Garren
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If you are going to say that John-morality and Mary-morality are different things, that is effectively conceding that they are subjective.
The focus doesn't have to be on John and Mary; it can be on the morality we're referencing via John and Mary. By analogy, we could talk about John's hometown and Mary's hometown, without being subjectivists about the cities we are referencing.
If you have multiple contradictory judgements being made by multiple standards, and you deem them to be objective, then you end up with multiple contradictoryobjective truths. But I don't think you can have multiple contradictory objective truths.
Ok, instead of meter measurements, let's look at cubit measurements. Different ancient cultures represented significantly different physical lengths by 'cubits.' So a measurement of 10 cubits to a Roman was a different physical distance than 10 cubits to a Babylonian.
A given object could thus be 'over ten cubits' and 'under ten cubits' at the same time, though in different senses. Likewise, a given action can be 'right' and 'wrong' at the same time, though in... (read more)
It seems to me I cannot provide him compelling grounds as to why he ought not to have done what he did, and that to punish him would be arbitrary.
When a dispute is over fundamental values, I don't think we can give the other side compelling grounds to act according to our own values. Consider Eliezer's paperclip maximizer. How could we possibly convince such a being that it's doing something irrational, besides pointing out that its current actions are suboptimal for its goal in the long run?
Thanks for the link to the Carroll story. I plan on taking some time to think it over.
... (read more)If the view is correct, then you can at
I think the worry here is that realizing 'right' and 'wrong' are relative to values might make us give up our values. Meanwhile, those who aren't as reflective are able to hold more strongly onto their values.
But let's look at your deep worry about fanatics with nukes. Does their disregard for life have to also be making some kind of abstract error for you to keep and act on your own strong regard for life?
OK, but what I want to know is how you react to some person -whose belief system is internally consistent- who has just, say, committed a gratuitous murder. Are you committed to saying that there are no objective grounds to sanction him
There's an ambiguity here. A standard can make objective judgments, without the selection of that standard being objective. Like meter measurements.
Such a person would be objectively afoul of a standard against randomly killing people. But let's say he acted according to a standard which doesn't care about that; we wouldn't be able to tell him he did something wrong by that other standard. Nor could we tell him he did... (read more)
What I was getting at is that this looks like complete moral relativism -'right for me' is the only right there is
While it is relativism, the focus is a bit different from 'right for me.' More like 'this action measures up as right against standard Y' where this Y is typically something I endorse.
For example, if you and I both consider a practice morally right and we do so because it measures up that way against the standard of improving 'the well-being of conscious creatures,' then there's a bit more going on than it just being right for you and me.
Or if I consider a practice morally right for the... (read 466 more words →)
Would you say a person is obligated by facts woven into the universe to believe that 68 + 57 = 125 ? (ie, are we obligated in this sense to believe anything?) Would you say a person is obligated by facts woven into the universe to believe that 68 + 57 = 125 ? (ie, are we obligated in this sense to believe anything?)
No, I wouldn't say that. It would be a little odd to say anyone who doesn't hold a belief that 68 + 57 equals 125 is neglecting some cosmic duty. Instead, I would affirm:
In order to hold a mathematically correct belief when considering 68 + 57, we are obligated... (read more)
Strictly speaking, we can exhibit any definition of "good", even one that doesn't make any of the errors you pointed out, and still ask "Is it good?".
Moore was correct that no alternate concrete meaning is identical to 'good,' his mistake was thinking that 'good' had its own concrete meaning. As Paul Ziff put it, good means 'answers to an interest' where the interest is semantically variable.
In math terms, the open question argument would be like asking the value of f(z) and when someone answers f(3), pointing out that f(z) is not the same thing as f(3).
I think the 'huge and complicated' X that Luke mentions is supposed to be the set all of inputs to f(z) that a given person is disposed to use. Or maybe the aggregate of all such sets for people.
If by 'obligated' you mean it's demanded by those who fear being the targets of those actions, yes. Or if you mean exercising restraint may be practically necessary to comply with certain values those actions thwart, yes. Or if you mean doing those things is likely to result in legal penalties, that's often the case.
But if you mean it's some simple fact that we're morally obligated to restrain ourselves from doing certain things, no. Or at least I don't see how that could even possibly be the case, and I already have a theory that explains why people might mistakenly think such a thing is the case (they mistake their own values for facts woven into the universe, so hypothetical imperatives look like categorical imperatives to them).
The 'commission' vs. 'omission' thing is often a matter of wording. Rape can be viewed as omitting to get proper permission, particularly when we're talking about drugging, etc.
What could 'right' and 'wrong' mean, beyond the criteria used to make the judgment?
Sure, if you're talking about appealing to people to change their non-fundamental values to be more in line with their fundamental values. But I've still never heard how reason can have anything to say about fundamental values.
So far as I can tell, only by reasoning from their pre-existing values.