Vanessa Kosoy

Director of AI research at ALTER, where I lead a group working on the learning-theoretic agenda for AI alignment. I'm also supported by the LTFF. See also LinkedIn.

E-mail: {first name}@alter.org.il

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I feel that this post would benefit from having the math spelled out. How is inserting a trader a way to do feedback? Can you phrase classical RL like this?

P(GPT-5 Release)

What is the probability that OpenAI will release GPT-5 before the end of 2025? "Release" means that a random member of the public can use it, possibly paid.

 

Does this require a product called specifically "GPT-5"? What if they release e.g "OpenAI o2" instead, and there will never be something called GPT-5?

Number of Current Partners
(for example, 0 if you are single, 1 if you are in a monogamous relationship, higher numbers for polyamorous relationships)

 

This is a confusing phrasing. If you have 1 partner, it doesn't mean your relationship is monogamous. A monogamous relation is one in which there is a mutually agreed understanding that romantic or sexual interaction with other people is forbidden. Without this, your relationship is not monogamous. For example:

  • You have only one partner, but your partner has other partners.
  • You have only one partner, but you occasionally do one night stands with other people.
  • You have only one partner, but both you and your partner are open to you having more partners in the future.

All of the above are not monogamous relationships!

I've been thinking along very similar lines for a while (my inside name for this is "mask theory of the mind": consciousness is a "mask"). But my personal conclusion is very different. While self-deception is a valid strategy in many circumstances, I think that it's too costly when trying to solve an extremely difficult high-stakes problem (e.g. stopping the AI apocalypse). Hence, I went in the other direction: trying to self-deceive little, and instead be self-honest about my[1] real motivations, even if they are "bad PR". In practice, this means never making excuses to myself such as "I wanted to do A, but I didn't have the willpower so I did B instead", but rather owning the fact I wanted to do B and thinking how to integrate this into a coherent long-term plan for my life.

My solution to "hostile telepaths" is diving other people into ~3 categories:

  1. People that are adversarial or untrustworthy, either individually or as representatives of the system on behalf of which they act. With such people, I have no compunction to consciously lie ("the Jews are not in the basement... I packed the suitcase myself...") or act adversarially.
  2. People that seem cooperative, so that they deserve my good will even if not complete trust. With such people, I will be at least metahonest: I will not tell direct lies, and I will be honest about in which circumstances I'm honest (i.e. reveal all relevant information). More generally, I will act cooperatively towards such people, expecting them to reciprocate. My attitude towards in this group is that I don't need to pretend to be something other than I am to gain cooperation, I can just rely on their civility and/or (super)rationality.
  3. Inner circle: People that have my full trust. With them I have no hostile telepath problem because they are not hostile. My attitude towards this group is that we can resolve any difference by putting all the cards on the table and doing whatever is best for the group in aggregate.

Moreover, having an extremely difficult high-stakes problem is not just a strong reason to self-deceive less, it's also strong reason to become more truth-oriented as a community. This means that people with such a common cause should strive to put each other at least in category 2 above, tentatively moving towards 3 (with the caveat of watching out for bad actors trying to exploit that).

  1. ^

    While making sure to use the word "I" to refer to the elephant/unconscious-self and not to the mask/conscious-self.

Two thoughts about the role of quining in IBP:

  • Quine's are non-unique (there can be multiple fixed points). This means that, viewed as a prescriptive theory, IBP produces multi-valued prescriptions. It might be the case that this multi-valuedness can resolve problems with UDT such as Wei Dai's 3-player Prisoner's Dilemma and the anti-Newcomb problem[1]. In these cases, a particular UDT/IBP (corresponding to a particular quine) loses to CDT. But, a different UDT/IBP (corresponding to a different quine) might do as well as CDT.
  • What to do about agents that don't know their own source-code? (Arguably humans are such.) Upon reflection, this is not really an issue! If we use IBP prescriptively, then we can always assume quining: IBP is just telling you to follow a procedure that uses quining to access its own (i.e. the procedure's) source code. Effectively, you are instantiating an IBP agent inside yourself with your own prior and utility function. On the other hand, if we use IBP descriptively, then we don't need quining: Any agent can be assigned "physicalist intelligence" (Definition 1.6 in the original post, can also be extended to not require a known utility function and prior, along the lines of ADAM) as long as the procedure doing the assigning knows its source code. The agent doesn't need to know its own source code in any sense.
  1. ^

    @Squark is my own old LessWrong account.

I just read Daniel Boettger's "Triple Tragedy And Thankful Theory". There he argues that the thrival vs. survival dichotomy (or at least its implications on communication) can be understood as time-efficiency vs. space-efficiency in algorithms. However, it seems to me that a better parallel is bandwidth-efficiency vs. latency-efficiency in communication protocols. Thrival-oriented systems want to be as efficient as possible in the long-term, so they optimize for bandwidth: enabling the transmission of as much information as possible over any given long period of time. On the other hand, survival-oriented systems want to be responsive to urgent interrupts which leads to optimizing for latency: reducing the time it takes between a piece of information appearing on one end of the channel and that piece of information becoming known on the other end.

Ambidistributions

I believe that all or most of the claims here are true, but I haven't written all the proofs in detail, so take it with a grain of salt.

Ambidistributions are a mathematical object that simultaneously generalizes infradistributions and ultradistributions. It is useful to represent how much power an agent has over a particular system: which degrees of freedom it can control, which degrees of freedom obey a known probability distribution and which are completely unpredictable.

Definition 1: Let  be a compact Polish space. A (crisp) ambidistribution on  is a function  s.t.

  1. (Monotonocity) For any , if  then .
  2. (Homogeneity) For any  and .
  3. (Constant-additivity) For any  and .

Conditions 1+3 imply that  is 1-Lipschitz. We could introduce non-crisp ambidistributions by dropping conditions 2 and/or 3 (and e.g. requiring 1-Lipschitz instead), but we will stick to crisp ambidistributions in this post.

The space of all ambidistributions on  will be denoted .[1] Obviously,  (where  stands for (crisp) infradistributions), and likewise for ultradistributions.

Examples

Example 1: Consider compact Polish spaces  and a continuous mapping . We can then define  by

That is,  is the value of the zero-sum two-player game with strategy spaces  and  and utility function .

Notice that  in Example 1 can be regarded as a Cartesian frame: this seems like a natural connection to explore further.

Example 2: Let  and  be finite sets representing actions and observations respectively, and  be an infra-Bayesian law. Then, we can define  by

In fact, this is a faithful representation:  can be recovered from .

Example 3: Consider an infra-MDP with finite state set , initial state  and transition infrakernel . We can then define the "ambikernel"  by

Thus, every infra-MDP induces an "ambichain". Moreover:

Claim 1:  is a monad. In particular, ambikernels can be composed. 

This allows us defining

This object is the infra-Bayesian analogue of the convex polytope of accessible state occupancy measures in an MDP.

Claim 2: The following limit always exists:

Legendre-Fenchel Duality

Definition 3: Let  be a convex space and . We say that  occludes  when for any , we have

Here,  stands for convex hull.

We denote this relation . The reason we call this "occlusion" is apparent for the  case.

Here are some properties of occlusion:

  1. For any .
  2. More generally, if  then .
  3. If  and  then .
  4. If  and  then .
  5. If  and  for all , then .
  6. If  for all , and also , then .

Notice that occlusion has similar algebraic properties to logical entailment, if we think of  as " is a weaker proposition than ".

Definition 4: Let  be a compact Polish space. A cramble set[2] over  is  s.t.

  1.  is non-empty.
  2.  is topologically closed.
  3. For any finite  and , if  then . (Here, we interpret elements of  as credal sets.)

Question: If instead of condition 3, we only consider binary occlusion (i.e. require , do we get the same concept?

Given a cramble set , its Legendre-Fenchel dual ambidistribution is

Claim 3: Legendre-Fenchel duality is a bijection between cramble sets and ambidistributions.

Lattice Structure

Functionals

The space  is equipped with the obvious partial order:  when for all  . This makes  into a distributive lattice, with

This is in contrast to  which is a non-distributive lattice.

The bottom and top elements are given by

Ambidistributions are closed under pointwise suprema and infima, and hence  is complete and satisfies both infinite distributive laws, making it a complete Heyting and co-Heyting algebra.

 is also a De Morgan algebra with the involution

For  is not a Boolean algebra:  and for any  we have .

One application of this partial order is formalizing the "no traps" condition for infra-MDP:

Definition 2: A finite infra-MDP is quasicommunicating when for any 

Claim 4: The set of quasicommunicating finite infra-MDP (or even infra-RDP) is learnable.

Cramble Sets

Going to the cramble set representation,  iff 

 is just , whereas  is the "occlusion hall" of  and .

The bottom and the top cramble sets are

Here,  is the top element of  (corresponding to the credal set .

The De Morgan involution is

Operations

Definition 5: Given  compact Polish spaces and a continuous mapping , we define the pushforward  by

When  is surjective, there are both a left adjoint and a right adjoint to , yielding two pullback operators :

 

Given  and  we can define the semidirect product  by

There are probably more natural products, but I'll stop here for now.

Polytopic Ambidistributions

Definition 6: The polytopic ambidistributions  are the (incomplete) sublattice of  generated by .

Some conjectures about this:

  • For finite , an ambidistributions  is polytopic iff there is a finite polytope complex  on  s.t. for any cell  of  is affine.
  • For finite , a cramble set  is polytopic iff it is the occlusion hall of a finite set of polytopes in .
  •  and  from Example 3 are polytopic.
  1. ^

    The non-convex shape  reminds us that ambidistributions need not be convex or concave.

  2. ^

    The expression "cramble set" is meant to suggest a combination of "credal set" with "ambi".

One reason to doubt chaos theory’s usefulness is that we don’t need fancy theories to tell us something is impossible. Impossibility tends to make itself obvious.

 

This claim seems really weird to me. Why do you think that's true? A lot of things we accomplished with technology today might seem impossible to someone from 1700. On the other hand, you could have thought that e.g. perpetuum mobile, or superluminal motion, or deciding whether a graph is 3-colorable in worst-case polynomial time, or transmitting information with a rate higher than Shannon-Hartley is possible if you didn't know the relevant theory.

Vanessa KosoyΩ19302

Here's the sketch of an AIT toy model theorem that in complex environments without traps, applying selection pressure reliably produces learning agents. I view it as an example of Wentworth's "selection theorem" concept.

Consider any environment  of infinite Kolmogorov complexity (i.e. uncomputable). Fix a computable reward function

Suppose that there exists a policy  of finite Kolmogorov complexity (i.e. computable) that's optimal for  in the slow discount limit. That is,

Then,  cannot be the only environment with this property. Otherwise, this property could be used to define  using a finite number of bits, which is impossible[1]. Since  requires infinitely many more bits to specify than  and , there has to be infinitely many environments with the same property[2]. Therefore,  is a reinforcement learning algorithm for some infinite class of hypothesis.

Moreover, there are natural examples of  as above. For instance, let's construct  as an infinite sequence of finite communicating infra-RDP refinements that converges to an unambiguous (i.e. "not infra") environment. Since each refinement involves some arbitrary choice, "most" such  have infinite Kolmogorov complexity. In this case,  exists: it can be any learning algorithm for finite communicating infra-RDP with arbitrary number of states.

Besides making this a rigorous theorem, there are many additional questions for further investigation:

  • Can we make similar claims that incorporate computational complexity bounds? It seems that it should be possible to at least constraint our algorithms to be PSPACE in some sense, but not obvious how to go beyond that (maybe it would require the frugal universal prior).
  • Can we argue that  must be an infra-Bayesian learning algorithm? Relatedly, can we make a variant where computable/space-bounded policies can only attain some part of the optimal asymptotic reward of ?
  • The setting we described requires that all the traps in  can be described in a finite number of bits. If this is not the case, can we make a similar sort of an argument that implies  is Bayes-optimal for some prior over a large hypothesis class?
  1. ^

    Probably, making this argument rigorous requires replacing the limit with a particular regret bound. I ignore this for the sake of simplifying the core idea.

  2. ^

    There probably is something more precise that can be said about how "large" this family of environment is. For example, maybe it must be uncountable.

Can you explain what's your definition of "accuracy"? (the 87.7% figure)
Does it correspond to some proper scoring rule?

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