Buck

CEO at Redwood Research.

AI safety is a highly collaborative field--almost all the points I make were either explained to me by someone else, or developed in conversation with other people. I'm saying this here because it would feel repetitive to say "these ideas were developed in collaboration with various people" in all my comments, but I want to have it on the record that the ideas I present were almost entirely not developed by me in isolation.

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@ryan_greenblatt is working on a list of alignment research applications. For control applications, you might enjoy the long list of control techniques in our original post.

BuckΩ673
  • Alignable systems design: Produce a design for an overall AI system that accomplishes something interesting, apply multiple safety techniques to it, and show that the resulting system is both capable and safe. (A lot of the value here is in figuring out how to combine various safety techniques together.)

I don't know what this means, do you have any examples?

BuckΩ12198

I think we should just all give up on the word "scalable oversight"; it is used in many conflicting ways, sadly. I mostly talk about "recursive techniques for reward generation".

BuckΩ563

Some reasons why the “ten people on the inside” might have massive trouble doing even cheap things:

  • Siloing. Perhaps the company will prevent info flowing between different parts of the company. I hear that this already happens to some extent already. If this happens, it’s way harder to have a safety team interact with other parts of the company (e.g. instead of doing auditing themselves, they’d have to get someone from all the different teams that are doing risky stuff to do the auditing).
  • Getting cancelled. Perhaps the company will learn “people who are concerned about misalignment risk constantly cause problems for us, we should avoid ever hiring them”. I think this is plausible.
  • Company-inside-the-company. Perhaps AI automation allows the company to work with just a tiny number of core people, and so the company ends up mostly just doing a secret ASI project with the knowledge of just a small trusted group. This might be sensible if the leadership is worried about leaks, or if they want to do an extremely aggressive power grab.

How well did this workshop/exercise set go?

BuckΩ893

Yep, I think that at least some of the 10 would have to have some serious hustle and political savvy that is atypical (but not totally absent) among AI safety people.

What laws are you imagine making it harder to deploy stuff? Notably I'm imagining these people mostly doing stuff with internal deployments.

I think you're overfixating on the experience of Google, which has more complicated production systems than most.

Buck*Ω14294

I've talked to a lot of people who have left leading AI companies for reasons related to thinking that their company was being insufficiently cautious. I wouldn't usually say that they'd left "in protest"; for example, most of them haven't directly criticized the companies after leaving.

In my experience, the main reason that most of these people left was that they found it very unpleasant to working there and thought their research would be better elsewhere, not that they wanted to protest poor safety policies per se. I usually advise such people against leaving if the company has very few safety staff, but it depends on their skillset.

(These arguments don't apply to Anthropic: there are many people there who I think will try to implement reasonable safety techniques, so on the current margin, the benefits to safety technique implementation of marginal people seems way lower. It might still make sense to work at Anthropic, especially if you think it's a good place to do safety research that can be exported.)

Incidentally, I'm happy to talk to people who are considering leaving AI companies and give them much more specific advice.

BuckΩ331

Many more than two safety-concerned people have left AI companies for reasons related to thinking that those companies are reckless.

BuckΩ173714

Some tweets I wrote that are relevant to this post:

In general, AI safety researchers focus way too much on scenarios where there's enough political will to adopt safety techniques that are seriously costly and inconvenient. There's a couple reasons for this.

Firstly, AI company staff are disincentivized from making their companies look reckless, and if they give accurate descriptions of the amount of delay that the companies will tolerate, it will sound like they're saying the company is reckless.

Secondly, safety-concerned people outside AI companies feel weird about openly discussing the possibility of AI companies only adopting cheap risk mitigations, because they're scared of moving the Overton window and they're hoping for a door-in-the-face dynamic.

So people focus way more on safety cases and other high-assurance safety strategies than is deserved given how likely they seem. I think that these dynamics have skewed discourse enough that a lot of "AI safety people" (broadly interpreted) have pretty bad models here.

I appreciate the spirit of this type of calculation, but think that it's a bit too wacky to be that informative. I think that it's a bit of a stretch to string these numbers together. E.g. I think Ryan and Tom's predictions are inconsistent, and I think that it's weird to identify 100%-AI as the point where we need to have "solved the alignment problem", and I think that it's weird to use the Apollo/Manhattan program as an estimate of work required. (I also don't know what your Manhattan project numbers mean: I thought there were more like 2.5k scientists/engineers at Los Alamos, and most of the people elsewhere were purifying nuclear material)

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