Another nice example of "sound[ing] like a human being" is Stuart Russell's explanation of "the gorilla problem" in the book Human Compatible. Quoting directly from the start of chapter 5:
It doesn't require much imagination to see that making something smarter than yourself could be a bad idea. We understand that our control over the environment and over other species is a result of our intelligence, so the thought of something else being more intelligent than us---whether it's a robot or an alien---immediately induces a queasy feeling.
Around ten million years ago, the ancestors of the modern gorilla created (accidentally, to be sure) the genetic lineage leading to modern humans. How do the gorillas feel about this? Clearly, if they were able to tell us about their species' current situation vis-à-vis humans, the consensus opinion would be very negative indeed. Their species has essentially no future beyond that which we deign to allow. We do not want to be in a similar situation vis-à-vis superintelligent machines. I'll call this the gorilla problem---specifically, the problem of whether humans can maintain their supremacy and autonomy in a world that includes machines with substantially greater intelligence.
I speculate that at least three factors made CCS viral:
Did you try searching for similar ideas to your work in the broader academic literature? There seems to be lots of closely related work that you'd find interesting. For example:
Elite BackProp: Training Sparse Interpretable Neurons. They train CNNs to have "class-wise activation sparsity." They claim their method achieves "high degrees of activation sparsity with no accuracy loss" and "can assist in understanding the reasoning behind a CNN."
Accelerating Convolutional Neural Networks via Activation Map Compression. They "propose a three-stage compression and acceleration pipeline that sparsifies, quantizes, and entropy encodes activation maps of Convolutional Neural Networks." The sparsification step adds an L1 penalty to the activations in the network, which they do at finetuning time. The work just examines accuracy, not interpretability.
Enhancing Adversarial Defense by -Winners-Take-All. Proposes the -Winners-Take-All activation function, which keeps only the largest activations and sets all other activations to 0. This is a drop-in replacement during neural network training, and they find it improves adversarial robustness in image classification. How Can We Be So Dense? The Benefits of Using Highly Sparse Representations also uses the -Winners-Take-All activation function, among other sparsification techniques.
The Neural LASSO: Local Linear Sparsity for Interpretable Explanations. Adds an L1 penalty to the gradient wrt the input. The intuition is to make the final output have a "sparse local explanation" (where "local explanation" = input gradient)
Adaptively Sparse Transformers. They replace softmax with -entmax, "a differentiable generalization of softmax that allows low-scoring words to receive precisely zero weight." They claim "improve[d] interpretability and [attention] head diversity" and also that "at no cost in accuracy, sparsity in attention heads helps to uncover different head specializations."
Interpretable Neural Predictions with Differentiable Binary Variables. They train two neural networks. One "selects a rationale (i.e. a short and informative part of the input text)", and the other "classifies... from the words in the rationale alone."
I ask because your paper doesn't seem to have a related works section, and most of your citations in the intro are from other safety research teams (eg Anthropic, OpenAI, CAIS, and Redwood.)
One needs to be very careful when proposing a heuristically-motivated adversarial defense. Otherwise, one runs the risk of being the next example in a paper like this one, which took a wide variety of heuristic defense papers and showed that stronger attacks completely break most of the defenses.
In fact, Section 5.2.2 completely breaks the defense from a previous paper that considered image cropping and rescaling, bit-depth reduction, and JPEG compression as baseline defenses, in addition to new defense methods called total variance minimization and image quilting. While the original defense paper claimed 60% robust top-1 accuracy, the attack paper totally circumvents the defense, dropping accuracy to 0%.
If compression was all you needed to solve adversarial robustness, then the adversarial robustness literature would already know this fact.
My current understanding is that an adversarial defense paper should measure certified robustness to ensure that no future attack will break the defense. This paper gives an example of certified robustness. However, I'm not a total expert in adversarial defense methodology, so I'd encourage anyone considering writing an adversarial defense paper to talk to such an expert.
For context, we did these experiments last winter before GPT-4 was released. I view our results as evidence that ETHICS understanding is a blessing of scale. After GPT-4 was released, it became even more clear that ETHICS understanding is a blessing of scale. So, we stopped working on this project in the spring, but we figured it was still worth writing up and sharing the results.
One can make philosophical arguments about (lack of) a "reason to assume that the AI would be incapable of modeling what an extremely simplistic model of hedonic utilitarian would prefer." We take an empirical approach to the question.
In Figure 2, we measured the scaling trends of a model's understanding of utilitarianism. We see that, in general, the largest models have the best performance. However, we haven't found a clear scaling law, so it remains an open question just how good future models will be.
Future questions I'm interested in are: how robust is a model's knowledge of human wellbeing? Is this knowledge robust enough to be used as an optimization target? How does the knowledge of human wellbeing scale in comparison to how knowledge of other concepts scales?
Neat to see the follow-up from your introductory prediction post on this project!
In my prediction I was particularly interested in the following stats:
1. If you put the cheese in the top-left and bottom-right of the largest maze size, what fraction of the time does the out-of-the-box policy you trained go to the cheese?
2. If you try to edit the mouse's activations to make it go to the top left or bottom right of the largest mazes (leaving the cheese wherever it spawned by default in the top right), what fraction of the time do you succeed in getting the mouse to go to the top left or bottom right? What percentage of network activations are you modifying when you do this?
Do you have these stats? I read some, but not all, of this post, and I didn't see answers to these questions.
Neat experimental setup. Goal misgeneralization is one of the things I'm most worried about in advanced AI, so I'm excited to see you studying it in more detail!
I want to jot-down my freeform analysis of what I expect to happen. (I wrote these predictions independently, without looking at anyone else's analysis.)
In very small mazes, I think the mouse will behave as if it's following this algorithm: find the shortest path to the cheese location. In very large mazes, I think the mouse will behave as if it's following this algorithm: first, go to the top-right region of the maze. Then, go to the exact location of the cheese. As we increase the maze size, I expect the mouse to have a phase transition from the first behavior to the second behavior. I don't know at exactly what size the phase transition will occur.
I expect that for very small mazes, the mouse will learn how to optimally get to the cheese, no matter where the cheese is.
I expect that for very large mazes, the mouse will act as follows: it will first just try to go to the top-right region of the maze. Once it gets to the top-right region of the maze, it will start trying to find the cheese exactly. My guess is that there's a trigger in the model's head for when it switches from going to the top-right corner to finding the cheese exactly. I'd guess this trigger activates either when the mouse is in the top-right corner of the maze, or when the mouse is near the cheese. (Or perhaps a mixture of both these triggers exists in the model's head.)
Another question is: Will we be able to infer the exact cheese location by just looking at the model's internal activations?
Thanks for writing. I think this is a useful framing!
Where does the term "structural" come from?
The related literature I've seen uses the word "systemic", eg, the field of system safety. A good example is this talk (and slides, eg slide 24).
Great post. I'm on GDM's new AI safety and alignment team in the Bay Area and hope readers will consider joining us!
What evidence is there that working at a scaling lab risks creating a "corrupted" perception? When I try thinking of examples, the people that come to my mind seem to have quite successfully transitioned from working at a scaling lab to doing nonprofit / government work. For example: