momom2

AIS student, self-proclaimed aspiring rationalist, very fond of game theory.
"The only good description is a self-referential description, just like this one."

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momom210

In that case, per my other comment, I think it's much more likely that superbabies concern only a small fraction of the population and exacerbates inequality without bringing the massive benefits that a generally more capable population would.

Do you think superbabies would be put to work on alignment in a way that makes a difference due to geniuses driving the field? I'm having trouble understanding how concretely you think superbabies can lead to significantly improved chance of helping alignment.

momom2114

I'm having trouble understanding your ToC in a future influenced by AI. What's the point of investigating this if it takes 20 years to become significant?

momom220-1

I'm surprised to see no one in the comments whose reaction is "KILL IT WITH FIRE", so I'll be that guy and make a case why this research should be stopped rather than pursued:

On the one hand, there is obviously enormous untapped potential in this technology. I don't have issues about the natural order of life or some WW2 eugenics trauma. From my (unfamiliar with the subject) eyes, you propose a credible way to make everyone healthier, smarter, happier, at low cost and within a generation, which is hard to argue against.

On the other hand, you spend no time mentioning the context in which this technology will be developed. I imagine there will be significant public backlash and that most advances on superbabies-making will be made by private labs funded by rich tech optimists, so it seems overwhelmingly likely to me that if this technology does get developed in the next 20 years, it will not improve everyone

At this point, we're talking about the far future, so I need to make a caveat for AI: I have no idea how the new AI world will interact with this, but there are a few most likely futures I can condition on.

  • Everyone dies: No point talking about superbabies.
  • Cohabitive singleton: No point. It'll decide whether it wants superbabies or not.
  • Controlled ASI: Altman, Musk and a few others become kings of the universe, or it's tightly controlled by various governments.

In that last scenario, I expect people having superbabies will be the technological and intellectual elites, leading to further inequality, and not enough improvements at scale to significantly improve global life expectancy or happiness... though I guess the premises are already an irrecoverable catastrophe, so superbabies are not the crux in this case.

Lastly, there is the possibility that AI does not reach superintelligence before we develop superbabies, or that the world will proceed more or less unchanged for us; in that case, I do think superbabies will increase inequality for little gains on the scale of humanity, but I don't see this scenario as likely enough to be upset about it.

So I guess my intuitive objection was simply wrong, but I don't mind posting this since you'll probably meet more people like me.

momom296

There are three traders on this market; it means nothing at the moment. No need for virtue signalling to explain a result you might perceive as abnormal, it's just not formed yet.

momom210

Thanks for writing this! I was unaware of the Chinese investment, which explains another recent information which you did not include but I think is significant: Nvidia's stock plummeted 18% today.

momom21-4

Five minutes of thought on how this could be used for capabilities:
- Use behavioral self-awareness to improve training data (e.g. training on this dataset increases self-awareness of code insecurity, so it probably contains insecure code that can be fixed before training on it).
- Self-critique for iterative improvement within a scaffolding (already exists, but this work validates the underlying principles and may provide further grounding).

It sure feels like behavioral self-awareness should work just as well for self capability assessments as for safety topics, and that this ought to be usable to improve capabilities but my 5 minutes are up and I don't feel particularly threatened by what I found.

In general, given concerns that safety-intended work often ends up boosting capabilities, I would appreciate systematically including a section on why the authors believe their work is unlikely to have negative externalities.

momom230

(If you take time to think about this, feel free to pause reading and write your best solution in the comments!)

How about:
- Allocating energy everywhere to either twitching randomly or collecting nutrients. Assuming you are propelled by the twitching, this follows the gradient if there's one.
- Try to grow in all directions. If there are no outside nutrients to fuel this growth, consume yourself. In this manner, regenerate yourself in the direction of the gradient.
- Try to grab nutrients from all directions. If there are nutrients, by reaction you will be propelled towards it so this moves in the direction of the gradient.

 

Update after seeing the solution of B. subtilis: Looks like I had the wrong level of abstraction in mind. Also, I didn't consider group solutions.

momom250

Contra 2:
ASI might provide a strategic advantage of a kind which doesn't negatively impact the losers of the race, e.g. it increases GDP by x10 and locks competitors out of having an ASI.
Then, losing control of the ASI could [not being able of] posing an existential risk to the US.
I think it's quite likely this is what some policymakers have in mind: some sort of innovation which will make everything better for the country by providing a lot cheap labor and generally improving productivity, the way we see AI applications do right now but on a bigger scale.

Comment on 3:
Not sure who your target audience is; I assume it would be policymakers, in which case I'm not sure how much weight that kind of argument has? I'm not a US citizen, but from international news I got the impression that current US officials would rather relish the option to undermine the liberal democracy they purport to defend.

momom22-2

From the disagreement between the two of you, I infer there is yet debate as to what environmentalism means. The only way to be a true environmentalist then is to make things as reversible as possible until such time as an ASI can explain what the environmentalist course of action regarding the Sun should be.

momom210

The paradox arises because the action-optimal formula mixes world states and belief states. 
The [action-planning] formula essentially starts by summing up the contributions of the individual nodes as if you were an "outside" observer that knows where you are, but then calculates the probabilities at the nodes as if you were an absent-minded "inside" observer that merely believes to be there (to a degree). 

So the probabilities you're summing up are apples and oranges, so no wonder the result doesn't make any sense. As stated, the formula for action-optimal planning is a bit like looking into your wallet more often, and then observing the exact same money more often. Seeing the same 10 dollars twice isn't the same thing as owning 20 dollars. 

If you want to calculate the utility and optimal decision probability entirely in belief-space (i.e. action-optimal), then you need to take into account that you can be at X, and already know that you'll consider being at X again when you're at Y. 

So in belief space, your formula for the expected value also needs to take into account that you'll forget, and the formula becomes recursive. So the formula should actually be: 

Explanation of the terms in order of appearance:

  • If we are in X and CONTINUE, then we will "expect the same value again" when we are in Y in the future. This enforces temporal consistency.
  • If we are in X and EXIT, then we should expect 0 utility
  • If we are in Y and CONTINUE, then we should expect 1 utility
  • If we are in Y and EXIT, then we should expect 4 utility We also know that a must be 1 / (1 + p), because when driving n times, you're in X for n times, and in Y for p * n times. 

Under that constraint, we get that  The optimum here is at p=2/3 with an expected utility of 4/3, which matches the planning-optimal formula. 

[Shamelessly copied from a comment under this video by xil12323.]

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