What about a situation where the threat would be considered non-credible because the cost to A of carrying out on it would cost more than not carrying it out, regardless whether B gives in, but A decides to carryout on it anyway with the sole objective to inflict more damage on B? Example A doesn't carryout threat, B doesn't give in payout is 0,0 ; A doesn't carryout threat, B gives in payout is 0,-5 ; A carries out threat, B gives in payout is 0,-10; A carries out threat, B doesn't give in payout is -10,-100. These situatiions happen often. A big flaw of Game Theory is to assume that agents act rationally.
What about a situation where the threat would be considered non-credible because the cost to A of carrying out on it would cost more than not carrying it out, regardless whether B gives in, but A decides to carryout on it anyway with the sole objective to inflict more damage on B? Example A doesn't carryout threat, B doesn't give in payout is 0,0 ; A doesn't carryout threat, B gives in payout is 0,-5 ; A carries out threat, B gives in payout is 0,-10; A carries out threat, B doesn't give in payout is -10,-100. These situatiions happen often. A big flaw of Game Theory is to assume that agents act rationally.