1. In regard to mental imagery and other lack of qualia phenomena, it seems to me that the lack of qualia can be in the other directions in all cases. For example, people who say that they can form mental images, may not have qualia for real life imagery, so both experiences are more of the same to them.
How you can distinguish between those two possibilities?
2. People without qualia (if exist) will have their “real” interpretation of stuff like "vivid sensation of my own presence", and i think that most definitions will failed to find them.
And to be more specific to your definition - non-qualia person will still have awareness for his presence and a self. And still will have more awareness for what he think and his body when meditate.
Really interesting, I like the use of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem, but not sure yet about the claims against indexing.
I have some problems with the SIA vs SSA discussion:
As I see it, SIA and SSA are not alternative for each other, they are both true, and cancel each other, so the doomsday argument is true argument (when ignoring other information like SIA) and also the claim for more life is true (when ignoring SSA) - but together the claims are false. My ranking is evidence for doomsday, but my existence is evidence for more life, when putting them together (in Bayes theorem) they just cancel. No paradoxes.
this claim is not really relevant for the doomsday argument, you only need the random sampling of the index of someone, you use you, because you are random choice. it doesn't matter that you can't be another you.
this claim can be interesting regarding SIA, but even there i don't think it holds, but it will be more interesting and nuance.