I'm not sure I can come up with a distinguishing principle here, but I feel like some but not all unpleasant emotions feel similar to physical pain, such that I would call them a kind of pain ("emotional pain"), and cringing at a bad joke can be painful in this way.

More reasons: people wear sunglasses when they’re doing fun things outdoors like going to the beach or vacationing so it’s associated with that, and also sometimes just hiding part of a picture can cause your brain to fill it in with a more attractive completion than is likely.

This probably does help capitalize AI companies a little bit, demand for call options will create demand for the underlying. This is probably a relatively small effect (?), but I'm not confident in my ability to estimate this at all.

I'm confused about what you mean & how it relates to what I said.

It's totally wrong that you can't argue against someone who says "I don't know", you argue against them by showing how your model fits the data and how any plausible competing model either doesn't fit or shares the salient features of yours. It's bizarre to describe "I don't know" as "garbage" in general, because it is the correct stance to take when neither your prior nor evidence sufficiently constrain the distribution of plausibilities. Paul obviously didn't posit an "unobserved kindness force" because he was specifically describing the observation that humans are kind. I think Paul and Nate had a very productive disagreement in that thread and this seems like a wildly reductive mischaracterization of it.

I don’t think this is accurate, I think most philosophy is done under motivated reasoning but is not straightforwardly about signaling group membership

Hi, any updates on how this worked out? Considering trying this...

This is the most interesting answer I've ever gotten to this line of questioning. I will think it over!

What observation could demonstrate that this code indeed corresponded to the metaphysical important sense of continuity across time? What would the difference be between a world where it did or it didn't?

Say there is a soul. We inspect a teleportation process, and we find that, just like your body and brain, the soul disappears on the transmitter pad, and an identical soul appears on the receiver. What would this tell you that you don't already know?

What, in principle, could demonstrate that two souls are in fact the same soul across time?