public support for social movements? Here we test the claim that extreme protest actions—protest behaviors perceived to be harmful to others, highly disruptive, or both—typically reduce support for social movements. Across 6 experiments, including 3 that were preregistered, participants indicated less support for social movements that used more extreme protest actions. This result obtained across a variety of movements (e.g., animal rights, anti-Trump, anti-abortion) and extreme protest actions (e.g., blocking highways, vandalizing property). Further, in 5 of 6 studies, negative reactions to extreme protest actions also led participants to support the movement's central cause less, and these effects were largely independent of individuals' prior ideology or views on the issue. In all studies we found effects were driven by diminished social identification with the movement. In Studies 4-6, serial mediation analyses detailed a more in-depth model: observers viewed extreme protest actions to be immoral, reducing observers' emotional connection to the movement and, in turn, reducing identification with and support for the movement. Taken together with prior research showing that extreme protest actions can be effective for applying pressure to institutions and raising awareness of movements, these findings suggest an activist's dilemma, in which the same protest actions that may offer certain benefits are also likely to undermine popular support for social movements.
It could be that moderate protests are useful. It would be an interesting test of a group: whether it's able to consistently avoid extreme behavior.
Smart people are often too arrogant and proud, and know too much.
I thought that might be the case. If you looked at GPT-3 or 3.5, then, the higher the quality of your own work, the less helpful (and, potentially, the more destructive and disruptive) it is to substitute in the LLM's work; so higher IQ in these early years of LLMs may correlate with dismissing them and having little experience using them.
But this is a temporary effect. Those who initially dismissed LLMs will eventually come round; and, among younger people, especially as LLMs get better, higher-IQ people who try LLMs for the first time will find them worthwhile and use them just as much as their peers. And if you have two people who have both spent N hours using the same LLM for the same purposes, higher IQ will help, all else being equal.
Of course, if you're simply reporting a correlation you observe, then all else is likely not equal. Please think about selection effects, such as those described here.
Using LLMs is an intellectual skill. I would be astonished if IQ was not pretty helpful for that.
For editing adults, it is a good point that lots of them might find a personality tweak very useful, and e.g. if it gave them a big bump in motivation, that would likely be worth more than, say, 5-10 IQ points. An adult is in a good position to tell what's the delta between their current personality and what might be ideal for their situation.
Deliberately tweaking personality does raise some "dual use" issues. Is there a set of genes that makes someone very unlikely to leave their abusive cult, or makes them loyal obedient citizens to their tyrannical government, or makes them never join the hated outgroup political party? I would be pretty on board with a norm of not doing research into that. Basic "Are there genes that cause personality disorders that ~everyone agrees are bad?" is fine; "motivation" as one undifferentiated category seems fine; Big 5 traits ... have some known correlations with political alignment, which brings it into territory I'm not very comfortable with, but if it goes no farther that it might be fine.
On a quick skim, an element that seems to be missing is that having emotions which cause you to behave 'irrationally' can in fact be beneficial from a rational perspective.
For example, if everyone knows that, when someone does you a favor, you'll feel obligated to find some way to repay them, and when someone injures you, you'll feel driven to inflict vengeance upon them even at great cost to yourself—if everyone knows this about you, then they'll be more likely to do you favors and less likely to injure you, and your expected payoffs are probably higher than if you were 100% "rational" and everyone knew it. I believe this is in fact why we have the emotions of gratitude and anger, and I think various animals have something resembling them. Put it this way: carrying out threats and promises is "irrational" by definition, but making your brain into a thing that will carry out threats and promises may be very rational.
So you could call these emotions "irrational" or the thoughts they lead to "biased", but I think that (a) likely pushes your thinking in the wrong direction in general, and (b) gives you no guidance on what "irrational" emotions are likely to exist.
What is categorized as "peer pressure" here? Explicit threats to report you to authorities if you don't conform? I'm guessing not. But how about implicit threats? What if you've heard (or read in the news) stories about people who don't conform—in ways moderately but not hugely more extreme than you—having their careers ruined? In any situation that you could call "peer pressure", I imagine there's always at least the possibility of some level of social exclusion.
The defining questions for that aspect would appear to be "Do you believe that you would face serious risk of punishment for not conforming?" and "Would a reasonable person in your situation believe the same?". Which don't necessarily have the same answer. It might, indeed, be that people whom you observe to be "conformist" are the ones who are oversensitive to the risk of social exclusion.
The thing that comes to mind, when I think of "formidable master of rationality", is a highly experienced engineer trying to debug problems, especially high-urgency problems that the normal customer support teams haven't been able to handle. You have a fresh phenomenon, which the creators of the existing product apparently didn't anticipate (or if they did, they didn't think it worth adding functionality to handle it), which casts doubt on existing diagnostic systems. You have priors on which tools are likely to still work, priors on which underlying problems are likely to cause which symptoms; tests you can try, each of which has its own cost and range of likely outcomes, and some of which you might invent on the spot; all of these lead to updating your probability distribution over what the underlying problem might be.
Medical diagnostics, as illustrated by Dr. House, can be similar, although I suspect the frequency of "inventing new tests to diagnose a never-before-seen problem" is lower there.
One argument I've encountered is that sentient creatures are precisely those creatures that we can form cooperative agreements with. (Counter-argument: one might think that e.g. the relationship with a pet is also a cooperative one [perhaps more obviously if you train them to do something important, and you feed them], while also thinking that pets aren't sentient.)
Another is that some people's approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma is to decide "Anyone who's sufficiently similar to me can be expected to make the same choice as me, and it's best for all of us if we cooperate, so I'll cooperate when encountering them"; and some of them may figure that sentience alone is sufficient similarity.
So, the arithmetic and geometric mean agree when the inputs are equal, and, the more unequal they are, the lower the geometric mean is.
I note that the subtests have ceilings, which puts a limit on how much any one can skew the result. Like, if you have 10 subtests, and the max score is something like 150, then presumably each test has a max score of 15 points. If we imagine someone gets five 7s and five 13s (a moderately unbalanced set of abilities), then the geometric mean is 9.54, while the arithmetic mean is 10. So, even if someone were confused about whether the IQ test was using a geometric or an arithmetic mean, does it make a large difference in practice?
The people you're arguing against, is it actually a crux for them? Do they think IQ tests are totally invalid because they're using an arithmetic mean, but actually they should realize it's more like a geometric mean and then they'd agree IQ tests are great?
I'd point out that the magnitude of the "exploitation" is the magnitude of the incentive for market players to find the better solution. If Bob is the one guy for whom making him wear a tuxedo isn't worthwhile, and if it's close to worthwhile—e.g. him wearing it produces $4000 of value to the company over the time he wears it—then that's $1000 being left on the table. If there are 100 employees being "exploited" like Bob, for whom making them wear tuxedos is extremely wasteful—say it produces only $100 of value for them to wear tuxedos—then there is $490,000 being left on the table, which may be enough to justify making a new company if the existing one is for some reason stubborn about the issue. (Also, the more employees there are in that situation, the more likely it is that someone will complain and someone else will notice the opportunity.)