Thanks a lot for this post! I appreciate you taking the time to engage, I think your recommendations are good, and I agree with most of what you say. Some comments below.
Intelligence curse != Gradual disempowerment
"the intelligence curse" or "gradual disempowerment"—concerns that most humans would end up disempowered (or even dying) because their labor is no longer valuable.
The intelligence curse and GD are not equivalent. In particular, I expect @Jan_Kulveit & co. would see GD as a broader bucket including also various subtle forms of cultural misalignment (which tbc I think also matter!), whereas IC is more specifically about things downstream of economic (and hard power, and political power) incentives. (And I would see e.g. @Tom Davidson's AI-enabled coup risk work as a subset of IC, as representing the most sudden and dramatic way that IC incentives could play out)
On the stakes
It's worth noting I doubt that these threats would result in huge casualty counts (due to e.g. starvation) or disempowerment of all humans (though substantial concentration of power among a smaller group of humans seems quite plausible).
[fn:]
That said, I do think that technical misalignment issues are pretty likely to disempower all humans and I think war, terrorism, or accidental release of homicidal bioweapons could kill many. That's why I focus on misalignment risks.
I think if you follow the arguments, disempowerment of all humans is plausible, and disempowerment of the vast majority even more so. I agree that technical misalignment is more likely to lead to high casualty counts if it happens (and I think the technical misalignment --> x-risk pathway is possible and incredibly urgent to make progress on).
I think there's also a difference between working on mitigating very clear sequences of steps that lead to catastrophe (e.g. X --> Y --> everyone drops dead), and working on maintaining the basic premises that make things not broken (e.g. for the last 200 years when things have been getting much better, the incentives of power and humans have been remarkably correlated, and maybe we should try to not decorrelate them). The first is more obvious, but I think you should also be able to admit theories of change of the second type at least sufficiently that, for example, you would've decided to resist communism in the 1950s ("freedom good" is vague, and there wasn't yet consensus that market-based economies would provide better living standards in the long run, but it was still correct to bet against the communists if you cared about human welfare! basic liberalism is very powerful!).
The proposals
- Mandatory interoperability for alignment and fine-tuning is a great idea that I'm not sure I've heard before!
- Alignment to the user is also a great idea (which @lukedrago & I also wrote about in The Intelligence Curse). There are various reasons I think the per-user alignment needs to be quite fine-grained (e.g. I expect it requires finetuning / RLHF, not just basic prompting), which I think you also buy (?), and which I hope to write about more later.
Implicit in my views is that the problem would be mostly resolved if people had aligned AI representatives which helped them wield their (current) power effectively.
Yep, this is a big part of the future I'm excited to build towards.
Prioritization of proposals
- I'm skeptical of generally diffusing AI into the economy, working on systems for assisting humans, and generally uplifting human capabilities. This might help some with societal awareness, but doesn't seem like a particularly leveraged intervention for this. Things like emulated minds and highly advanced BCIs might help with misalignment, but otherwise seems worse than AI representatives (which aren't backdoored and don't have secret loyalties/biases).
I think there are two basic factors that affect uplift chances:
- Takeoff speed—if this is fast, then uplift matters less. However, note that there are two distinct ways in which time helps:
- more societal awareness over time and more time to figure out what policies to advocate and what steps to take and so on—and the value of this degrades very quickly with takeoff speed increasing
- people have more power going into the extreme part of takeoff—but note that how rapidly you can ramp up power also increases with takeoff speed (e.g. if you can achieve huge things in the last year of human labor because of AI uplift, you're in a better position when going into the singularity, and the AI uplift amount is related to takeoff speed)
- How contingent is progress along the tech tree. I believe:
- The current race towards agentic AGI in particular is much more like 50% cultural/path-dependent than 5% cultural/path-dependent and 95% obvious. I think the decisions of the major labs are significantly influenced by particular beliefs about AGI & timelines; while these are likely (at least directionally) true beliefs, it's not at all clear to me that the industry would've been this "situationally aware" in alternative timelines.
- Tech progress, especially on fuzzier / less-technical things about human-machine interaction and social processes, is really quite contingent. I think we'd have much meaningfully worse computer interfaces today if Steve Jobs had never lived.
(More fundamentally, there's also the question of how high you think human/AI complementarity at cognitive skills to be—right now it's surprisingly high IMO)
I'm skeptical that local data is important.
I'm curious what your take on the basic Hayek point is?
- I agree that AI enabled contracts, AI enabled coordination, and AIs speeding up key government processes would be good (to preserve some version of rule of law such that hard power is less important). It seems tricky to advance this now.
I expect a track record of trying out some form of coordination at scale is really helpful for later getting it into government / into use by more "serious" actors. I think it's plausible that it's really hard to get governments to try any new coordination or governance mechanism before it's too late, but if you wanted to increase the odds, I think you should just very clearly be trying them out in practice.
- Understanding agency, civilizational social processes, and how you could do “civilizational alignment” seems relatively hard and single-single aligned AI advisors/representatives could study these areas as needed (coordinating research funding across many people as needed).
I agree these are hard, and also like an area where it's unclear if cracking R&D automation to the point where we can hill-climb on ML performance metrics gets you AI that does non-fake work on these questions. I really want very good AI representatives that are very carefully aligned to individual people if we're going to have the AIs work on this.
We mention the threat of coups—and Davidson et. al.'s paper on it—several times.
Regarding the weakness or slow-actingness of economic effects: it is true that the fundamental thing that forces the economic incentives to percolate to the surface and actually have an effect is selection pressure, and selection pressure is often slow-acting. However: remember that the time that matters is not necessarily calendar time.
- Most basically, the faster the rate of progress and change, the faster selection pressures operate.
- As MacInnes et. al. point out in Anarchy as Architect, the effects of selection pressures often don't manifest for a long time, but then appear suddenly in times of crisis—for example, the World Wars leading to a bunch of industrialization-derived state structure changes happening very quickly. The more you believe that takeoff will be chaotic and involve crises and tests of institutional capacity, the more you should believe that unconscious selection pressures will operate quickly.
- You don't need to wait for unconscious selection to work, if the agents in charge of powerful actors can themselves plan and see the writing on the wall. And the more planning capacity you add into the world (a default consequence of AI!), the more effectively you should expect competing agents (that do not coordinate) to converge on the efficient outcome.
Of course, it's true that if takeoff is fast enough then you might get a singleton and different strategies apply—though of course singletons (whether human organizations or AIs) immediately create vast risk if they're misaligned. And if you have enough coordination, then you can in fact avoid selection pressures (but a world with such effective coordination seems to be quite an alien world from ours or any that historically existed, and unlikely to be achieved in the short time remaining until powerful AI arrives, unless some incredibly powerful AI-enabled coordination tech arrives quickly). But this requires not just coordination, but coordination between well-intentioned actors who are not corrupted by power. If you enable perfect coordination between, say, the US and Chinese government, you might just get a dual oligarchy controlling the world and ruling over everyone else, rather than a good lightcone.
If humanity loses control and it's not due to misaligned AI, it's much more likely to be due to an AI enabled coup, AI propaganda or AI enabled lobbying than humans having insufficient economic power.
AI-enabled coups and AI-enabled lobbying all get majorly easier and more effective the more humanity's economic role have been erased. Fixing them is also all part of maintaining the balance of power in society.
I agree that AI propaganda, and more generally AI threats to the information environment & culture, are a big & different deal that intelligence-curse.ai don't address except in passing. You can see the culture section of Gradual Disempowerment (by @Jan_Kulveit @Raymond D & co.) for more on this.
There's a saying "when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" that I think applies here. I'm bearish on [approaches] opposed to multi-disciplinary approaches that don't artificially inflate particular factors.
I share the exact same sentiment, but for me it applies in reverse. Much "basic" alignment discourse seems to admit exactly two fields—technical machine learning and consequentialist moral philosophy—while sweeping aside considerations about economics, game theory, politics, social changes, institutional design, culture, and generally the lessons of history. A big part of what intelligence-curse.ai tries to do is take this more holistic approach, though of course it can't focus on everything, and in particular neglects the culture / info environment / memetics side. Things that try to be even more holistic are my scenario and Gradual Disempowerment.
I don’t believe the standard story of the resource curse.
What do you think is the correct story for the resource curse?
I find the scenario implausible.
This is not a scenario, it is a class of concerns about the balance of power and economic misalignment that we expect to be a force in many specific scenarios. My actual scenario is here.
The “social-freeze and mass-unemployment” narrative seems to assume that AI progress will halt exactly at the point where AI can do every job but is still somehow not dangerous.
We do not assume AI progress halts at that point. We say several times that we expect AIs to keep improving. They will take the jobs, and they will keep on improving beyond that. The jobs do not come back if the AI gets even smarter. We also have an entire section dedicated to mitigating the risks of AIs that are dangerous, because we believe that is a real and important threat.
More directly, full automation of the economy would mean that AI can perform every task in companies already capable of creating military, chemical, or biological threats. If the entire economy is automated, AI must already be dangerously capable.
Exactly!
I expect reality to be much more dynamic, with many parties simultaneously pushing for ever-smarter AI while understanding very little about its internals.
"Reality will be dynamic, with many parties simultaneously pushing for ever-smarter AI [and their own power & benefit] while understanding very little about [AI] internals [or long-term societal consequences]" is something I think we both agree with.
I expect that approaching superintelligence without any deeper understanding of the internal cognition this way will give us systems that we cannot control and that will get rid of us. For these reasons, I have trouble worrying about job replacement.
If we hit misaligned superintelligence in 2027 and all die as a result, then job replacement, long-run trends of gradual disempowerment, and the increased chances of human coup risks indeed do not come to pass. However, if we don't hit misaligned superintelligence immediately, and instead some humans pull a coup with the AIs, or the advanced AIs obsolete humans very quickly (very plausible if you think AI progress will be fast!) and the world is now states battling against each other with increasingly dangerous AIs while feeling little need to care for collateral damage to humans, then it sure will have been a low dignity move from humanity if literally no one worked on those threat models!
You also seem to avoid mentioning the extinction risk in this text.
The audience is primarily not LessWrong, and the arguments for working on alignment & hardening go through based on merely catastrophic risks (which we do mention many times). Also, the series is already enough of an everything-bagel as it is.
The scenario does not say that AI progress slows down. What I imagined to be happening is that after 2028 or so, there is AI research being done by AIs at unprecedented speeds, and this drives raw intelligence forward more and more, but (1) the AIs still need to run expensive experiments to make progress sometimes, and (2) basically nothing is bottlenecked by raw intelligence anymore so you don't really notice it getting even better.
I will admit I'm not an expert here. The intuition behind this is that if you grant extreme performance at mathsy things very soon, it doesn't seem unreasonable that the AIs will make some radical breakthrough in the hard sciences surprisingly soon, while still being bad at many other things. In the scenario, note that it's a "mathematical framework" (implicitly a sufficiently big advance in what we currently have such that it wins a Nobel) but not the final theory of everything, and it's explicitly mentioned empirical data bottlenecks it.
Thanks for these speculations on the longer-term future!
while I do think Mars will be exploited eventually, I expect the moon to be first for serious robotics effort
Maybe! My vague Claude-given sense is that the Moon is surprisingly poor in important elements though.
not being the fastest amongst them all (because replicating a little better will usually only get a little advantage, not an utterly dominant one), combined with a lot of values being compatible with replicating fast, so value alignment/intent alignment matters more than you think
This is a good point! However, more intelligence in the world also means we should expect competition to be tighter, reducing the amount of slack by which you can deviate from the optimal. In general, I can see plausible abstract arguments for the long-run equilibrium being either Hansonian zero-slack Malthusian competition or absolute unalterable lock-in.
Given no nationalization of the companies has happened, and they still have large freedoms of action, it's likely that Google Deepmind, OpenAI and Anthropic have essentially supplanted the US as the legitimate government, given their monopolies on violence via robots.
I expect the US government to be competent enough to avoid being supplanted by the companies. I think politicians, for all their flaws, are pretty good at recognising a serious threat to their power. There's also only one government but several competing labs.
(Note that the scenario doesn't mention companies in the mid and late 2030s)
the fact that EA types got hired to some of the most critical positions on AI was probably fairly critical in this timeline for preventing the worst outcomes from the intelligence curse from occurring.
In this timeline, a far more important thing is the sense among American political elite that they are freedom-loving people and that they should act in accordance with that, and a similar sense among Chinese political elite that they are a civilised people and that Chinese civilisational continuity is important. A few EAs in government, while good, will find it difficult to match the impact of the cultural norms that a country's leaders inherit and that proscribe their actions.
For example: I've been reading Christopher Brown's Moral Capital recently, which looks at how opposition to slavery rose to political prominence in 1700s Britain. It claims that early strong anti-slavery attitudes were more driven by a sense that slavery was insulting to Britons' sense of themselves as a uniquely liberal people, than by arguments about slave welfare. At least in that example, the major constraint on the treatment of a powerless group of people seems to have been in large part the political elite managing its own self-image.
I built this a few months ago: https://github.com/LRudL/devcon
Definitely not production-ready and might require some "minimal configuration and tweaking" to get working.
Includes a "device constitution" that you set; if you visit a website, Claude will judge whether the page follows that written document, and if not it will block you, and the only way past it is winning a debate with it about why your website visit is in-line with your device constitution.
I found it too annoying but some of my friends liked it.
However, I think there is a group of people who over-optimize for Direction and neglect the Magnitude. Increasing Magnitude often comes with the risk of corrupting the Direction. For example, scaling fast often makes it difficult to hire only mission-aligned people, and it requires you to give voting power to investors that prioritizes profit. To increase Magnitude can therefore feel risky, what if I end up working at something that is net-negative for the world? Therefore it might be easier for one's personal sanity to optimize for Direction, to do something that is unquestionably net-positive. But this is the easy way out, and if you want to have the highest expected value of your Impact, you cannot disregard Magnitude.
You talk here about an impact/direction v ambition/profit tradeoff. I've heard many other people talking about this tradeoff too. I think it's overrated; in particular, if you're constantly having to think about it, that's a bad sign.
- It's rare that you have a continuous space of options between lots of impact and low profit, and low/negative impact and high profit.
- If you do have such a continuous space of options then I think you are often just screwed and profit incentives will win.
- The really important decision you make is probably a discrete choice: do you start an org trying to do X, or an org trying to do Y? Usually you can't (and even if you can, shouldn't) try to interpolate between these things, and making this high-level strategy call will probably shape your impact more than any later finetuning of parameters within that strategy.
- Often, the profit incentives point towards the more-obvious, gradient-descent-like path, which is usually very crowded and leads to many "mediocre" outcomes (e.g. starting a $10M company), but the biggest things come from doing "Something Else Which Is Not That" (as is said in dath ilan). For example, SpaceX (ridiculously hard and untested business proposition) and Facebook (started out seeing very small and niche and with no clue of where the profit was).
Instead, I think the real value of doing things that are startup-like comes from:
- The zero-to-one part of Peter Thiel's zero-to-one v one-to-n framework: the hardest, progress-bottlenecking things usually look like creating new things, rather than scaling existing things. For example, there is very little you can do today in American politics that is as impactful or reaches as deep into the future as founding America in the first place.
- In the case of AI safety: neglectedness. Everyone wants to work at a lab instead, humans are too risk averse in general, etc. (I've heard many people in AI safety say that neglectedness is overrated. There are arguments like this one that replaceability/neglectedness considerations aren't that major: job performance is heavy-tailed, hiring is hard for orgs, etc. But such arguments seem like weirdly myopic parameter-fiddling, at least when the alternative is zero-to-one things like discussed above. Starting big things is in fact big. Paradigm shifts matter because they're the frame that everything else takes place in. You either see this or you don't.)
- To the extent you think the problem is about economic incentives or differential progress, have you considered getting your hands dirty and trying to change the actual economy or the direction of the tech tree? There are many ways to do this, including some types of policy and research. But I think the AI safety scene has a cultural bias towards things that look like research or information-gathering, and away from being "builders" in the Silicon Valley sense. One of the things that Silicon Valey does get right is that being a builder is very powerful. If the AI debate comes down to a culture/influence struggle between anti-steering, e/acc-influenced builder types and pro-steering EA-influenced academic types, it doesn't look good for the world.
1Thanks for the heads-up, that looks very convenient. I've updated the post to link to this instead of the scraper repo on GitHub.
There's a version now that was audited by Chrome Web Store, if that's enough for you: https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/objective/dckljlpogfgmgmnbaicaiohioinipbge?authuser=0&hl=en-GB
Currently you need to be on the beta list though, since it costs Gemini API credits to run (though a quite trivial amount)—if you (or anyone else) DMs me an email I can add you to the list, and at some point if I have time I might enable payments such that it's generally available.