I’ve finished reading through Functional Decision Theory: A New Theory of Instrumental Rationality, and in my mind, the main defense of causal-decision-theory (CDT) agents in Newcomb’s Problem is not well-addressed. As they stated in the paper, the standard defense of two-boxing is that Newcomb’s Problem explicitly punishes rational decision theories, and rewards others. The paper then refutes this by saying: “In short, Newcomb’s Problem doesn’t punish rational agents; it punishes two-boxers”.
It is true that FDT agents will “win” at Newcomb’s Problem, but what the paper doesn’t address is that it is quite easy to come up with similar situations where FDT agents are punished and CDT agents are not.... (read 638 more words →)
I think I see where you're coming from with the inverse problem feeling "cheaty". It's not like other decision problems in the sense that it is not really a dilemma; two-boxing is clearly the best option. I used the word "problem" instinctively, but perhaps I should have called it the "Inverse Newcomb Scenario" or something similar instead.
However, the fact that it isn't a real "problem" doesn't change the conclusion. I admit that the inverse scenario is not as interesting as the standard problem, but what matters is that it's just as likely, and clearly favours two-boxers. FDT agents have a pre-commitment to being one-boxers, and that would work well if the universe... (read more)
Yes that's right, I regret calling it a problem instead of just a "scenario".
As a follow up though,I would say that the standard Newcomb's problem is (essentially) functionally equivalent to:
“Omega scans your brain. If it concludes that you would two-box in Newcomb’s Problem, it hands you at most $1,000 and flies off. If it concludes that you would one-box in Newcomb’s Problem, it hands you at least $1,000,000 and flies off.”