All of teradimich's Comments + Replies

Earlier, you wrote about a change to your AGI timelines.
What about p(doom)? It seems that in recent months there have been reasons for both optimism and pessimism.

6Daniel Kokotajlo
I haven't tried to calculate it recently. I still feel rather pessimistic for all the usual reasons. This paper from OpenAI was a positive update; Vance's strong anti-AI-safety stance was a negative update. There have been various other updates besides. 

It seems a little surprising to me how rarely confident pessimists (p(doom)>0.9) they argue with moderate optimists (p(doom)≤0.5).
I'm not specifically talking about this post. But it would be interesting if people revealed their disagreement more often.

2Towards_Keeperhood
Seems totally unrelated to my post but whatever: My p(this branch of humanity won't fulfill the promise of the night sky) is actually more like 0.82 or sth, idk. (I'm even lower on p(everyone will die), because there might be superintelligences in other branches that acausally trade to save the existing lives, though I didn't think about it carefully.) I'm chatting 1 hour every 2 weeks with Erik Jenner. We usually talk about AI safety stuff. Otherwise also like 1h every 2 weeks with a person who has sorta similar views to me. Otherwise I currently don't talk much to people about AI risk.

Thanks for the reply. I remembered a recent article by Evans and thought that reasoning models might show a different behavior. Sorry if this sounds silly

Doesn't sound silly!

My current thoughts (not based on any additional experiments):

  • I'd expect the reasoning models to become misaligned in a similar way. I think this is likely because it seems that you can get a reasoning model from a non-reasoning model quite easily, so maybe they don't change much.
  • BUT maybe they can recover in their CoT somehow? This would be interesting to see.
3Jan Betley
In short - we would love to try, but we have many ideas and I'm not sure what we'll prioritize. Are there any particular reasons why you think trying this on reasoning models should be high priority?

I agree. But now people write so often about short timelines that it seems appropriate to recall the possible reason for the uncertainty.

Doesn't that seem like a reason to be optimistic about reasoning models?

There doesn't seem to be a consensus that ASI will be created in the next 5-10 years. This means that current technology leaders and their promises may be forgotten.
Does anyone else remember Ben Goertzel and Novamente? Or Hugo de Garis?

True, that can definitely happen, but consider

1) the median and average timeline estimates have been getting shorter, not longer, by most measures, 

and 

2) no previous iteration of such claims was credible enough to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in funding, or meaningfully impact politics and geopolitics, or shift the global near-consensus that has held back nuclear power for generations. This suggests a difference in the strength of evidence for the claims in question.

Also 3) When adopted as a general principle of thought, this approach... (read more)

5Gordon Seidoh Worley
While history suggests we should be skeptical, current AI models produce real results of economic value, not just interesting demos. This suggests that we should be willing to take more seriously the possibility that they will be produce TAI since they are more clearly on that path and already having significant transformative effects on the world.

Yudkowsky may think that the plan 'Avert all creation of superintelligence in the near and medium term — augment human intelligence' has <5% chance of success, but your plan has <<1% chance. Obviously, you and he disagree not only on conclusions, but also on models.

EY is known for considering humanity almost doomed. 
He may think that the idea of human intelligence augmentation is likely to fail. But it's the only hope. Of course, many will disagree with this.

He writes more about it here or here.

3Noosphere89
The problem is that from a relative perspective, human augmentation is probably more doomed than AI safety automation, which in turn is more doomed than AI governance interventions, though I may have gotten the relative ordering of AI safety automation and I think the crux is I do not believe in the timeline for human genetic augmentation in adults being only 5 years, even given a well-funded effort, and I'd expect it to take 15-20 years, minimum for large increases in adult intelligence, which basically rules out the approach given the very likely timelines to advanced AI either killing us all or being aligned to someone.

It seems that we are already at the GPT 4.5 level? Except that reasoning models have confused everything, and increasing OOM on output can have the same effect as ~OOM on training, as I understand it.

By the way, you've analyzed the scaling of pretraining a lot. But what about inference scaling? It seems that o3 has already used thousands of GPUs to solve tasks in ARC-AGI.

Thank you. In conditions of extreme uncertainty about the timing and impact of AGI, it's nice to know at least something definite.

Can we assume that Gemini 2.0, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 and other models with similar performance have a similar compute?

For Claude 3.5, Amodei says the training time cost "a few $10M's", which translates to between 1e25 FLOPs (H100, $40M, $4/hour, 30% utilization, BF16) and 1e26 FLOPs (H100, $80M, $2/hour, 50% utilization, FP8), my point estimate is 4e25 FLOPs.

GPT-4o was trained around the same time (late 2023 to very early 2024), and given that the current OpenAI training system seems to take the form of three buildings totaling 100K H100s (the Goodyear, Arizona site), they probably had one of those for 32K H100s, which in 3 months at 40% utilization in BF16 gives 1e26 FLO... (read more)

If we don't build fast enough, then the authoritarian countries could win. 

Ideally it would be something like the UN, but given the geopolitical complexities, that doesn't seem very possible.

This sounds like a rejection of international coordination.

But there was coordination between the United States and the USSR on nuclear weapons issues, despite geopolitical tensions, for example. You can interact with countries you don't like without trying to destroy the world faster than them!

2 years ago, you seemed quite optimistic about AGI Safety/Alignment and had a long timeline.
Have your views changed since then?
I understand that hiring will be necessary in any case.

8Rohin Shah
Still pretty optimistic by the standards of the AGI safety field, somewhat shorter timelines than I reported in that post. Neither of these really affect the work we do very much. I suppose if I were extremely pessimistic I would be doing something else, but even at a p(doom) of 50% I'd do basically the same things I'm doing now. (And similarly individual team members have a wide variety of beliefs on both optimism and timelines. I actually don't know their beliefs on those topics very well because these beliefs are usually not that action-relevant for us.)

Keeping people as a commodity for acasual trade or pets seems like a more likely option.

If only one innovation separates us from AGI, we're fucked.
It seems that if OpenAI or Anthropic had agreed with you, they should have had even shorter timelines.

A short reading list which should be required before one has permission to opine. You can disagree, but step 1 is to at least make an effort to understand why some of the smartest people in the world (and 100% of the top 5 ai researchers — the group historically most skeptical about ai risk) think that we’re dancing on a volcano . [Flo suggests: There’s No Fire Alarm for Artificial General Intelligence, AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities, Superintelligence by Nick Bostrom, and Superintelligence FAQ by Scott Alexander]

But Bostrom estimated the probability of e... (read more)

I would expect that the absence of a global catastrophe for ~2 years after the creation of AGI would increase the chances of most people's survival. Especially in a scenario where alignment was easy.
After all, then there will be time for political and popular action. We can expect something strange when politicians and their voters finally understand the existential horror of the situation!
I don't know. Attempts to ban all AI? The Butlerian jihad? Nationalization of AI companies? Revolutions and military coups? Everything seems possible.
If AI respects the ... (read more)

3Noosphere89
I think the crux is I don't believe political will/popular action will matter until AI can clearly automate ~all jobs, for both reasonable and unreasonable reasons, and I think this is far too late to do much of anything by default, in the sense that the point of no return was way earlier. In order for political action to be useful, it needs to be done when there are real signs that AI could for example automate AI research, not when the event has already happened.

It's possible that we won't get something that deserves the name ASI or TAI until, for example, 2030.
And a lot can change in more than 5 years!

The current panic seems excessive. We do not live in a world where all reasonable people expect the emergence of artificial superintelligence in the next few years and the extinction of humanity soon after that.
The situation is very worrying, and this is the most likely cause of death for all of us in the coming years, yes. But I don't understand how anyone can be so sure of a bad outcome as to consider people's sur... (read more)

Then what is the probability of extinction caused by AI?

4Nikola Jurkovic
My best guess is around 2/3.

Of course, capital is useful in order to exert influence now. Although I would suggest that for a noticeable impact on events, capital or power is needed, which are inaccessible to the vast majority of the population.

But can we end up in a world where the richest 1% or 0.1% will survive, and the rest will die? Unlikely. Even if property rights were respected, such a world would have to turn into a mad hell.
Even a world in which only people like Sam Altman and their entourage will survive the singularity seems more likely.
But the most likely options should be the extinction of all or the survival of almost all without a strong correlation with current well-being. Am I mistaken?

7Noosphere89
I think the answer is yes, and the main way I could see this happening is that we live in an alignment is easy world, property rights are approximately respected for the rich (because they can create robotic armies/supply lines to defend themselves), but anyone else's property rights are not respected. I think the core crux is I expect alignment is reasonably easy, and I also think that without massive reform that is unfortunately not that likely, the mechanisms that allow capitalism to help humans by transforming selfish actions into making other people well off will erode rapidly, and I believe that once you are able to make a robot workforce that doesn't require humans, it becomes necessary to make assumptions about their benevolence in order to survive, and we are really bad at making political systems do work when we have to assume benevolence/trustworthiness. To be fair, I do agree with this:

Most experts do not believe that we are certainly (>80%) doomed. It would be an overreaction to give up after the news that politicians and CEO are behaving like politicians and CEO.

3Vladimir_Nesov
The crux is timing, not doom. In the absence of doom, savings likely become similarly useless. But in the absence of superintelligence (doom or not), savings remain important.

But your P(doom) still only 0.6? Or are you considering disempowerment from AI separately?

It still surprises me that so many people agree on most issues, but have very different P(doom). And even long-term patient discussions do not bring people's views closer. It will probably be even more difficult to convince a politician or the CEO.

3Noosphere89
Eh, I'd argue that people do not in fact agree on most of the issues related to AI, and there's lot's of disagreements on what the problem is, or how to solve it, or what to do after AI is aligned.
5Noosphere89
Generally speaking, it's probably 5-20%, at this point on chances of doom.

I have already tried to collect the most complete collection of quotes here. But it is already very outdated.

4Nathan Young
Thank you, this is the kind of thing I was hoping to find.

It seems that in 2014 he believed that p(doom) was less than 20%

I do expect some of the potential readers of this post to live in a very unsafe environment - e.g. parts of current-day Ukraine, or if they live together with someone abusive - where they are actually in constant danger.

I live ~14 kilometers from the front line, in Donetsk. Yeah, it's pretty... stressful. 
But I think I'm much more likely to be killed by an unaligned superintelligence than an artillery barrage. 
Most people survive urban battles, so I have a good chance. 
And in fact, many people worry even less than I do! People get tired of feeling in danger all the time.

'“Then why are you doing the research?” Bostrom asked.

“I could give you the usual arguments,” Hinton said. “But the truth is that the prospect of discovery is too sweet.” He smiled awkwardly, the word hanging in the air—an echo of Oppenheimer, who famously said of the bomb, “When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it, and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success.”'

'I asked Hinton if he believed an A.I. could be controlled. “That is like asking if a child can control his parents,” he sa

... (read more)

The level of concern and seriousness I see from ML researchers discussing AGI on any social media platform or in any mainstream venue seems wildly out of step with "half of us think there's a 10+% chance of our work resulting in an existential catastrophe".

In fairness, this is not quite half the researchers. This is half the agreed survey.

'We contacted approximately 4271 researchers who published at the conferences NeurIPS or ICML in 2021. [...] We received 738 responses, some partial, for a 17% response rate'.

I expect that worried researchers are more likely to agree to participate in the survey.

2Steven Byrnes
I recall that they tried to advertise / describe the survey in a way that would minimize response bias—like, they didn’t say “COME TAKE OUR SURVEY ABOUT AI DOOM”. That said, I am nevertheless still very concerned about response bias, and I strongly agree that the OP’s wording “48% of researchers” is a mistake that should be corrected.

Thanks for your answer, this is important to me.

I am not an American (so excuse me for my bad English!), so my opinion about the admissibility of attack on the US data centers is not so important. This is not my country.

But reading about the bombing of Russian data centers as an example was unpleasant. It sounds like a Western bias for me. And not only for me.

'What on Earth was the point of choosing this as an example? To rouse the political emotions of the readers and distract them from the main question?'.

If the text is aimed at readers not only from the First World countries, well, perhaps the author... (read more)

9Tapatakt
I'm Russian and I think, when I will translate this, I will change "Russian" to "[other country's]". Will feel safer that way.
8laserfiche
Thank you for pointing this perspective out. Although Eliezer is from the west, I assure you he cares nothing for that sort of politics. The whole point is that the ban would have to be universally supported, with a tight alliance between US, China, Russia, and ideally every other country in the world. No one wants to do any airstrikes and, you're right, they are distracting from the real conversation.
8Daniel Kokotajlo
Thanks. I agree it was a mistake for Yudkowsky to mention that bit, for the reason you mention. Alternatively he should have clarified that he wasn't being a hypocrite and that he'd say the same thing if it was US datacenters going rogue and threatening the world. I think your opinion matters morally and epistemically regardless of your nationality. I agree that your opinion is less likely to influence the US government if you aren't living in the US. Sorry about that.  

I'm not an American, so my consent doesn't mean much :)

3Daniel Kokotajlo
? Can you elaborate, I'm not sure what you are saying.

Suppose China and Russia accepted the Yudkowsky's initiative. But the USA is not. Would you support to bomb a American data center?

If diplomacy failed, but yes, sure.  I've previously wished out loud for China to sabotage US AI projects in retaliation for chip export controls, in the hopes that if all the countries sabotage all the other countries' AI projects, maybe Earth as a whole can "uncoordinate" to not build AI even if Earth can't coordinate.

2gilch
Not sure if I would put it that strongly, but I think I would not support retaliation for the bombing if it legitimately (after diplomacy) came to that. The bombing country would have to claim to be acting in self-defense, try to minimize collateral damage, and not be doing large training runs themselves.

American here. Yes, I would support it -- even if it caused a lot of deaths because the data center is in a populated area. American AI researchers are a much bigger threat to what I care about (i.e., "the human project") than Russia is.

-6avturchin

I for one am not being hypocritical here. Analogy: Suppose it came to light that the US was working on super-bioweapons with a 100% fatality rate, long incubation period, vaccine-resistant, etc. and that they ignored the combined calls from most of the rest of the world to get them to stop. They say they are doing it safely and that it'll only be used against terrorists (they say they've 'aligned' the virus to only kill terrorists or something like that, but many prominent bio experts say their techniques are far from adequate to ensure this and some say t... (read more)

I can provide several links. And you choose those that are suitable. If suitable. The problem is that I retained not the most complete justifications, but the most ... certain and brief. I will try not to repeat those that are already in the answers here.

Ben Goertzel

Jürgen Schmidhuber

Peter J.Bentley

Richard Loosemore

Jaron Lanier and Neil Gershenfeld


Magnus Vinding and his list

Tobias Baumann

Brian Tomasik
 

Maybe Abram Demski? But he changed his mind, probably.
Well, Stuart Russell. But this is a book. I can quote.

I do think that I’m an optimist. I think the

... (read more)
1Optimization Process
Yeah, if you have a good enough mental index to pick out the relevant stuff, I'd happily take up to 3 new bounty-candidate links, even though I've mostly closed submissions! No pressure, though!

I have collected many quotes with links about the prospects of AGI. Most people were optimistic.

2Optimization Process
Thanks for the collection! I wouldn't be surprised if it links to something that tickles my  sense of "high-status monkey presenting a cogent argument that AI progress is good," but didn't see any on a quick skim, and there are too many links to follow all of them; so, no bounty, sorry!

Glad you understood me. Sorry for my english!
Of course, the following examples themselves do not prove the opportunity to solve the entire problem of AGI alignment! But it seems to me that this direction is interesting and strongly underestimated. Well, someone smarter than me can look at this idea and say that it is bullshit, at least.

Partly this is a source of intuition for me, that the creation of aligned superintellect is possible. And maybe not even as hard as it seems.
We have many examples of creatures that follow the goals of someone more stupid. An... (read more)

It seems to me that the brains of many animals can be aligned with the goals of someone much more stupid themselves.
People and pets. Parasites and animals. Even ants and fungus.
Perhaps the connection that we would like to have with superintellence, is observed on a much smaller scale.

3Cameron Berg
I think this is an incredibly interesting point.  I would just note, for instance, in the (crazy cool) fungus-and-ants case, this is a transient state of control that ends shortly thereafter in the death of the smarter, controlled agent. For AGI alignment, we're presumably looking for a much more stable and long-term form of control, which might mean that these cases are not exactly the right proofs of concept. They demonstrate, to your point, that "[agents] can be aligned with the goals of someone much stupider than themselves," but not necessarily that agents can be comprehensively and permanently aligned with the goals of someone much stupider than themselves. Your comment makes me want to look more closely into how cases of "mind control" work in these more ecological settings and whether there are interesting takeaways for AGI alignment.

I apologize for the stupid question. But…

Do we have more chances to survive in the world, which is closer to Orwell's '1984'?
It seems to me that we are moving towards more global surveillance and control. China's regime in 2021 may seem extremely liberal for an observer in 2040.

6[anonymous]
Welcome to 2021, where 1984 is Utopian fiction.

I guess I missed the term gray goo. I apologize for this and for my bad English.
Is it possible to replace it on the 'using nanotechnologies to attain a decisive strategic advantage'?
I mean the discussion of the prospects for nanotechnologies on SL4 20+ years ago. This is especially:

My current estimate, as of right now, is that humanity has no more than a 30% chance of making it, probably less. The most realistic estimate for a seed AI transcendence is 2020; nanowar, before 2015.

I understand that since then the views of EY have changed in many ways. But I a... (read more)

4Rob Bensinger
Makes sense, thanks for the reference! :)

Nanosystems are definitely possible, if you doubt that read Drexler’s Nanosystems and perhaps Engines of Creation and think about physics. 

Is there something like the result of a survey of experts about the feasibility of drexlerian nanotechnology? Are there any consensus among specialists about the possibility of a gray goo scenario?

Drexler and Yudkowsky both extremely overestimated the impact of molecular nanotechnology in the past.

9PeterMcCluskey
A survey of leading chemists would likely produce dismissals based on a strawmanned version of Drexler's ideas. If you could survey people who demonstrably understood Drexler, I'm pretty sure they'd say it's feasible, but critics would plausibly complain about selection bias. The best analysis of gray goo risk seems to be Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by Biovorous Nanoreplicators, with Public Policy Recommendations. They badly overestimated how much effort would get put into developing nanotech. That likely says more about the profitability of working on early-stage nanotech than it says about the eventual impact.
7Rob Bensinger
I don't think anyone (e.g., at FHI or MIRI) is worried about human extinction via gray goo anymore. Like, they expected nanotech to come sooner? Or something else? (What did they say, and where?)

not an expert, but I think life is an existence proof for the power of nanotech, even if the specifics of a grey goo scenario seem less than likely possible. Trees turn sunlight and air into wood, ribosomes build peptides and proteins, and while current generation models of protein folding are a ways from having generative capacity, it's unclear how many breakthroughs are between humanity and that general/generative capacity.  
 

I do not know the opinions of experts on this issue. And I lack competence for such conclusions, sorry.

AlexNet was the first publication that leveraged graphical processing units (GPUs) for the training run

Do you mean the first of the data points on the chart? The GPU was used for DL long before AlexNet. References: [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].

1lennart
Thanks for the correction and references. I just followed my "common sense" from lectures and other pieces. What do you think made AlexNet stand out? Is it the depth and use of GPUs?
0johnlawrenceaspden
Those really don't look too bad to me! (It's 2022). We're all starting to think AI transcendence is 'within the decade', even though no-one's trying to do it deliberately any more. And nanowar before 2015? Well we just saw (2019) an accidental release of a probably-engineered virus. How far away can a deliberate release be? Not bad for 1999.   In 2010, I wrote: https://johnlawrenceaspden.blogspot.com/2010/12/all-dead-soon.html At the time Eliezer was still very optimistic, but I thought that things would take longer than he thought, but also that the AI alignment project was hopeless. As I remember I thought that AI was unlikely to kill me personally, but very likely to kill my friends' children. Updating after ten years, I was less wrong about the hopelessness, and he was less wrong about the timelines.
4Daniel Kokotajlo
Sweet, thanks!

Probably that:

When we didn’t have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33)

This can be useful:

We trained the league using three main agents (one for each StarCraft race), three main exploiter agents (one for each race), and six league exploiter agents (two for each race). Each agent was trained using 32 third-generation tensor processing units (TPUs) over 44 days

Perhaps my large collection of quotes about the impact of AI on the future of humanity here will be helpful.

Then it is worth considering the majority of experts from the FHI to be extreme optimists, the same 20%? I really tried to find all the publicly available forecasts of experts and those who were confident that AI would lead to the extinction of humanity, there were very few among them. But I have no reason not to believe you or Luke Muehlhauser who introduced AI safety experts as even more confident pessimists: ’Many of them are, roughly speaking, 65%-85% confident that machine superintelligence will lead to human extinction’ . The reason may... (read more)

What about this and this? Here, some researchers at the FHI give other probabilities.

4Rob Bensinger
Yeah, I've seen that photo before; I'm glad we have a record of this kind of thing! It doesn't cause me to think that the thing I said in 2017 was false, though it suggests to me that most FHI staff overall in 2014 (like most 80K staff in 2017) probably would have assigned <10% probability to AGI-caused extinction (assuming there weren't a bunch of FHI staff thinking "AGI is a lot more likely to cause non-extinction existential catastrophes" and/or "AGI has a decent chance of destroying the world, but we definitely won't reach AGI this century").
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