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This quote is in reference to a supposed split in the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorsal_stream The first was a 'coordinate system' that preserved metric information. "Therefore, another type of spatial description of the object’s geometry seems more useful, one that preserves invariant spatial information by ignoring metric information. Indeed, many contemporary theories of object identification (e.g., Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987) assume that objects are represented using such structural descriptions, which use abstract types of spatial representations to specify relations among parts (e.g., top-of, end-to-middle-connected, left-side-connected)." A quote from a book on MBTI. Describes something called http://greenlightwiki.com/lenore-exegesis/Introverted_Thinking "When we use Thinking in an Introverted way, we get a mental image of the logical relationships in an entire system. For example, if we're crocheting an initial into a sweater, we're likely to draw a picture rather than work out the logical relationships analytically." MBTI isn't neuroscience but it's managed to hit on important distinctions in how people think.

Anyways, a problem you'll see with students in math is that they don't realize that the basics of logic/mathematical reasoning are SPATIAL. They see math formulas and think that's all there is to it. In fact, this was my problem. I could do fine with philosophical verbal reasoning, but I would end up asking a bunch of questions and create a bunch of possibilities. I never realized the importance of what Eliezer calls "Constraining the search-space". Turns out it's not the words that are important, it's the "spatial idea" it stands for. It took a LONG time for me to see that. I started to realize it from reading Eliezer's writings specifically "I keep emphasizing the idea that evidence slides probability because of research that shows people tend to use spatial intutions to grasp numbers. In particular, there's interesting evidence that we have an innate sense of quantity that's localized to left inferior parietal cortex - patients with damage to this area can selectively lose their sense of whether 5 is less than 8, while retaining their ability to read, write, and so on. (Yes, really!) The parietal cortex processes our sense of where things are in space (roughly speaking), so an innate "number line", or rather "quantity line", may be responsible for the human sense of numbers. This is why I suggest visualizing Bayesian evidence as sliding the probability along the number line; my hope is that this will translate Bayesian reasoning into something that makes sense to innate human brainware. (That, really, is what an "intuitive explanation" is.) For more information, see Stanislas Dehaene's The Number Sense." Eliezer talks about this all the time, whether it's the importance of anticipating an experience, or replacing the symbol with the substance.

The other thing I want to draw attention to is http://greenlightwiki.com/lenore-exegesis/IntrovertedIntuition?version=66 "p. 225: "For INJs, patterns aren't 'out there' in the world, waiting to be discovered. They're part of us--the way we make sense of the riot of energy and information impinging on our systems. A disease syndrome is a useful construct, but that's all it is--an aggregate of observations attached to a label, telling us what to see and how to deal with it."" "p. 234: "For INJs, truth isn't about logic. Truth is a frame of reference, a way of organizing information, which serves one set of needs or another."" When Robin Hanson talks about "meta" this or that, or talks about frameworks. It seems that he is thinking in an Introverted Intuition sort of way. It's much more verbal. Eliezer also talks about this in http://yudkowsky.net/bayes/truth.html , specifically "Inspector Darwin looks at the two arguers, both apparently unwilling to give up their positions. "Listen," Darwin says, more kindly now, "I have a simple notion for resolving your dispute. You say," says Darwin, pointing to Mark, "that people's beliefs alter their personal realities. And you fervently believe," his finger swivels to point at Autrey, "that Mark's beliefs can't alter reality. So let Mark believe really hard that he can fly, and then step off a cliff. Mark shall see himself fly away like a bird, and Autrey shall see him plummet down and go splat, and you shall both be happy.""

Robin doesn't see the PRIMACY of spatial relationships to reasoning. So when Eliezer talks about surface analogies compared to deep causal STRUCTURE (spatial) Robin just sees it as a frame of reference, instead of something invariant across frames of reference. I hope some of this made sense.