See also: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qij9v3YqPfyur2PbX/indexical-uncertainty-and-the-axiom-of-independence for an argument against independence
The military and information assurance communities, which are used to dealing with highly adversarial environments, do not search for solutions that render all failures an impossibility.
In information security, practitioners do not look for airtight guarantees of security, but instead try to increase security iteratively as much as possible. Even RSA, the centerpiece of internet encryption, is not provably completely unbreakable (perhaps a superintelligence could find a way to efficiently factor large numbers).
I take your point, and I like the analog...
I agree with both your claims, but maybe with less confidence than you (I also agree with DanielFilan's point below).
Here are two places I can imagine MIRI's intuitions here coming from, and I'm interested in your thoughts on them:
(1) The "idealized reasoner is analogous to a Carnot engine" argument. It seems like you think advanced AI systems will be importantly disanalogous to this idea, and that's not obvious to me.
(2) 'We might care about expected utility maximization / theoretical rationality because there is an impo...
I'm not sure what it means for this work to "not apply" to particular systems. It seems like the claim is that decision theory is a way to understand AI systems in general and reason about what they will do, just as we use other theoretical tools to understand current ML systems. Can you spell this out a bit more? (Note that I'm also not really sure what it means for decision theory to apply to all AI systems: I can imagine kludgy systems where it seems really hard in some sense to understand their behavior with decision theory, but I'm not confident at all)
I claim (with some confidence) that Updateless Decision Theory and Logical Induction don't have much to do with understanding AlphaGo or OpenAI Five, and you are better off understanding those systems using standard AI/ML thinking.
I further claim (with less confidence) that in a similar way, at the time that we build our first powerful AI systems, the results of Agent Foundations research at that time won't have much to do with understanding those powerful AI systems.
Does that explain what it means? And if so, do you disagree with either of the claims?
I'm not sure if this will be helpful or if you've already explored this connection, but the field of abstract interpretation tries to understand the semantics of a computer program without fully executing it. The theme of "trying to understand what a program will do by just examining its source code" is also present in program analysis. If we can understand neural networks as typed functional programs maybe there's something worth thinking about here.
Like some other commenters, I also highly recommend Impro if this post resonates with you.
Readers who are very interested in a more conceptual analysis of what decision making "is" in the narrative framework may want to check out Tempo (by Venkatesh Rao, who writes at Ribbonfarm). Rao takes as axiomatic the memetically derived idea that all our choices are between life scripts that end in our death, and looks at how to make these choices. It's more of an analytical book on strategy (with exercises) than a poetic exemplar of Mythic Mode, but...
I'm still confused on where to post stuff that I would think of posting in the old LW's Open Threads. For example, "What are the best pieces of writing/advice on dealing with 'shoulds'?" would be one thing that I'd want to post in an Open Thread. I have other various little questions/requests like this.
I don't understand the point about avoiding government involvement in the long run. It seems like your argument is that government projects are incompetent at managing tech projects (maybe because of structural reasons). This seems like a very strong claim to me, and seems only accurate when there's bad incentive compatibility. For example, are you excluding things like the Manhattan Project?
Has either one been fully specified/formalized?
Here's one attempt to further formalize the different decision procedures: http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Hintze-Problem-class-dominance-in-predictive-dilemmas.pdf (H/T linked by Luke)
Thanks. I have some followup questions :)
Please correct me if I've misrepresented your views.
What do you think are the most interesting philosophical problems within our grasp to be solved?
I'm not sure there is any. A big part of it is that metaphilosophy is essentially a complete blank, so we have no way of saying what counts as a correct solution to a philosophical problem, and hence no way of achieving high confidence that any particular philosophical problem has been solved, except maybe simple (and hence not very interesting) problems, where the solution is just intuitively obvious to everyone or nearly everyone. It's also been my experien...
Do you mean they don't tell us what's up with the difference in risks of the measured techniques, or that they don't tell us much about AI risk in general? (I'd at least benefit from learning more about your views here)