If we find ourselves in a world where ASI seems imminent and nations understand its implications, I'd predict that time will be more characterized by mutually assured cooperation rather than sabotage. One key reason for this is that if one nation is seen as leading the race and trying to grab a strategic monopoly via AI, both its allies and enemies will have similar incentives to pursue safety — via safety assurances or military action. There are quite a lot of agreeable safety assurances we can develop and negotiate (some of which you discuss in the paper), and pursuing them will very likely be attempted before direct military escalation. A surprisingly likely end result and stable equilibrium of this then seems to be one where ASI is developed and tightly monitored as an international effort.
This equilibrium of cooperation seems like a plausible outcome the more it's understood that:
While sabotage and military power are the deterrent, it seems unlikely they will be the action taken; there will likely be no clear points at which to initiate a military conflict, no "fire alarm" — while at the same time nations will feel pressured to act before it is too late. This is an unstable equilibrium that all parties will be incentivized to de-escalate, resulting in "mutually assured cooperation".
That said, I recognize this cooperation-focused perspective may appear optimistic. The path to "mutually assured cooperation" is far from guaranteed. Historical precedents for international cooperation on security matters are mixed[1]. Differences in how nations perceive AI risks and benefits, varying technological capabilities, domestic political pressures, and the unpredictable nature of AI progress itself could all dramatically alter this dynamic. The paper's MAIM framework may indeed prove more accurate if trust breaks down or if one actor believes they can achieve decisive strategic advantage before others can respond. I'm curious how others view the balance of incentives between competition and cooperation in this context.
I like the anecdote that the Cuban missile crisis was at its peak defused because the nations found a deal that was plainly rational and fair, with Kennedy saying he would be in an insupportable position to refuse the deal because "it’s gonna — to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade”.
To draw parallels from nuclear weapons: The START I nuclear disarmament treaty between the US and the USSR included some 12 different types of inspection, which included Russian inspectors at US sites and vice versa. We also have the International Atomic Energy Agency that coordinates various safety measures for inhibiting dangerous uses of nuclear technologies. There are many more techniques and agreements that were cooperatively deployed to improve outcomes.
With AI, we already have precursory elements for this in place, with for example the UK AISI evaluating US-developed models for safety. If AI power and danger levels continue to progress, its development will likely become increasingly government-controlled and monitored. The more it is seen as a national security issue, the more pressure there will be for international cooperation from enemies and allies alike.
This cooperation might include reciprocal inspection regimes, joint safety standards, transparency requirements for training runs above certain compute thresholds, and international verification mechanisms. While military conflict remains a theoretical option, the threshold for such action would be extremely high given both nuclear deterrence and the significant diplomatic costs. Instead, we'd likely see a gradual evolution of international governance similar to what we've seen with nuclear technology, but hopefully with more robust cooperation given the shared risks and benefits inherent to ASI.